Friday 28 November 2014

Editor's Choice

Participation mechanisms beyond European Citizens’ initiative

Despite a common misconception, the European Citizens’ Initiative is not the alpha and omega of EU citizens’ engagement in EU decision-making.  There is a variety of other mechanisms that allow EU citizens to influence EU agenda.

For example, an average civic society organisation would hardly ever opt in favour of a logistically as challenging high-cost way for influencing EU decision-making as collecting 1 million signatures  across the European Union – it is much more likely that this organisation would rather:

a)       contact a member of European Parliament who would then suggest to the European Parliament to come up with its own report asking the European Commission to propose a legislative initiative on some subject (the European Parliament has good track record in complying with such requests);

b)      Participate in public hearings, consultations organized with by the European Commission or by European Parliament on some specific type of a new legislative proposal;

c)       Contact its national government when it is pondering its national position on some new directive or regulation proposed by the European Commission and deliberating its most likely response in the framework of the Council of the EU.

It is the later method – taking part in EU decision-making via shaping the national positions on EU level  – that was subject of a research that was conducted in three EU member states: Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland.

The report uncovered an uncomfortable truth: that there are few civic society organisations that are capable of participating in shaping the national positions at a stage when the European Commission has already come up with a draft. This problem is particularly acute for smaller member states, such as Latvia, that do not provide enough financial support to  civil society organisations that would enable such organisations to not only share their expertise on the local and national level issues, but also to provide strong argumentation for the European Union’s policy.

Those few who do participate – tend to struggle. First of all, it is usually a challenge to find a list of EU issues where the national government is elaborating its national position. Second, some governments (or even some ministries within the same government!) tend to view the draft national positions as a confidential document, and does not allow a civic society organisation to look inside. Those civic society organisations that do manage to make their views known to their national government – they are hardly ever informed on whether their expertise has been taken onboard in the final edition of the national position and what happens later,  when the national position has left the country and landed in the preparatory bodies of the Council.

So to be brief: overall it doesn’t seem to be working that well. Nevertheless, the research has also uncovered some inspiring success stories of citizen engagement and also some fascinating experiments in making the process work better both for civic society organisations’ and the government officials involved.  There are also specific recommendations for each of the three member states to improve their systems of consulting the civic society organisations on EU matters.

Our organisation organized an opinion survey in Latvia about the preferred means of taking part in EU decision-making in September, 2014. In the context of citizen participation, Latvia is a particularly important country as it is in Latvia (along with Italy) where the citizens feel most sceptical about whether their voices are heard at the EU level.  Out of different engagement methods 9% chose public hearing, 9% – shaping their government’s national position, 14% – European Citizens’ initiative, 16% – contacting a member of European Parliament elected in Latvia.

There were two more popular choices. What were they?  22% – no answer; 33% – prefer not to engage in EU decision-making at all. That’s bad.

To me the results of the survey signify that the EU and national government should work on strengthening all methods of civil dialogue – not just the European Citizens’ initiative – important though it may be. And one of the most meaningful methods accessible to national civic society organisations:  a meaningful engagement on EU policy at the national level, as advisors of their governments on issues that need to be defended in the Council and in negotiations with the European Parliament.



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Juncker’s investment plan gets cool reception

Posted by Open Europe blog team on 26th November 2014

This is the name which has been given to the long touted €315bn investment fund which European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has put front and centre of his programme to deliver jobs and growth. The key points of the proposal (EC press release, Juncker speech, Katainen speech) are:

  • €315bn investment from 2015 – 2017. This is made up of a €16bn guarantee from the EU budget (a 50% guarantee from €8bn of the budget) and €5bn from the European Investment Bank (EIB). This money will be used as a guarantee to raise the targeted €315bn from private financing on the market.**
  • Of the total spend €240bn will go towards long term investments and €75bn to SMEs/mid-cap companies.
  • The EFSI will be under the umbrella of the EIB but will have different goals and do a different type of lending.
  • In conjunction with the EFSI the Commission will create a “project pipeline” along with technical assistance to help identify viable projects for investment at EU level.
  • The investment plan will also contain a road map to remove sector specific regulations that hamper investment, with a focus on the financial sector to tie in with the push towards a Capital Markets Union.
This is the opening salvo of a plan which has long been muted. Judging by the initial reactions, the plan leaves something to be desired. Some thoughts below:
  • As an opening salvo, the plan has already been watered down from what many had expected it to be – a real attempt at fiscal stimulus. Whether or not you agree with that prospect, it’s clear this plan does not constitute such an attempt. As it now enters the negotiation phase with approval from the member states and European parliament needed it could still be restricted and fudged further.
  • This process seems very similar to previous attempts to create such a fund in 2012 (discussed by us here) and the failed attempt to leverage the European Financial Stability Facility from 2011 (which fell down on the reluctance of the ECB to be involved and the level of public guarantees were not sufficient and too highly correlated with potential risks). History suggests pinning significant hopes on these sorts of plans is not usually a good approach.
  • It’s not clear that this buffer will be enough to encourage private investors to take on greater risk. There are numerous factors which are leading to a lack of private investment, risk (at these levels) is only part of it.
  • Furthermore, to the point above, reports now suggest that the €21bn will actually be used by the EIB to borrow €63bn in bonds and cash which will then be used as a first loss buffer for the private investors – however, this does not seem to be mentioned in the press release, factsheets or Q&A. Additionally, we’re not sure what rating these bonds issued solely as loss protection would get or who would want to invest in them (seems akin to the lower riskier mezzanine tranches of asset backed securities).
  • The promise to review the regulatory issues and create a central system of projects could actually prove to be more important than the funds themselves. That said, we have often heard the first point and the Commission has never followed through. The latter project has potential but the focus will be around “EU value added” and “EU objectives”. We’re not sure why the EU thinks it has a better idea of the returns and benefits on private investment than the market more broadly. Furthermore, these objectives already cloud what should be a simple idea – promote economic growth.
  • More generally, questions can be asked about how these funds will be targeted. The focus seems heavily on pan-European infrastructure. While there are sectors where this could be useful – energy and high-tech – such a rigid focus is not needed for a general fund. Many parts of Europe (notably Spain) loaded up on infrastructure in the boom years; they do not really need more of it. What is really needed across Europe is investment in human capital, (re)training and R&D.
  • All this once again highlights the huge amount of waste inside the EU budget, which could of course fill some of these roles. It also raises questions about whether the EIB should rethink its investment priorities.
Overall, the response from all sides has been very lukewarm. The plan seems very similar to previous iterations and, for better or worse, does not involve new money. Negotiations are likely to further impact the structure, while questions can be raised about the target and agenda included in the fund. The accompanying proposals for a project pipeline and improving regulation could be useful and tie in with plans for a single market in capital. That said, the EU’s track record on these fronts is not good and will likely take some time for any real impact to be seen.

**Correction: A previous version of this blog post said €294bn would be raised from private finance. However, the aim will actually be to use the €21bn as a guarantee on issuing €315bn worth of bonds on the market, meaning the entire €315bn will be private financing.

Higher inflation does not guarantee more jobs

Posted by Eberhard Rhein on 26th November 2014

On Friday (21 November) Mario Draghi, the ECB President, has provoked fireworks at EU stock exchanges after promising he would do all in his power to push inflation in the Euro – zone up to 2%, the ceiling considered as the “target” for EU and US central banks.

Expectations of rising prices may give a push to investments, as they raise nominal profitability. But those having invested in savings accounts or bonds will have to pay for it by a depreciation of their assets.

If that is the price for reducing high unemployment it might be acceptable.

But is the ECB really capable of inducing more private and public investment?

After all, it can only do more of the same, i.e. inject liquidity into the market by buying private or even public bonds or mortgages.

Mario Draghi`s announcement raises, however, two more systemic questions:

Can modern economies ensure high employment only at the price of moderate inflation?

Why are economists so scared about the risks of deflation, though it has been an extremely rare and temporary phenomenon in the last 50 years? Why is the present 0.4% inflation rate in the Euro-zone a risk for the economy?

EU inflation rates reflect very different national trends, from Greece and Bulgaria with prices having fallen by 1.8 and 1.3% respectively in October 2014 and Romania, Austria and Finland registering price rises between 1.8 and 1.2 per cent.

Present inflation rates are substantially lower than the 2.2% average during 1991-2014, during which the Euro-Area registered a moderate average GDP growth of 1.5%. During these two decades a deflationary sign has appeared only once, in July 2009, in the early phase of the EU recession. Is the deflationary nightmare not exaggerated ?

We should appreciate the present price stability even if it goes along with excessive unemployment. It removes illusions about income and wealth and certain costs caused by necessary inflationary adaptations:

Changing millions of prices become as unnecessary as wage indexing.

Wage negotiations can fully focus on productivity rises.

Will Europe ever again witness growth rates of more than 2%? Where should that growth come from beyond reintegrating millions of unemployed into the labour market, rising productivity and retirement age? Has an injection of liquidity the slightest impact on these three variables?

Eberhard Rhein, Brussels, 21/11/2014

25 years into transformation – what’s next?

Posted by adamczyzewski on 26th November 2014

A conference commemorating 25 years of Poland’s political transformation was held at the Warsaw School of Economics on November 19th 2014. Interested in what conclusions can be drawn from past events and how these can be used to shape the future, I decided to participate. The programme of the conference was a particular attraction, featuring speeches by such reformers as Leszek Balcerowicz, Jacob Frenkel (Chairman of JPMorgan Chase International) and Stanisław Gomułka, who were advisers to Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s administration 25 years ago, as well as Lajos Bokros, who stood behind Hungary’s reforms, and Oleh Havrylyshyn, a lecturer at the University of Toronto and Ukraine’s former deputy minister of finance. Further stoking my interest, the conference was held under the patronage of President Bronisław Komorowski, rectors of Katowice, Kraków, Poznań and Wrocław Universities of Economics and of the Warsaw School of Economics. In Poland, the economic discourse on evaluating the transformation is dominated by the critics of the shock therapy, whereas other nations tend to regard the achievement with undisguised admiration. Jacob Frenkel summed it up wonderfully, quoting Mark Twain, who – asked how he liked Wagner’s music – said: “it’s better than it sounds.” Lajos Bokros argued that being able to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the transformation, and under official government patronage at that, is an extraordinary privilege few countries that followed Poland on the path to transformation can enjoy. Sadly, Hungary is not among them.

Stanisław Gomułka delivered an interesting lecture in which he matched the lessons of the transformation with Poland’s current challenges of sustaining economic growth. He argued that the biggest threat to maintaining a high growth rate is the middle income trap, which can be avoided by expanding Poland’s innovation capacities. This coincides with my view of the matter, which I have presented on this blog. Professor Gomułka believed that the Czech Republic and Hungary have already fallen into the trap, but Poland may yet avert it. His arguments, which represent a strong message to economic policy makers, were the following:

‘A long-term economic growth rate per capita depends nearly entirely on the rate of qualitative changes, such as technological and institutional innovations as well as employees’ skills. In well developed countries these changes result primarily from the innovativeness of the entire world sector of R&D (research and development) and the national level of education. In less developed countries, that is the group of so-called catching-up countries to which Poland belongs, their own innovative activity is marginal and will be insignificant for yet a number of years , while the access to the latest innovation will continue to be strongly limited. Technological changes in economy within this group depend nearly entirely on the absorption of foreign innovations, primarily those easily accessible. This absorption occurs mainly through the channel of investment activity. In the case of high investment in relation to GDP, technological changes in the catching-up countries, in percentages terms, may be for a certain period of time even several times bigger than in the most developed countries. In Poland, as a result of transformation, the access to the world resources of knowledge and technology of older generations as well as the absorption capacity of the economy have considerably increased. This explains the paradox of a high innovativeness of the Polish economy and a low innovativeness of the Polish R&D. However, with the GDP per capita at a level of 50-70% of the most developed countries, further fast technological progress of a catching-up country is becoming more difficult, as access to technologies of newer generations in necessary. At this level of development the process of catching-up may be stopped. Economists speak about the so-called middle-development trap or middle-income trap. Further progress in gap bridging is possible, but the pace of catching up as a rule becomes slower. This pace may be sustained or the pace of the growth slowdown may be reduced in two ways. One way is to strongly raise the country’s own innovation and absorption capacity, especially directly by companies. The other is to care more about the factors which increase the attractiveness of the country for investors from the most developed countries. These factors include for example a good quality infrastructure, high quality vocational and university education, stable and entrepreneur-friendly legal and financial system, low political and exchange rate risk, low interest rates and low inflation.’ For a complete text, see:

In future entries, I will talk about how we can successfully bolster the Polish economy’s capacity for innovation.


« Nous sommes et seront toujours une Nation d’immigrants » (Barack Obama)

Posted by EU-Logos on 26th November 2014

Jeudi 20 novembre 2014 Barak Obama a annoncé des nouvelles mesures qui détermineraient la régularisation d’au moins 4 sur 11,4 millions des migrants actuellement résidant illégalement sur le territoire américain. Sont-elles un message positif et solidaire, dont l’Europe doit s’inspirer ?

Qui est concerné?

Le décret présidentiel concerne les immigrés, sans casier judiciaire, résidant depuis 5 ans aux États-Unis, parents d’enfants nés légalement sur le territoire. Ce qui exclue 6,5 millions de personnes, qui, par exemple, n’ont pas d’enfants ou qui ont divorcé. D’autres mesures avaient déjà été prises par Obama en 2012, grâce au programme Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), à l’encontre des enfants irréguliers, prolongeant leur permis de séjours.

Comme souligné dans ses déclarations, les nouvelles règles ne comprennent pas ceux qui ont migré récemment, ni les immigrés irréguliers futurs, éloignant ainsi toute crainte d’augmentation des entrées illégales. En outre, il ne s’agit pas d’octroyer la citoyenneté : au contraire, les migrants restent exclus de certains droits. Notamment, ils n’auront pas accès à la protection médicale et à d’autres programmes d’aide sociale, dont bénéficient les américains.

Quoi de neuf ?

Néanmoins, le plan d’action annoncé par Obama, parmi d’autres mesures, prévoit des soulagements aux décisions d’expulsions et accorde un permis de travail temporaire de trois ans. En générale, la plupart des dispositions préannonces s’adressent aux migrants à des fins d’étude, de recherche d’emploi ou encore pour des raisons professionnelles. En effet, le Président américain a beaucoup insisté sur les bénéfices économiques comme conséquences directes aux initiatives envisagées. En outre, à l’égard des individus, les nouvelles dispositions offrent des garanties fondamentales en termes de sécurité, diminuant les risques de rapatriement forcé.

Point critiques

Toutefois, selon Antonio Ginatta, US advocacy director à Human Rights Watch, malgré les améliorations assurées à l’égard des migrants, ‘les mesures sont incomplètes.’ En effet, elles retardent de trois ans le risque d’éloignement, sans cibler d’autres problématiques cruciales, liées notamment à l’intégration.

De plus, le programme concerne un nombre restreint d’individus. Récemment, son caractère exclusif a été confirmé par le Migration Policy Centre sur la base des résultats du programme Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), approuvé en 2012 et concernant les cas d’expulsion de jeunes entrés comme mineurs non autorisés. Selon les estimations du centre de recherche, seulement 55% des personnes concernées ont  eu un accès effectif aux bénéfices prévus. Cela principalement à cause d’obstacles matériels, notamment en raison de la complexité de la procédure administrative à suivre, des nombreux documents à présenter afin de prouver l’éligibilité ; mais surtout la plupart des migrants, ayant un travail non qualifié, ne peut pas soutenir le coût financier d’application, environ 500€.

 Véritable solidarité ou stratégie électorale ?

D’ailleurs le contexte entourant ces mesures, ne peut pas être négligé: le mandat d’Obama vient de subir un coup dur qui menace les résultats des futures élections en 2016. Au-delà des aspects polémiques du débat, il faut tenir compte que, selon les estimations du Pew Research, plus que la moitié des migrants non autorisés venant du Mexique (55%) seraient éligibles aux mesures annoncés ou aux programmes déjà existants. Par ailleurs, le poids électoral des Latinos, réguliers, n’est pas négligeable, même si 35% des électeurs enregistrés ne soutiennent pas les mesures prises par le Président. De surcroît, certains doutes ont été soulevés par rapport à son objectif réel, alors que, comme le rappelle le quotidien français Libération, le nombre d’expulsions des migrants non autorisés en 2013 s’élève à 438,421 individus (d’après les chiffres de Pew Research).

..Et en Europe ?

Il faut d’abord constater qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une régularisation du migrant, mais plutôt d’un prolongement de son permis de séjour , notamment à des fins de travail. Cela étant dit, l’instrument Européen le plus proche aux finalités des mesures prises, serait le permis de résidence qui désigne ‘toute autorisation valide pour au moins trois mois, émise par les autorités d’un État membre et permettant à un citoyen non-UE de séjourner légalement sur son territoire.’

Selon les statistiques publiées par Eurostat en octobre 2014, en 2013 les 28 États membres ont délivré 2,36 millions nouveaux permis de résidence. A l’exclusion d’autres raisons (29,1%), ils ont été accordés principalement pour des motifs familiaux (28,5%), suivis par les raisons d’emploi (22,7%) et, ensuite, d’éducation (19,7%). Royaume-Uni, Pologne et Italie sont au sommet de la liste. Toutefois, par rapport à la population du pays, les champions sont Malte, Chypre, Royaume-Uni et Suède. Les Européens, enfin, semblent être plus accueillant à l’égard des Ukrainiens, 10,0% du nombre total de nouveaux titres, principalement à de fins d’emploi ; 8,5% des permis ont été délivrés aux Indiens, 7,3% aux citoyens des Etats-Unis, suivis par les Chinois, avec 7,0%, migrant pour la plupart pour des raisons d’éducation.

Cependant, dans une perspective à plus à longue terme, le rapport Eurostat du 18 novembre 2014 affirme qu’en 2012, 818 000 personnes ont acquis la nationalité d’un État membre de l’UE28, plus que 85% étant citoyens d’un pays hors-UE. Du côté européen, Hongrie, Suède et Pologne ont été les meilleurs élèves ; d’autres part, la naturalisation a concerné en premier lieu les ressortissants du Maroc, de la Turquie, de l’Inde, d’Équateur et d’Irak, qui ensemble ont représenté le 25% du nombre total de nouveaux citoyens de l’UE en 2012.


Elena Sbarai

En savoir plus:

     -. BBC news, What does US immigration overhaul mean? 21 November 2014

     -. Pew Research, Obama’s expected immigration order: How many would be affected? November 14, 2014

     -.Pew Research, How Obama’s executive order will impact immigrants, by birth country, 21 novembre 2014

     -. Human Rights Watch, US: Immigration Plan Laudable But Incomplete, Harsh Treatment at Border, Detention of Families Unaddressed, 21 November 2014

     -. MPI, As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program 20 November 2014

     -. Eurostat, Acquisition de nationalité dans l’UE, Les États membres de l’UE28 ont octroyé la nationalité à près de 820 000 personnes en 2012, 175/2014 – 18 novembre 2014 FR EN

     -. Eurostat Permis de résidence dans l’UE28 pour les citoyens extracommunautaires, Plus de 2,3 millions nouveaux titres de séjour délivrés dans l’UE28 en 2013, 159/2014 – 22 octobre 2014 FR EN

Classé dans:IMMIGRATION, Politique d'intégration

Addressing the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) nightmare

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 25th November 2014

By Sorin MOISA MEP The importance of ISDS is blown out of proportion by its supporters, some of whom may suffer from a degree of strategic blindness. It is simply not going to be the end of the world if these clauses are remodelled or even eliminated.

What EU funded low-carbon energy solutions in Polish regions?

Posted by Bankwatch on 24th November 2014

The low-carbon energy ambitions of Polish regions for future EU funding are very diverse with only a few promising cases as an analysis of the Operational Programmes of Polish regions shows.

by Julia Krzyszkowska, cross-posted from the Bankwatch blog

Poland is currently in the final stages of planning how European funds under EU Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020 will be invested. Yet, beyond the national level, also Poland’s 16 regions (voivodeships) are about to conclude negotiations with the European Commission about the final shape of the Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs).

The results will show whether Poland’s regions are on the path to take full advantage of the potential of EU funds’ for the country’s sustainable development – a potential that is not to be underestimated. More than half of the EUR 9 billion that are earmarked for the low-carbon economy in Poland will be allocated and managed by the regional authorities. (For comparison, the total allocations of Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 for Bulgaria is EUR 7.59 billion, for Croatia EUR 8.61 billion.)

Bankwatch and Polish Green Network analysed the final drafts of the ROPs as they were presented to the European Commission. The analysis shows how ambitious (or not) the Polish regions are to invest in a low-carbon economy, in particularly when it comes to renewable energy and energy efficiency in residential buildings.

Report: Recommendations for the last state of programming of EU Regional Funds 2014-2020 for energy projects (pdf)

An important indicator is whether ordinary Polish households will be able to benefit from EU funds, for example through lower energy bills and greater security of energy supply. For smaller, localised investments, such as improving the energy standard in residential buildings or the production of citizen-owned energy from small renewables installations, the decisions made by the regional authorities will be essential.

Map: Allocation of funds for the thematic objective 4 on low-carbon economy as percentage of the total allocation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) – Click image for full size

As the map above shows the level of ambition shown by Polish regions varies significantly.

While Śląskie in the South of Poland plans to spend almost 30 per cent of its European Regional Development Plan funds for low-carbon economy measures, there are many regions who keep the allocations close to the minimum 15 per cent, prescribed by the Polish Partnership Agreement.

While indicating the overall importance placed on the low-carbon economy objective by different regions, the map does not show their spending priorities within this area.

Energy efficiency in residential buildings

Going into more detail, one of the key elements we evaluated [1] was the availability of funding for energy efficiency in housing. The residential housing sector in Poland consumes over 30 per cent of all energy used in the country. The generally very poor energy standard of buildings resembles that of the 1970s in Western Europe and means a huge waste of energy and heat.

These losses could be avoided thanks to investments in deep retrofitting, estimated to result in up to 70 per cent energy savings.

Graph: Funds for energy retrofit of residential buildings (in euros and as a percentage of all ERDF funds in a region)

Looking at the Regional Operational Programmes, the allocations for improving energy efficiency in residential buildings are alarmingly low in relation to the entire amount of funds intended to support a low-carbon economy, and even more so in relation to the total ERDF allocation in a given region (see graph).

According to our analysis, the public sector seems to have priority in the regional spending plans with more than twice as much funds allocated to improving energy efficiency in state and municipality-owned buildings than in residential houses.

Yet, it is especially in residential buildings where energy efficiency measures should get priority funding given that such investments are more difficult to undertake for private households who — in contrast to public institutions — do not have sufficient financial resources or access to subsidies and preferential loans.

Investments in retrofitting multifamily houses could significantly alleviate the financial burden faced by many Polish families and improve their quality of life. Research by the Polish Institute for Sustainable Development and the Warsaw Institute for Economic Studies shows that Polish households spend on average around 15 per cent of their disposable incomes on energy bills. According to another research paper (pdf) on energy poverty in the EU, more than 20 per cent are unable to afford comfortable temperature levels at home during the winter.

What’s next?

Once negotiations with the European Commission are finalised, it will be up to the regions themselves to prepare the more detailed implementation documents that outline exactly who will be able to apply for funding from the EU budget, for what kind of project and on what terms.

Our report “Green Energy for All: Six recommendations for the last stage of programming of EU regional funds 2014-2020 for energy projects” contains some key demands for the last, crucial stage of the EU funds programming, and recommendations on how to make them reality.

These recommendations regard:

  • allowing for deep retrofitting of residential buildings,
  • supporting RES microinstallations and prosumer energy,
  • investing in renewables to improve air quality in Polish cities,
  • financing environmental education and information campaigns,
  • ensuring high biodiversity protection standards in energy-related projects,
  • providing support for community energy and partnerships.

We call on Polish voivodeships to show ambition, go for quality and to invest rather than just spend.


1. The other elements are prosumer renewable energy, air quality, environmental education, biodiversity protection and communities and partnerships in the energy sector.

Owen Paterson: Has he called for #Brexit or #EUReform?

Posted by Open Europe blog team on 24th November 2014

BBC reports is is #Brexit
Former Cabinet Minister Owen Paterson has just made a hard hitting speech on the UK’s relationship with the EU. He made a familiar case that the EU is as much a political union as an economic one. He concluded that the UK should remain in the ‘economic’ Single Market but remove itself from the political union.

A clear position? Well, staying in the Single Market, while removing the political aspects of the EU can mean different things – it could mean remaining in the EU while pairing back the worst aspects of the EU’s state building or leaving altogether and negotiating instead a trade agreement in order to retain access to the Single Market.

There has been some understandable ambiguity in the reporting of Paterson’s position, this is our under-standing:
Times reports it is "reform"

Firstly, Paterson believes the issue should be solved via a referendum in 2017. But his proposed question is not entity straight forward. His preferred options are:

Yes: The UK leaves the EU and joins the EEA, like Norway; or
No: The UK stays in the EU and joins the euro

An interesting choice, that excludes the possibility of better EU terms or even continuing as a non-Euro state. However, it is clear that Paterson’s negotiation is not a ‘re-negotiation’ but a simple negotiation for #Brexit. He favours joining Iceland, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Norway in EFTA and joining EFTA’s deal with the EU – known as the EEA (of which Switzerland is not part). And in order to conclude his exit terms and EEA membership he seeks to use a provision of the Lisbon Treaty that allows a two year period after notifying the EU of an intention to exit to attempt to finalise continuity terms – Article 50. We're sceptical of the EEA model as an alternative for the UK outside the EU, at least as currently set out, but let's leave that one to the side for the moment.

It has been argued previously that Article 50 could be used to trigger a full renegotiation of the terms of the UK’s membership within the EU. However Paterson’s proposal is more straightforward – he wants to immediately start to negotiate Brexit terms in 2015 so that a clear proposition is on the table for the 2017 referendum. That may have the benefit of providing the clarity that has so far been lacking in the ‘out’ case – but has three obvious drawbacks.
  1. What happens if the other EU states do not wish to negotiate prior to a referendum outcome – they cannot be forced to.
  2. What happens if the UK votes to stay in – would the other EU member states be compelled to cancel the exit application? Perhaps but at what price?
  3. Article 50 isn't a great negotiating tool. We have previously weighed up the pros and cons of using Article 50 below, but what's clear is that it's giving away a lot leverage over the UK's terms of exit (for example, the final deal will be decided by a qualified majority vote of which the UK won't be part).
Source: Gaming Europe's Future by Open Europe
Paterson may however argue that Article 50 is a legal mechanism and something as important as the UK’s membership will ultimately be decided politically, in the UK and the EU level.

New study warns of sugar content in children’s juice drinks

Posted by Chris Whitehouse on 24th November 2014

Political Consultant Sam Blainey highlights a new report on sugar levels in children’s drinks.

To read Sam’s article, please click here.

The Whitehouse Consultancy is one of Europe’s leading public affairs and communications agencies.

Boeing 787 ecoDemonstrator begins new round of sustainability tests

Posted by Boeing on 24th November 2014

Boeing has launched a new round of tests with its specially outfitted B-787 ecoDemonstrator, employing it to test more than two dozen technologies to improve the aircraft’s environmental performance. The tests will evaluate software to improve the plane’s operational efficiencies, remote sensors that cut down on wiring, improvements in flight controls and special anti-icing wing coatings.

Other tests include automated, satellite-based continuous-descent spacing to make landings more efficient, new greenhouse gas sensors, real-time turbulence reports, cutting edge instrument landing systems and wing access doors made from recycled carbon fiber.

“The ecoDemonstrator is focused on technologies that can improve airlines’ gate-to-gate efficiency and reduce fuel consumption, emissions and noise,” says Boeing Commercial Airplanes president and CEO Ray Conner. “Through the ecoDemonstrator Program, Boeing continues to invest in innovation that benefits the environment and our customers.” The 787 joins a B-737 ecoDemonstrator that included wing and fan nozzle improvements.

The ecoDemonstrator program is part of Boeing’s commitment  to improving sustainability in flight and its goals are aligned with the EU focus on sustainable transport. The 787 Dreamliner itself represents a 20 percent improvement in efficiency compared with similarly sized aircraft.

Tipps für einen erfolgreichen Start ins Gastrogewerbe

Posted by annemoeller on 24th November 2014

Endlich der eigene Chef sein, selbstverantwortlich arbeiten, Selbstverwirklichung, die eigene Kreativität entfalten, ohne dass jemand die eigenen Ideen begrenzt oder einem hereinredet – die Gründe für den Schritt in die Selbstständigkeit sind vielfältig. Das ist in der Gastronomie nicht anders als in anderen Gewerben. Von der Überlegung, sich selbstständig zu machen, bis hin zur endgültigen Entscheidung ist es jedoch ein weiter Weg. Denn die selbstständige Arbeit ist trotz aller Freiheiten auch mit Schattenseiten verbunden. Den Sprung ins kalte Wasser scheuen daher viele. Allerdings schrecken auch zahlreiche Menschen vor der Selbstständigkeit zurück, weil sie kaum oder keine Informationen darüber haben, wie sie diesen Schritt realisieren sollen und ein eigenes Restaurant oder eine Bar eröffnen können. Oder sie dramatisieren die damit verbundenen Risiken. Bei der richtigen Beratung über die Selbstständigkeit im Gastronomiegewerbe können zahlreiche falsche Vorstellungen und Irrtümer abgebaut und Mut gemacht werden, sein eigenes Restaurant zu eröffnen. Manchmal jedoch reichen bereits einige Tipps aus.


(Foto: Pixabay)

Eine gründliche Vorarbeit ist unerlässlich

Vor der Eröffnung eines Gastronomiebetriebes sollte sich der angehende selbstständige Restaurantbetreiber oder Barbesitzer zunächst einmal in Ruhe hinsetzen und überlegen, was alles mit der Eröffnung eines Gastronomiebetriebes in Verbindung steht. Welche rechtlichen Fragen hängen mit dem Betrieb eines Lokals zusammen, etwa zum Alkoholausschank und zu baulichen Veränderungen? Und damit ist es noch nicht getan, für die Eröffnung einer Gaststätte oder einer Bar sind weitere Überlegungen grundlegend. Zunächst ist ein Gastronomiebetreiber eine Person, die Gästen Speisen und Getränke anbietet, in einem Gastronomiebetrieb werden ebendiese Speisen und Getränke von den Gästen gekauft und oftmals auch umgehend verzehrt. Klingt banal, doch diese Feststellung ist wichtig, denn gerade Banalitäten werden gern übersehen. Ein Gastronomiebetrieb ist also ein Geschäft, das auf Gäste angewiesen ist. Damit verbunden ist, dass der Erfolg eines Lokals stark standortabhängig ist. In der Regel ist es ideal, wenn der Standort in einem Gebiet liegt, an dem zahlreiche Menschen wohnen und Laufkundschaft vorhanden ist. Eine folgende zielgruppenorientierte Forschung gibt Aufschluss darüber, welcher Standort am geeignetsten für das jeweilige Gastronomiegewerbe ist. In einem Stadtteil mit einem hohen Anteil an jungen Menschen ist beispielsweise eine Cocktailbar besser aufgehoben als in einem Stadtteil, in dem hauptsächlich Menschen im Rentenalter wohnen.

Was macht die Konkurrenz?

Im Zuge der Wahl des richtigen Standortes sollte auch die Konkurrenzsituation evaluiert werden. Denn auch diese betreibt zielgruppenorientierte Betriebe und hat ihre Hausaufgaben gemacht. Die Fragen sind also, wie viele Konkurrenten teilen sich den Markt bereits auf und welche davon sind schon fest etabliert und könnten Neulinge schnell wieder herausdrängen? Doch niemand muss gleich das Handtuch werfen, wenn sich am ausgewählten Standort bereits Konkurrenten befinden. In den meisten Fällen ist noch eine Nische offen, die von den anderen Lokalen nicht besetzt wurde und welche die Zielgruppe dennoch anspricht. Eine solche Nische gilt es, auszumachen und ein Gastronomiegewerbe mit diesem Alleinstellungsmerkmal zu etablieren. Dies kann sowohl mit einer besonderen Auswahl der Speisen oder Getränke erreicht werden, die den potenziellen Gästen angeboten werden, als auch durch eine Einrichtung, die sich von der Konkurrenz absetzt. Bei den Speisen und Getränken ist zudem immer auf eine hohe Qualität zu achten.

Immer ein Auge auf den Markt haben

Im Gastronomiegewerbe gilt wie in kaum einem anderen Gewerbe, dass man immer ein Auge auf die Marktsituation haben sollte. Wer schläft, verliert hier unweigerlich. In der heutigen schnelllebigen Zeit sind die Menschen sehr sprunghaft. Ein Lokal, das gestern noch den Zeitgeist der Zielgruppe getroffen hat, kann morgen bereits nicht mehr beachtet werden. Es gilt also, den Puls der Zeit zu spüren. Auch auf eventuelle Schwankungen der Wirtschaft reagiert die Gastronomiebranche neben den Kulturbetrieben als erstes, denn wenn den Menschen weniger Geld zur Verfügung steht, sparen sie zuerst an den privaten Vergnügungen und geben weniger Geld in Gaststätten oder Bars aus. Auch hier gilt es, stets flexibel zu reagieren.




Ukraine will scrap gas subsidies

Posted by Eberhard Rhein on 24th November 2014

For many years Ukraine has wasted huge amounts of energy through exorbitant subsidies on gas consumption, coupled with in-transparent multiple gas prices and large-scale corruption. Due to these factors, Ukraine has become one of the most wasteful energy consuming countries in the world. With household gas prices substantially lower than in any other European country and lower than the wholesale purchase prices, this regime had long become unsustainable.

Under the new political leadership it will finally disappear. There will be a single wholesale gas price which will cover the supply costs and yield a decent profit for the state-owned gas company. The IMF and the EU had conditioned their financial assistance to a profound reform of the Ukrainian gas market.

Gas prices will have to more than double, which cannot happen overnight. This huge rise of prices will induce consumers to a much more economic use of gas and higher energy efficiency. By the same token it will dampen the social impact of the price rise.

The future generated profits will be used to financing improvements of the gas distribution, improving energy efficiency and offering specific assistance to vulnerable groups of society.

This will be a revolution for Ukraine and other the countries still indulging in the luxury of fossil subsidies. It will not be easy to “sell” politically. But Ukrainians, having shown they can be tough, are likely to accept a higher gas price in exchange for security of supply.

If the anticipated increase of energy efficiency happens in the wake of the phasing out of subsidies Ukraine might become an example for other developing and emerging countries to be followed.

Eberhard Rhein, Brussels, 20/11/2014

EU und USA und Putin

Posted by Günter K.V. Vetter on 23rd November 2014

Je stärker Putin zu rhetorischen Mitteln greift, umso mehr treffen die Sanktionen seine russische Heimat. Wobei die eigentliche Wirkung darin besteht, dass durch Fracking und Opec-Zurückhaltung das Erdöl im Jahr 2014 im Grunde zu billig ist. Doch hinter dem Dumpingpreis steckt ein Machtkalkül: Weil der Gas- an den Ölpreis gekoppelt ist, fehlen Russland wichtige Einnahmen. Zugleich wird durch die Sanktionen der Ex- und Import behindert. Und das alles zusammen verschärft das Verhältnis zwischen West und Ost. EU und USA wollen dieses Kräftemessen um jeden Preis gewinnen. Nach einer vernünftigen Außenpolitik klingt das nicht.

What tech can do for policy

Posted by Laurens Cerulus on 23rd November 2014

ICT is coming to the aid of policy makers, with a number of EU projects using into tech and computation tools to figure out what's happening in policy making. EU Community, too, is on the cutting edge of this development.

UK looking down and out on banker’s bonus cap challenge

Posted by Open Europe blog team on 23rd November 2014

It’s a bad start to what looks as if it could be a very challenging day for the UK government with UKIP looking likely to win the by-election in Rochester and Strood.

This morning the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Advocate General Niilo Jaaskinen issued his opinion on the UK’s challenge against the EU’s banker’s bonus cap and it does not make good reading for the UK. Jaaskinen suggested that “all the UK’s pleas should be rejected and that the Court of Justice dismiss the action”. The key points of his reasoning are:
  • The legal basis of the legislation cannot be challenged since remuneration in this sector “impacts directly on the risk profile of financial institutions”, since these operate freely across the EU this can have impacts on markets across the EU.
  • Jaaskinen “accepts that the determination of the level of pay is unquestionably a matter for the Member States”, but since the law is just a stipulation of the ratio and not a direct cap on pay, there is still flexibility to set pay levels.
  • The delegation of power to the European Banking Authority (EBA) is “valid” since it is “merely empowered to elaborate non-binding draft measures” – i.e. create technical standards.
  • There has been sufficient notice of the legislation to allow firms time to adjust to the new rules.
A fairly comprehensive rejection, but there are a few points which we believe have been overlooked or under discussed, laid out below.
  • One of the UK’s main arguments is that this law will result in higher fixed pay which makes remuneration less flexible and raises fixed costs for banks, thereby undermining any attempt to improve financial stability. This issue is not addressed at all in the opinion. Furthermore, while the opinion addresses the issues of remuneration impacting risk and the fact that fixed pay can still vary it does not look at how the two can interact. It is clear that as a result of this fixed pay will increase substantially but there is no question of how this impacts stability. This may be more an economic/financial point but given the issues are discussed separately their interaction should also be examined.
  • The ruling could also have interesting implications for EU jurisdiction when it comes to the rate of pay. Variable pay is very loosely defined. For example, standard overtime paid at double the hourly rate could theoretically fall under EU jurisdiction by the definition used here. This highlights the importance of this ruling as a step into an area which the EU has previously largely steered clear of and the potential precedence it creates. This could develop in many unknown ways in the future.
  • There is no mention of the UK’s claim that this violates international law or is extraterritorial since it applies to all employees of EU banks no matter where they are based. We noted this may not be entirely a legal issue for the ECJ but it deserves some attention. Related to this, it remains unclear whether third countries firms operating in the EU will be forced to institute similar caps if there are to be deemed ‘equivalent’ under rules coming in under MiFID II in 2016.
  • One of the weakest points seems to be on the powers transferred to the EBA. Control over technical standards, particularly here, should not be dismissed lightly. The regulation deals in very broad strokes and leaves significant interpretation for the technical rules – including the exact level of the cap and who it will apply to. This power is being borne out right now with the EBA passing judgement on the way in which the rules are being implemented and whether ‘allowances’ count as variable pay. The EBA retains significant power to judge how the rules are being implemented and adjust the technical standards if it think the spirit of the rule is not being followed.
  • In general, the combination of the ECJ and EBA seem overly focused on the UK (accepted the UK has been pushing the issue as well). But looking at the legislation which Germany has passed on this issue, there are serious questions over how it has implemented the rules. Germany has exempted anyone covered by collective bargaining from all the remuneration requirements of CRD IV, including the bonus cap. This is because collective bargaining is a constitutional right in Germany and cannot be overridden. While it’s not clear how many people this applies to, the principle is concerning and it is a significant exemption. Why this does not merit examination while the use of allowances as a de facto exemption does is not clear.
What happens now?
  • The full ECJ ruling will come early next year and is likely to be in line with the opinion – although the ECJ did previously ignore Jääskinen’s opinion on short selling where to leant towards siding with the UK.
  • The EBA will publish updated guidelines and technical standards in the new year which will incorporate its concerns about allowances. At this point the UK will likely find itself squeezed by both the EBA and ECJ and could face punishment if it is not seen to be implementing the rules properly. The UK could of course refuse, but given the high profile nature of the issue it could escalate the situation. One option for the UK would be to point to other infringements such as the German example above.
  • In terms of the bigger picture, though not a huge issue on its own, this will be another ruling which plays into the hands of those who wish to see the UK exit the EU. It also continues to add to concerns over the role of the ECJ and its ability to be an impartial arbiter, particularly on financial services – an aspect which will likely be crucial if the UK is to remain an EU member both in the short and long term.

Sécurité nationale : un concept flou, insaisissable, fuyant?

Posted by EU-Logos on 23rd November 2014

Le 27 août 2014 la députée Sophie in’t Veld (ALDE) avait soumis à la Commission la question suivante : ‘Can the Commission clarify its definition of ‘national security’ when applied in relation to adopted or proposed EU legislation as a reason for the application of specific measures and provisions?’. Pour toute réponse José Manuel. Barroso déclarait : ‘Since Article 4 (2) TEU provides that safeguarding national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State, the Commission, when preparing legislation, carefully scrutinises that the envisaged measures fall within the competence of the Union.’

Toutefois, n’ayant pas respecté les délais obligatoires de réponse prévus par le règlement, la Commission et le Conseil ont été interrogés de nouveau lors de la dernière réunion LIBE.

Mais faisons un pas en arrière..

En effet, il ne s’agit pas d’un caprice parlementaire. La controverse entre sécurité nationale et sécurité intérieure, de l’Union Européenne, fait l’objet de débats depuis longtemps, notamment après l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne.

En effet, l’article 4 §2 (TUE), repris par M. Barroso, affirme :

(L’Union) respecte les fonctions essentielles de l’État, notamment celles qui ont pour objet d’assurer son intégrité territoriale, de maintenir l’ordre public et de sauvegarder la sécurité nationale. En particulier, la sécurité nationale reste de la seule responsabilité de chaque État membre.

Le Traité insiste deux fois sur le concept, afin d’exclure complètement toute intervention de l’Union en ce domaine. En outre, l’article 40 impose clairement le respect ‘des procédures et l’étendue respective des attributions des institutions prévues par les traités pour l’exercice des compétences de l’Union’, lors de la mise en oeuvre de la politique de sécurité commune.

Sécurité nationale et sécurité commune semblent, au moins du point de vue formel, couvrir des aspects différents. Toutefois, le Traité n’explique pas très clairement les matières concernées. Le thème est encore davantage ambrouillée à cause de la sensibilité du sujet, qui touche directement la souveraineté nationale de l’État. Enfin, alors que la sécurité nationale relève exclusivement de la compétence étatique, celle commune est partagée entre l’Union et ses membres.

Du point de vue général les matières couvertes par la sécurité commune comprennent la coopération judiciaire et policière, l’application de la loi, la sécurité publique. Mais lorsque l’Union intervient en ce domaine il y a toujours des implications dans la sécurité nationale, à laquelle les actes mêmes font référence.

Le Rapport Borsellino du février 2011, a réfléchi sur les aspects substantiels de ces questions, mettant en évidence les points critiques. À cause de la globalisation, certaines préoccupations liées à la sécurité concernent l’ensemble des États membres de l’Union. Face à ces défis communs, ils ont progressivement transféré des compétences au niveau supranational, comme démontré par la création de plateformes des données (SIS), d’agences opérationnelles (Frontex), ou encore de Codes législatifs (Schengen et Visa). Toutefois, ce passage implique certaines complications : le principe de primauté du droit européen, sur le droit national, ainsi que l’effet direct des règlements ; aux yeux des États, ce sont autant d’éléments perçus comme une mise en danger de leur souveraineté. En plus, la ‘sécurité’ du citoyen est définie de manière très divergente entre les pays. Pour cette raison, les actes législatifs qui visent la sécurité commune, souvent renvoient à celle nationale. Dans la pratique, donc, les termes sont très liés et interdépendants. La confusion le dispute au désordre.

De tout cela il en résulte que les principes de proportionnalité et de subsidiarité sont cruciaux en matière de sécurité. Il est, donc, fondamental de clarifier les deux concepts afin d’éviter tout conflit et toute incertitude législative et judiciaire. Cependant, bien que le Parlement européen ait soulevé la question à plusieurs reprises, ce vide juridique persiste.

Un exemple des implications pratiques qui renforcent la nécessité de plus de précision de la part de l’Union : la protection des données et leur transfert aux tiers. Comme le relève le rapport du Parlement du mars 2014 (voir « pour en savoir plus) sécurité nationale, sécurité intérieure et sécurité de l’Union Européenne sont très liées ; de surcroît, comme l’affirme une récente décision de la Cour de justice (Arrêt du 4 juin 2013 dans l’affaire C-300/11, ZZ contre Secretary of State for the Home Department) : « bien qu’il appartient aux États membres d’arrêter les mesures propres à assurer leur sécurité intérieure et extérieure, le seul fait qu’une décision concerne la sûreté de l’État ne saurait entraîner l’inapplicabilité du droit de l’Union ». En outre, lorsque sécurité nationale et commune sont également concernées, il n’est pas clair qui est responsables des éventuels violations, notamment à l’égard des droits fondamentaux des individus.

Mais revenons maintenant au débat en commission

En réunion de la Commission LIBE Sophie In’t Veld a beaucoup insisté sur la nécessité d’une définition juridique de ‘sécurité nationale’, qui soit propre à l’Union Européenne. Elle s’est dite choquée que la Commission emploie ce terme dans beaucoup de ses propositions, laissant à chaque pays membre la liberté d’en apprécier l’interprétation. D’après elle, il est nécessaire de définir le champ d’application du concept, car d’autres mesures qui concernent la sécurité intérieure de l’Union, comme dans le cas de la protection des frontières externes, reprennent ce terme controversé.

Le président Claude Moraes est intervenu soulignant l’importance de la question qui ‘est loin d’être abstraite’ ; au contraire, elle est ‘un fil rouge dans les débats au sein de la commission LIBE’ qui a besoin d’une clarification précise.

Le représentant de la Commission, interrogé, a repris la réponse de l’ancien Président Barroso, regrettant les retards : ‘Il s’agit d’un terme autonome, inscrit à l’article 4 § 2 du Traité de Lisbonne (TUE)’. Toutefois, d’après la Commission, il ne serait pas possible de donner une définition plus précise, car la compétence de l’Union est limitée en matière de sécurité. L’Union doit respecter la sécurité nationale, qui relève exclusivement de la responsabilité des États. En conséquence, il appartient à la Cour de Justice de l’UE de dégager une interprétation autonome du terme, vu que le Droit de l’Union appartient à un ordre juridique propre. Si la commission LIBE souhaite avoir des réponses plus précises, elle devra poser des questions plus ciblées, visant des cas bien précis et faisant référence à un acte spécifique de droit secondaire.

La réaction de Mme in t’ Veld ne s’est pas fait attendre : ‘Ce débat ne rend pas justice à la portée de la question’, dénonce-t-elle. ‘Souvent la ‘sécurité nationale’ justifie des exceptions au droit européen, il faut connaître ce qu’il prévoit, pour éviter toute mise en danger des droits fondamentaux.’ La députée rappelle qu’il y a des implications concrètes, comme c’est le cas des procédures Safe Harbor pour la protection des données dans les transferts transatlantiques, concernés par le rapport du février 2014 du Parlement sur le programme de surveillance de la NSA (voir en savoir plus).

L’importance du sujet a été soulignée par d’autres députés. Parmi eux, Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts)a fait remarquer que quand le Parlement doit discuter d’un texte il y a toujours des incertitudes et l’application du concept peut aller très loin, s’il n’est pas encadré.

D’autre part, souligne un autre député, il faut reconnaître les difficultés d’établir une définition univoque : la sécurité nationale est trop liée aux perceptions des menaces concrètes et potentielles, qui varient énormément entre les pays et dans le temps. Néanmoins, la plupart des membres de LIBE sont d’accord : une interprétation ponctuelle du concept augmente les possibilités d’exception. Par conséquence, elle n’est pas suffisante pour garantir le respect des droits fondamentaux des citoyens européens. De même il faut éliminer toute incertitude législative et juridique.

En conclusion, la députée Sophia in’t Veld (ALDE) lance une ferme accusation: ‘la Commission fait des propositions sans savoir de quoi elle parle’ ; en même temps, elle précise, ‘je ne conteste pas le principe mais l’absence d’une définition claire et détaillée.’ Pour l’instant, la commission LIBE envisage de s’adresser au Service Juridique du Parlement afin d’aller jusqu’au au fond de la question.

Il serait donc impossible de définir ce que recouvre le concept de sécurité nationale ? Certainement il faut exclure l’hypothèse d’une rédaction d’une liste exhaustive des cas, mais, d’autre part, une appréciation au cas par cas, selon les actes spécifiques ou par l’intervention de la CJUE, ne résout pas la question essentielle. Il faudrait, plutôt, définir un cadre de compréhension globale, des principes communs, afin d’éviter tout abus de la part des autorités nationales qui mettent en danger les droits fondamentaux et la sécurité juridique au nom de la sécurité. Il en va de l’image de la Commission qui, pour l’instant, semble proposer des lois sans savoir à quoi elle fait référence.


Elena Sbarai


En savoir plus:


-. Working document, Rapport de Rita Borsellino du 14 fevrier 2011

-. Rapport de Rita Borsellino sur la Stratégie de Sécurité Intérieure de l’Union européenne, du 24 avril 2012 ((2010)2308 (INI)) FR EN

-. Rapport du Parlement européen du 12 mars 2014 sur le programme de surveillance de la NSA, les organismes de surveillance dans divers États membres et les incidences sur les droits fondamentaux des citoyens européens et sur la coopération transatlantique en matière de justice et d’affaires intérieures, (2013/2188(INI)) FR EN


Classé dans:COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Questions institutionnelles, Traité de LISBONNE