A European Foundation Statute would reduce the amount spent on needless administration and instead allow the money to be spent furthering foundations’ philanthropic work.

A European Foundation Statute is a vital element in cultivating the right European environment for public-benefit foundations – and the citizens’ initiatives they support – to flourish. A new European legal tool, it would be both additional to existing national legislations and optional, i.e. used by those who need it to expand or start cross-border activities and collaborative ventures. Accessible and tailored to foundations’ needs, this tool would enable them to pool resources and give a European scale to their work, while also reducing costs and legal uncertainties

The Statute has won the backing of the sector – through members of the EFC and the 22 national associations of foundations that make up DAFNE. In addition, the Statute has secured the support of the European Economic and Social Committee in 2010 and the European Parliament in a recent written declaration. Entering the closing straits, the baton is now passed on to national governments and EU decision makers to get the European Foundation Statute across the finishing line. The demand is clear: that national governments and the European Parliament adopt the European Foundation Statute before 2014.

Es Grecia presa de su propia paradoja. Allí se creo la tragedia griega que hoy en forma de pesadilla irónica viven sin máscaras, ni teatros, en plena calle. De ahí que me permita la licencia de recordar que la tragedia helena está estructurada siguiendo un esquema rígido, cuyas formas se pueden definir con precisión. Se inicia generalmente con un prólogo, que según Aristóteles es lo que antecede a la entrada del coro. Las características generales son que se da la ubicación temporal y se une el pasado del héroe con el presente, pueden participar hasta tres actores, pero sólo hablan dos y el otro interviene o puede recitar un monólogo. Se informa al espectador del porqué del castigo que va a recibir el héroe y en esta parte no interviene el coro. Verdad que nos suena: el héroe el pueblo greigo, dos actores, Merkel y Sarzoky, con el monólogo de la Canciller, con el coro del eurogrupo. El castigo se anunció tras el primer rescate. Prosigue la párados, que son cantos a cargo del coro durante su entrada en la “orchestra”. En esta parte se realiza un canto lítico, donde se dan danzas de avance y retroceso. En la realidad que vivimos, se escenificó con las primeras huelgas y violencia en las calles de Atenas, mientras su clase política trataba de dar pasos hacia adelante y hacia atrás sin alcanzar acuerdos.

Luego comienzan los episodios que pueden ser hasta cinco. En ellos hay diálogo entre el coro y los personajes o entre personajes; es la parte más importante por ser la dramática por excelencia y expresa el pensamiento e ideas del personaje. Entre los episodios se hallan los estásimos, que son intervenciones del coro en las que se expresan las ideas políticas, filosóficas, religiosas o morales del autor. Aquí nos encontramos tras dimitir Papandreu y forzar la UE un gobierno de coalición presidido por el tecnócrata Lukas Papademos. Por último, el éxodo es la parte final de la tragedia, hay cantos líricos y dramáticos; el héroe reconoce su error. A veces es castigado con la muerte por los dioses y es allí donde aparece la enseñanza moral. A punto estamos de dictar esta trágica sentencia contra el pueblo griego y con ello condenarnos eternamente a la derrota del proyecto europeísta.

Volviendo a la cruda situación conviene analizar qué está exigiendo la troika de acreedores – Comisión Europea, FMI y BCE – al gobierno griego. El acuerdo sobre Grecia se basa en tres pilares. El compromiso de nuevos ajustes sociales por parte del Gobierno y los partidos políticos griegos, un acuerdo con la banca por el que acepte unas pérdidas o quita de la deuda de hasta el 70% de su inversión en Grecia y la aceptación por parte de la UE y el FMI de conceder un segundo paquete de ayudas que podría oscilar entre 130.000 y 145.000 millones de euros. El capítulo de recortes es especialmente traumático para un país que empieza su quinto año de recesión y que está cada vez más próximo a la explosión social. Los ajustes que se debaten ahora, muchos de los cuales son compromisos anteriores no aplicados aún, incluyen una reducción de gastos sanitarios de 1.100 millones; recortes en Defensa y en la Administración local, de 400 millones en cada caso; reducción del salario mínimo en 22% (pasaría de 750 euros brutos a 586 en 14 pagas), reducciones del 15% en las pensiones complementarias y aplicación del acuerdo anterior de eliminar 15.000 empleos del sector público.

La encrucijada a la que se está sometiendo a Grecia es tan simple como quedarse en el euro para sufrir décadas de pobreza e inestabilidad social o salirse y pasar a ser los parias de la Unión. Además, desde el punto de vista jurídico comunitario, no está regulada la salida del un miembro del euro, mientras que sí lo está cuando se sale Unión Europea, por lo que la caída de Grecia podría suponer que el Estado heleno se viera expulsado del club europeo. Hecho que podría convertirle en un oscuro objeto de deseo de potencias hostiles a los intereses europeos, dado el caos social que produciría quedarse en tierra de nadie en el escenario internacional.

El éxodo griego, de producirse, tendrá indudables efectos sobre la imagen de la Unión Europea y su ya tocada credibilidad en los mercados financieros. Así lo reconocía el ministro de Economía español Luis de Guindos al manifestar que “si Grecia va a la quiebra, puede haber contagio”. El temido efecto dominó sobre países con sus cuentas públicas cuestionadas alarga su sombra sobre el continente. De ahí que todos debamos ser muy conscientes de la trascendencia de cualquier decisión que se tome sobre Grecia porque del final de la tragedia griega depende en gran medida el futuro de Europa.

Greece has been missing one “critical deadline” after the other, without achieving any real progress on its troika programme. Ever since the European Council summit of July 21, 2011, when the first debt restructuring plan was agreed upon — the so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) — the Greek people have been the recipients of an unprecedented psychological war that sows the fear of bankruptcy/default every few weeks. The reasons Greece has been failing to cope with its troika programme can be divided into internal and external.

External factors:

• Greece was the first country to fall in the domino effect that commenced in 2008 and is still underway. For that the country has received most of the attention all these years, as it is (correctly) considered the weakest link in the euro chain. As such the treatment of Greece should “necessarily” have the following features:
  • The European Union needs to show that it does not violate its own rules – the no-bailout clause for instance, or the “prohibition” of debt monetization or eurobonds by the ECB.
  • Any support to Greece must be done in such a way so as to avoid moral hazard. In other words Greece must not be given away money which might seem like a “reward”. Instead it has to be “punished” (though such a word will never be used officially) for not complying with the rules governing the Euro architecture.
  • The European Union needs to handle the situation in such a way that markets do not lose faith in its capacity to deal with its own issues. Therefore even if the situation in Greece deteriorates, it will be because of the “special” circumstances that apply to Greece – not due to the narrow-sighted troika policies.
  • For as long as the broader eurozone is facing its systemic crisis (listen to 30-minute podcast) Greece must not be allowed to default on its creditors as that would (a) trigger a payment of the CDS contracts, with negative implications for the financial system, (b) would mortally wound several European banks that are directly or indirectly exposed to Greek debt, (c) it would create uncertainty about the prospects of other countries mired in recession or under bailout programmes.
• The troika officials are focusing only on the fiscal finances of the state without any real concern about the effects of their policies on the real economy. For instance they only ask for the reduction of the budget deficit even if that requires unprecedented tax hikes that increase costs, decrease demand and create uncertainty about the tax regime, hence new investments are held back.
• European politicians who will soon be running for elections, have found an easy victim in Greece that they can attack in order to raise their “popularity”. As such many have “threatened” to kick the Greeks out of the euro in case they do not comply with what “leaders” say, even though that will never happen (see Greece will not exit the Euro – Groundless threats and speculation).

To conclude on the section of the external factors, Greece is trapped in — or is part of —  a highly complex political system, namely the EU. For as long as this system lacks all those mechanisms/institutions/tools that would allow it to function as a unified entity, instead of the now-sectarianated patchwork of squabbling states; the situation will remain extremely difficult and more failures will definitely follow.

Internal factors:

• For reasons that go far beyond the scope of this article, the Greek state has always been ill-designed. The public administration of the country is very big and highly inefficient, while the resulting bureaucracy creates several problems:
  • It retards economic activity as even routine procedures require considerable time to materialize.
  • “Fakelaki” and “miza” (Greek words for corruption payments) become the only way for citizens to get their job done. As such corruption becomes a “vital part” of the broader political system.
  • Because political parties and the main body of the state’s public administration operate in Athens, the Greek state has gradually become Atheno-centric, since exponentially more powers are brought to the capital, leaving the periphery underdeveloped and thus the country less competitive and productive on aggregate.
• Decades of ill advised policies have created series of distortions in the economy, in the political system and the social order; while they have produced perverse incentives that lead to several unpleasant phenomena – such as the ongoing strikes of civil servants or special interest groups who wish to cling on to their privileges; or a highly ineffective and unfair tax system that puts the burdens only on the lower parts of the income distribution; or even economic cartels that do not wish to see their state-sponsored monopolies/oligopolies be liberalized (professional drivers, pharmacists, public universities etc.).
• Greece entered the EEC in 1981 even though it never complied with the criteria. The decision back then was political and had to do with the balance of power between “West – USSR” in the broader region of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.  Nonetheless, the European funds that suddenly started flowing in to the underdeveloped country, gave the impression that the European Community is a cornucopia, an infinite source of wealth that will be feeding the Greeks for decades to come. In short Greece started growing (not a robust growth, but a bubble really), without making any reforms in its economy and state. As such the European funds ended up in unproductive expenses, instead of improving key sectors of the economy, or accumulating technology and other industrial goods that increase productivity.

Conclusion:

Decades of malpractices cannot change within a few months, especially when several interests are involved. For Greece to escape from the greatest economic crisis of its history the entire Greek polity will need to be redesigned. This requires deep reforms in the economy, so that individual genius replaces bureaucratic interventionism; changes in the internal structure of the state, allowing peripheries to control considerably more power that will allow for balanced growth all across the country; modernization of the public administration so that procedures become fewer and faster and costs diminish.

The Greek nation will have to be constructed anew. The problem is that the Greeks are not willing to accept that, while the inane policies of the troika are only making things worse, as the crisis deepens, thus supporting the (insane) idea that Greece would be better off outside the Euro. The Greek failure represents a conundrum that none seems able to solve.

External and internal factors of the Greek failure | Protesilaos Stavrou.

The kicker? The country in which it decreased the most was Italy, where it fell by an incredible 1.6 percentage points in a single quarter. Spain’s debt-to-GDP remained unchanged and recently-downgraded France’s debt-to-GDP fell by 0.8% percentage points. Virtuous Germany, on the other hand, was barely in the black at 0.2%.

That is to say – before the European Central Bank, under intense pressure by German officials both in and outside the bank, refused to shelter Italian and Spanish bonds from the Greek contagion, causing the double-dip recession – all the big eurozone countries had neutral or improving debt outlooks. If Berlin had had less influence over Frankfurt, there would actually be far less debt in the peripherals for German taxpayers to worry about.

Berlin looks to be unfazed. As far they are concerned this recession and debt crisis were caused by fiscal profligacy – certainly not bone-headed monetary policy. German officials apparently “simply don’t understand” what the rest-of-the-world (especially the U.K., U.S. and I.M.F.) is disinterestedly advising them to do.

But no. Despite being the most fiscally responsible member of the eurozone, Italy must make further cuts because of the mistakes of Frankfurt-Berlin. Actually, it is not necessarily a “mistake,” at all. Wonks in Brussels regularly describe what is happening, dispassionately, as an intentional strategy: The ECB refuses to do what it takes to drive Italian bond yields down in order to force the country to adopt the reforms the bankers, all-knowing as the Frankfurt office-dwellers are, think best (budget cuts, job market liberalization, privatization of public services, etc).

Note that this amazing quarter of fiscal performance on Italy’s part was immediately before Jean-Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi issued their September letter to Italy demanding these reforms (The Economist readily described it as “diktat”). And that’s how, in the euro system, those who cause crisis in fiscally responsible countries still get to dictate what policies and governments those countries must have.

The most striking thing highlighted by the Eurostat figures is the perversely moralistic and anti-economic aspect of the European debate on austerity. German journalist Alan Posener, in a fine essay in Die Welt, attacks what he imagines to be Angela Merkel’s Protestant pain-now/payoff later attitude and suggests that having more debt for future generations is acceptable if it means growth now:

Compared to that [Germany recently fully repaying WW1 reparations debts], future generations should be glad to pay debt accumulated by a government that shelled out for unemployment benefits, pensions to mothers, health costs for the poor or college educations – even if it was a little dilatory about tax collection.

But in fact, the figures suggest there is not even any such trade-off: Had growth been maintained through an intelligent monetary policy then we would actually have less debt. The argument is not over whether we should pass on more debt to future generations to have growth today. It is about a status quo in the euro system, defended above all by Germany, which means Europe being both poorer and more indebted.

Other than that quibble, Posener’s essay is right on the ball. He concludes: “But the key is not savings. It’s growth. The green-Protestant, post-democratic austerity regime could end up destroying Europe.” With one-in-two youth unemployed in some countries and years more of recession still in sight, who could disagree?

For a while now the rhetorical narrative of those that advocate leaving the EU has been accompanied by a variety of alternatives to EU membership. Many ideas have been put forward, some quite ‘exotic’ or outright unrealistic, but there are two paradigms that are held up as the best possible options for Britain: Norway and Switzerland.

But upon closer inspection both options fail to stand up to scrutiny. They are both very different to Britain and not an appropriate model for how a country like the UK conducts its affairs on the world stage. Both Norway and Switzerland are small and peripheral states, with specialised economies and limited aspirations for influence at the global stage.

Take Norway for example, as a member of the European Free Trade Association it is part of the European Economic Area, which does give it access to the Single Market, with all the economic advantages that come with it. But here lays the catch, to be part of the Single Market and enjoy the benefits that affords you, Norway has to abide with its rules (not to mention contribute handsomely to the EU budget). But since Norway is not a member of the European Union it does not have the right to take part in the decision-making structures that decide the rules that govern that Single Market. Not a particularly advantageous state of affairs and the Norwegian government had the following to say in a recently published report: ‘The most problematic aspect of Norway’s form of association with the EU is the fact that Norway is in practice bound to adopt EU policies and rules in a broad range of issues without being a member and without voting rights. This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making processes that have direct consequences for Norway, and neither do we have any significant influence on them. Moreover, our form of association with the EU dampens political engagement and debate in Norway and makes it difficult to monitor the Government and hold it accountable in its European policy’ (Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union).

This is a damning verdict for those that call for withdrawal of the EU. Asking to relegate the UK to such an associate membership status is catastrophic and it does an enormous disservice to Britain, limits its influence on the international stage and undermines its ability to form the decisions that have an impact on its economic wellbeing.

The case of Switzerland is no different. It has to abide by the rules that govern the Single Market if it wants its companies to trade within it but it has no representation in the institutions, the EU Council and the European Parliament, which make those rules. Perhaps this is a satisfactory situation for a country with 2% of the EU population that might have compromised with the fact that its ability to influence the things that affect it is limited.

But Britain is one of the largest EU member states, smaller only to Germany and Poland, and of similar size to France. It has considerable influence over EU policies that affect it. Its views, when argued with confidence and convincing arguments, are respected and listened to. Very rarely has Britain lost a vote on matters governed by qualified majority voting, it is always consulted by the European Commission when it comes, for example, to rule-making in financial services and it has repeatedly and successfully argued its case before the European Court of Justice, which has ruled in its favour in cases that have to do with single market issues and liberalisation of trade.

Leaving the EU would mean removing ourselves from where decisions are made. Britain’s place is not outside the room, with its face pressed against the window, watching others take decisions that affect us, without us. Britain’s place is at the heart of the decision-making structures that govern one of the biggest economies of the world.

The benefits of EU membership are numerous and have often been repeated by pro-Europeans. Britain gains both in economic terms and in terms of its standing in the world. Our ability to influence the things that affect us, like Iranian nuclear aspirations, negotiations on climate change, international trade agreements, energy security, illegal immigration, international crime is enhanced when we act together with our EU partners, using the institutions of the EU as a vehicle to pursue our common interests. Leaving the EU will remove us not just from the biggest and wealthiest common market in the world. It will set us apart from an organisation (and its institutions) that share our aspirations for a liberal and peaceful world where democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and environmental protection reigns. The globalisation of our world and the rising power of developing countries are both full of challenges and opportunities. Britain can either try to make the most of these challenges and opportunities by standing together with its EU partners or risk having its influence fade by standing apart from them. This is no time to contemplate leaving the EU. The EU is a platform upon which we can all stand taller. We must make the most of that platform to increase our influence in the world and promote the principles that are important to us.

Petros Fassoulas is chairman of the European Movement UK.

This article was first published in the January issue of The European www.euromove.org.uk

Dans une lettre adressée à Larry  Page, directeur général de Google, les régulateurs expliquent qu’ils veulent évaluer les effets de la simplification des règles prévues par Google sur les internautes européens et tester leur degré de protection. En attendant ces réponses, les régulateurs ont donc demandé l’activation des nouvelles règles.

De son côté, la vice-présidente Reding, commissaire en charge du dossier s’est félicité de cette démarche qui permettra d’analyser et de mesurer de façon plus précise la conformité de ces nouveaux dispositifs avec les règles européennes, la directive de 1995,. Une directive quela Commissionvient de proposer la refonte complète le jour même où Google faisait son annonce.La Commissionentend bien s’assurer que les géants de l’informatique et plus particulièrement des firmes comme Google et Facebook donneront de réelles garanties aux internautes sur le traitement de leurs données via une information précise sur les motifs d’utilisation et un droit à l’effacement intégral de leurs données (« le droit à l’oubli numérique »). Notons qu’aux Etats-Unis également une investigation a été lancée sur les pratiques en usage et notamment sur les modes de suppression des données des internautes.

Google prévoit (et il en a largement informé les internautes mais d’une façon en général  peu compréhensible) à partir du 1^er mars de fondre environ 60 règlements distincts relatifs à la vie privée en une seule politique unique. Google s’efforce d’expliquer pourquoi les données (de localisation, les adresses IP, par exemple) sont recueillies et comment ils les utilisent. Google explique ainsi qu’il est susceptible «  d’utiliser le nom fourni dans le profil Google dans tous nos services qui requièrent l’utilisation d’un compte Google ». C’est une possibilité qui inquiètent très fortement les utilisateurs et les régulateurs. C’est pourquoi les régulateurs européens, dans leur lettre, s’inquiètent de voir Google partager les données personnelles des utilisateurs à travers ses différentes plate-formes (gmail, youtube, google+ etc….) sans laisser à l’internaute la possibilité de donner son accord préalable à cette utilisation. « Au vu de la large gamme de services que vous proposez et de la popularité de ces services, des modifications de votre politique de protection de la vie privée pourraient affecter de nombreux citoyens de la plupart, si ce n’est la totalité des Etats membres » concluent les régulateurs européens.

      -.Reply from Google adressed to the article 29 Working Party regarding the upcoming changes in their privacy Policy (03.02.2012) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2012/20120203_google_reply_to_art29_en.pdf

      -.Letter from the article 29 Working Party addressed to Google regarding the up coming change in their privacy Policy (02.02.2012) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2012/20120202_letter_google_privacy_policy_en.pdf

      -. Site de Google WWW.google.com/policies/privacy/préview

      -. Dossier Google de Nea say http://www.eu-logos.org/eu-logos-nea-recherche.php?q=google&Submit=%3E

The ECFR’s researchers have assessed the EU’s foreign policy performance in 2011 in six major areas: the relationship with China, Russia, the US, Wider Europe (Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood and Turkey), crisis management handling and the EU’s support for multilateralism. The Scorecard proves that the EU’s influence as a global player has diminished significantly as a result of the mishandling of the sovereign debt crisis. With an average unemployment rate of some 10,5 percent, the EU’s soft power model has lost its lustre, the continent being currently viewed as the main source of economic instability in the world, instead of as an active participant in providing solutions to the current crisis.

Whilst in some areas the EU’s foreign policy initiatives have earned decent marks (relationship with the US, crisis management or participation within multilateral institutions), in some others (diplomatic relationship with China, Russia, Turkey or the Western Balkans) its performance was below average.

The authors have also highlighted in the report the EU’s slow and inadequate response to the 2011 Arab Awakening, as well as the fact that to this day the EU has failed to frame a functional and comprehensive Southern neighbourhood policy.

The EU’s foreign policy leaders have traditionally been France and the UK. Recently, however, Germany, Poland and Sweden have also positioned themselves in the lead, with the rest of the member-countries falling into the «slackers» category. A common, coordinated EU-wide foreign policy is yet to emerge, as a consequence of the continent’s obsession with its internal woes and the inability of its leading countries to adopt adequate pro-growth, pro-employment economic policies. More often than not, as Justin Vaisse, co-lead author of the Scorecard has noted, EU countries prefer to conduct foreign policies which reflect their national interest at the expense of the general interest of the Union. Not surprisingly, the EU’s influence as a multilateral, multi-national model has lost most of its appeal in Asia and Latin America alike. (sources: ECFR, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, NYT)

You could create a long list of reproaches, but something’s up. Not only in the media.

The heads of major countries, confronted with the EU’s impotence in economic affairs, would be willing to throw someone to the lions (public opinion). Lady Ashton perfectly suits for this role because the government that supported her candidacy does not exist anymore and she has not built any political background for herself. She obtained the post as a European Socialist and there is currently no strong candidate from the same option. But… the Socialists have recently occupied the position of the President of the European Parliament.

In this context, there are two names that are being mentioned: Carl Bildt, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Radek Sikorski (Polish MFA). The latter, in fact, has a problem defining his approach toward Germany (leadership or hegemony) but he is one of the longest-serving incumbent Foreign Ministers. It is also obvious that in Poland he does not have any interesting self-development opportunities.

Con una oferta así, no es de extrañar lo ajustado del resultado, la tensión vivida en los días anteriores y los temblores de piernas que muchos compromisarios socialistas debieron sentir al meter la papeleta en la urna entre fortísimas medidas de seguridad para evitar pucherazos. El miedo se adueñó del sevillano hotel Renacimiento – el nombre del escenario no se escoge con más guasa ni a posta – y entre acusaciones mutuas de coacciones y juego sucio, llegaron los discursos de los candidatos dejando claras las intenciones de ambos. Rubalcaba ofrecía un tránsito lo más seguro posible para travesía del desierto y Chacón pretendía, sin perder un segundo, poner rumbo a la tierra prometida cruzando desiertos y montañas hasta llegar al oasis y degustar el ansiado maná del poder. Uno garantizaba flotar una patera para cruzar el estrecho que separa la muerte segura de un partido bajo mínimos en cuotas de cargos electos y la otra una expedición en galeras por mares desconocidos y horizontes lejanos en pos de tesoros de incalculable valor pero de ubicación incierta. Y como era natural, en un ejército diezmado y derrotado, triunfó la triste realidad de Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba ante la onírica y volátil figura de Carmen Chacón.

De ideas para qué hablar, cuando lo que toca es poner al mando a las personas que dirijan el naufragio. Entregados a la cita latina - Primum vivere deinde philosophari -, los socialistas han decidido primero vivir y luego filosofar. Tienen primero que reconstruir el partido federación a federación de un partido con un ERE en marcha dado el alto número de cargos que han perdido su cargo y con ello su puesto de trabajo. Tienen que recoser cada girón que en los territorios ha supuesto un enfrentamiento cainita entre dos bandos alineados a muerte cada uno con su candidato a secretario general.  O mejor dicho, los vencedores aplicarán su concepto de integración cortando a cuchillo la cabeza de los derrotados que es como se suelen debatir las diferencias personales en el seno de los partidos políticos.

Por delante tres años – hasta las próximas elecciones municipales y autonómicas – para recuperar el crédito perdido en la sociedad española, el apoyo dilapidado por no reconocer primero la gravedad de la crisis y después en un giro copernicano de sus políticas, aplicar las recetas más duras y ortodoxas del centro derecho europeo. En ese difícil navegar de la patera en las turbulentas y frías aguas del estrecho, en algún momento tendrán que reparar en la necesidad de lanzar una propuesta socialdemócrata y europeísta, desde un pensamiento renovado, capaz de afrontar los retos de la globalización y el diálogo con Estados emergentes que claman por su derecho a ser protagonistas en la toma de decisiones del mundo. Algún día, mejor pronto que tarde, deberían pensar en salir de las posiciones meramente defensivas del Estado del bienestar, para hacer una ofensiva de conquista de derechos, recuperando el discurso tradicional de la izquierda europea de trabajar por el progreso sin mirar al retrovisor. Deberían ponerse a la labor de ser alternativa, aunque solo sea porque deberían recordar que no solo de pan vive el hombre, si es que aún quieren ser útiles a la sociedad y no seguir siendo un mero centro de colocaciones plagado de nepotismo.

Además tendrán la responsabilidad de ser el principal partido de la oposición al recién nacido gobierno del Partido Popular. Eso para bien y para mal, es decir, para alcanzar acuerdos en cuestiones de Estado – que suelen interpretar como sinónimo de apaño – y para fiscalizar con contundencia la acción del Ejecutivo de Mariano Rajoy. Y no sé la verdad si la patera y sus tripulantes darán a basto a tanta tarea como tienen por delante o caerán exhaustos por la borda antes de pisar tierra. De momento hay que reconocer que han optado por la vía más realista que se les ofrecía, lo cual dice mucho de su capacidad de supervivencia que avalan los más de 130 años de existencia del partido contra viento y marea, dentro y fuera del mismo. No tienen un líder indiscutible, ni ilusionante. Rubalcaba es un dirigente para los tiempos que corren, para tratar de evitar un naufragio en medio de una tempestad. Ni nada más, ni nada menos.

Con todo le queda el reto de no ensimismarse en la turbulencia del oleaje, tratando de buscar un horizonte cierto para cuando la tormenta amaine. Porque por mucho que sus problemas internos le ocupen gran parte de su trabajo, fuera seguirá habiendo un Estado plurinacional que demanda nuevas fórmulas de convivencia con legítimas reivindicaciones de pueblos con identidad, realidad económica y culturas propias. Fuera seguirá habiendo una sociedad que anhela soluciones a sus demandas de quienes dicen representarles. Porque como nos cantó Serrat,

Detrás de los héroes y de los titanes,
detrás de las gestas de la humanidad
y de las medallas de los generales.
Detrás de la Estatua de la Libertad.

Detrás de los himnos y de las banderas.
Detrás de la hoguera de la Inquisición.
Detrás de las cifras y de los rascacielos.
Detrás de los anuncios de neón.

Detrás, está la gente
con sus pequeños temas,
sus pequeños problemas
y sus pequeños amores.

Today it is opposing the austerity measures promoted by Mario Monti’s government, accusing him of stealing money out of Italians’ pockets. However, yesterday it acted as protagonist as a key ally of Berlusconi’s coalition which was about to bring the country into the mire, with an alarmingly high public debt and peaking interest rates on ten-year sovereign bonds (over 7%) and increasing spread against the German state’s bund.

That is the Northern League, one of the most rooted Italian parties (especially in the North East), born in the nineties with the clear objective of separation from the rest of the peninsula. One of the most famous slogans used by its leaders is “Roma ladrona” (“Big robber Rome”), blamed of retaining the whole taxation due by Northerners to the central government without receiving appropriate redistribution or even wasting resources for sterile expenses in the South. Nevertheless, providing an account of the national debates over bad administration and clientelism in the South against better policy-making in Northern Italy is beyond the scope of this article.

The alarming side of the rise of the ‘greens’ within the Italian political system is instead its unquestioned appeal to many working class people who feel penalized by a ‘lazy’ South producing only debt, as well as by an increasing number of immigrants who are accusing of invading their country to find a job. Regions such as Sicily, Campania and Apulia are depicted as burdens for Italy’s productivity, with a high level of tax evasion and penetration of organized crime and whose people take advantage of Northerners comply with their fiscal duties and fund the State’s investments.

Among the other things, the whole concepts of regionalism contributed to a great extent to fervid confrontations over the Unification of Italy, seen as a catastrophe. In reality, regional disputes over interpretation of historical events and local peculiarities are still very common in the Belpaese, which unfortunately appears much divided even after 150 years of formal amalgamation. The fact that the former Prime Minister Berlusconi did not intervene publicly to stigmatize Bossi’s (Northern League’s leader) statement “I clean my arse up with the tricolor flag” says a lot on the deep-seated divisions over the Italian identity.

Most critics argue that the Northern League’s supporters propagate a sterile populism made of aggressive slogans and vulgar language, yet in the last years this party has experiences a significant mount in voting support, reaching around 15% in some areas in 2008 elections. Since its first participation in Berlusconi’s government in 1994 Bossi’s party has never seen its major proposal – federalism – implemented, instead it has steadily become part of the centralized administration which it had disapproved vehemently in the early 1990s.

The Northern League has found consensus among many citizens because its exponents blended issues of regionalism as an aged winning strategy in Italian politics – a similar political experiment led the MPA (Movement for Autonomy) to win Presidency of Sicily Region in 2008 – with extremely xenophobic positions and overt racism. Being incapable of tackling the economic challenges affecting the North, as it has been the case with the whole country, with increasing unemployment and diminished opportunities for youngsters, the leaders of the Northern League diverted attention to concerns of wild immigration and loose barriers, especially after many Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004. This situation has led to much uncertainty among people over the actual causes of the crisis Europe is undergoing, but the old “those foreigners stealing our jobs” slogans generate still empathy in many citizens who would not consider low-salary, labor-intensive jobs that Bulgarian or Polish people would instead accept.

Today every political party is supporting Monti’s government of technicians as the moment for austerity reforms and difficult decisions has come thus most political leaders can provide an external support without being criticized as unpopular by the public opinion. The plan of the main political groups (Party of Freedom and Democratic Party) is unambiguous: since a considerable disaffection and explicit attacks on political leadership have emerged over the last months, the decision to let technicians do the “dirty job” would mean taking breath and gain experience so as to get ready for next elections in 2013 when Monti will have to leave his post as Prime Minister.

In this case, the Northern League’s strategy may seem to have a good rationale in considering the upcoming vote, by accusing the government of rising taxation and postponing retirement age. However, most Italians are bravely accepting responsibly those urgent measures since they are aware of the high debt provoked by decades of bad administration and lack of fiscal discipline. Hence, this strategy could backfire on Bossi’s strategy in the long run. This view can be strengthened in case Monti succeeds in dealing with the spread, thus increasing the confidence of American rating agencies and investors to pour fresh money into Italy’s cash desk.

To this respect, the next weeks will probably be crucial as the EU Member States will decide how to produce growth, because years of austerity and spending cuts only will not be enough to save the European countries from depression.

Nonetheless, putting aside the political discourses brought about by the Northern League in Italy, it remains to be seen to what extent issues of immigration, regionalism and xenophobia would turn into broader considerations on the role of the European Union as an aggregating organization which, by tidying not only economies but also cultures, risks to pave the way to a degenerating future in terms of social cohesion.

In other words, it is not only the economic interdependence affecting the stability of the Union, but also the lack of communication and common understanding between Europe’s sections of society which may trigger further rows.

If the Northern League represents intolerance, other political organizations across the old continent – such as Le Pen’s front in France, the Nigel Farage’s UKIP in the Kingdom, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom in the Netherlands, the True Finns in Finland – are spreading fanatic right-wing narratives focusing on the rejection of “the other”. In times of economic and social crisis, these divergences have the potential to lead to forms of ‘balkanization’ in the territories represented by the most liberal, open and rights-guardian organization worldwide. On contrast, around a decade ago a similar case, after the ethno-populist claims made by the nationalist leader Jörg Haider in Austria, was followed by wide condemnation and EU-led sanctions imposed on the Austrian state .

Most agree on the fact that those considerations are appropriately defining the current European society, and given this moment of unstoppable austerity and low (if no) growth for many European countries, it seems legitimate to wonder to what extent those ‘separatist’ issues will interact in next European elections in 2013. Evidence seems to suggest that a drop in citizens’ participation and climbing abstention will be deeper.

As the Utøya tragedy shows, one of the most demanding challenges in the future for the EU is internal terrorism and social degradation, since hostile tendencies of anti-Marxism, anti-Islamism, anti-multiculturalism are likely to emerge more and more, representing a fundamental threats for the entire Union. Among the other things, this politics of the enemy and intolerance against “the other” (this being very difficult to classify nowadays into an ethnic, cultural or national model) has generated in Italy the creation of so-called “ronde“, namely spontaneous organizations of citizens vigilante groups patrolling quarters overnight to look for and punish possible aggressions and thefts committed by foreigners .

As for the EU and its citizens, it is time to wonder how to stop such episodes of separatism, anti-EU demonstrations and violence among frustrated and angry people. Although good economy and healthy balances of payment are key factors in providing nations with stability, it seems also legitimate to cast doubt over social cohesion in a Union which appears more violent, more divided, definitely on the wrong track.

Finally: if political parties are the representation of people, and right-wing intolerant political groups are on the rise, what comes next?

More individual traffic cannot be the answer, not the electric car, not even car-sharing. Cities have only one solution: extend their public transport systems, make them faster and more frequent, while at the same time inhibiting individual transport.

Brussels is an example of flawed policies during the 1960-80s, when those in charge believed that it would be possible to expand population far beyond the city limits and rely on cars as the major means transport. The result: in 2011 only one third of the daily commuters to Brussels used public transport! It is only slowly that those in charge attempt to correct earlier mistakes and catch up with Berlin, Hamburg, Munich or Frankfurt and their exemplary electric train + subway connections up to 60 km from the city centre.

Encouraging public transport in European cities is crucial for clean air on the one hand and lower C02 emissions on the other. Individual transport in cities is the most polluting form of traffic. It consumes easily three times as much energy as public transport. Though all this is well-known to policy makers, little action has been taken, and almost none at EU level, municipalities falling under strict subsidiarity!

Still, the EU should facilitate the transition from individual to public traffic in Europe’s major cities by

• producing a green paper on urban traffic and green house gas emissions;
• regularly bringing together mayors from major cities for an exchange of experience on how to cope with rising numbers of commuters;
• making available more funding from structural funds and EIB for co-financing the necessary subway, train and tram investments;
• announcing stricter EU regulations for C02 and hazardous emissions from cars.

Duran´s opinion prevails over Mas-Colell´s criticism regarding income tax rise

CiU vote for GOS (Government of Spain) anti-crisis measures has not been fully understood in Catalonia. Not even for a large number of CDC rank-and-file members, according to several CDC militants close to RCAT associates.

These members have started to press the party’s leaders. They don’t quite understand the yes vote, specially after voting against Mr.Mariano Rajoy´s election as President. And also after Mr. Andreu Mas-Colell, the Minister for Economy and Knowledge, categorical words opposing to those measures -that include a rise of the income tax. According to the Minister´s words, tax income rise risks to place Catalonia’s fiscal burden at a suffocation level. In critics opinion “if they didn´t want to to vote against, they could have just abstained“.

Having that in mind, it is quite obvious the motivation of former president Jordi Pujol‘s article posted in his website. Mr. Pujol would have written it to try to appease the unease of militants. In the piece, Mr. Pujol acknowledges that

“ Catalonia as a country could be driven to unviability, (…) not because of the economic consequences of independence, but the impossibility – as a result of economic discrimination –of Catalonia to respond not only to the needs of wealth creation or the support for our language and culture, but also to build a truly bona fide society for all her citizens. This, as much or more than any other argument, would be a valid reason to opt for independence. “

However, some analysts consider that the yes vote can also be read having in mind the traditional tensions between CDC and UDC. And more specifically as a Mr. Duran‘s victory not only over Mr. Mas-Colell, but over the whole Catalan Government. Mr. Duran, as CiU´s top figure in Madrid, in this sense, would be setting the political line of the Government of the Generalitat, without paying the costs that entails to head a department.

Authored: RCAT Web Team

Translation: MA