What on earth is going on inside the Conservative Party? Are the last years of the Major Government repeating themselves, with “Europe” once again tearing the Party to pieces and driving it to electoral suicide? by Ben Patterson, former MEP and current chairman of the Conservative Party in Kent.

By Protesilaos Stavrou After having abused and distorted the term “federation” and its derivatives, inwardly transforming it from a firm political position against nation states to an intergovernmental, confederalist conception where the nation state lies “at the heart” of the whole venture, Mr. Barroso has now taken it upon himself to deny the systemic aspects of the localized economic crises witnessed across the Euro Area, in propounding the well-known conservative postulate of certain powers of the establishment, that “there is no such thing as a eurocrisis”.

Revolts did not knock on the door, they just sneaked in the Arab region, toppling some regimes while shaking the thrones of others. Analyses began to heap in an attempt to examine this state of affairs; some choose to factor in this context a new foreign conspiracy, aiming at dividing of what is left from the region. Others suggest that the revolts are a long awaited revolution of pride and dignity and were ignited by plain domestic forces. As a prelude to this analysis, in today’s article we wish to address the common views, widespread not only among academics and politicians, but also amongst the Arab masses which started to question, doubt and lose confidence in the current spate of Arab revolts. in order to keep readers abreast of the latest developments, this article espouses a nuanced approach in addressing a third view which considers the events mere scientific material that can serve as a platform to examine existing theories of International politics in a region, described for long time as idle and sluggish towards transformations.

Many of those who believe the Arab Spring is part of a conspiracy theory, have linked their views to many remarks, articles and literature of non-Arab intellectuals like Bernard Lewis and Thierry Meyssan. Such writings gave an impression that the Arab Middle East is in a process of transformation, similar to that of the Sykes–Picot in 1916. On the official level, many terms and projects like “constructive chaos”, the “New Middle East” and the “Greater Middle East”, coined and uttered by “mainly” US officials, leading to further worry and distrust. For instance, in March 2004, the Bush administration adopted what was named “the Greater Middle East Project”. The avowed goal of the project was encouraging political, economic and social reforms in the Arab Middle East, in addition to Turkey, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. One can argue that the US vision of this project was based on two main pillars; first is to reshuffle and reorganize cards in the Middle East after seizing control of the World Political Order, in the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, while the second pillar is largely based on the concept of improving the image of the US in the Middle East, after being greatly smeared and distorted as a result of US invasion to Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq.

Nevertheless, the project did not bear any fruit and was complete fiasco. Other terms and projects followed like “the New Middle East” project, which was introduced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006. The new project was accompanied with a new term of “constructive chaos”. In his article “Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a “New Middle East” on November 18, 2006 at the GLOBAL RESEARCH (Center for Research on Globalization), Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya defines constructive chaos as “generates conditions of violence and warfare throughout the region– would in turn be used so that the United States, Britain, and Israel could redraw the map of the Middle East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives.” A starker example of this approach was reflected in the new map of the Middle East, presented in the U.S. military’s Armed Forces Journal in 2006 entitled: “Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would look”.

Simply put, as the goals of these projects went down the drain, US decision makers started to think of a new plan that would replace previous ones and may achieve the required results. The new approach is primarily to seek a new “model” that can be accepted by Arabs and that would alienate images and stereotypes related to old and traditional regimes. The rise of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) of Turkey in 2002 inspired that viewpoint and moved the compass into the direction of what was called “moderate Islam” day after day. Hitherto, promoting the Turkish model in particular and encouraging “moderate Islam” in general widespread struck a chord with public dissatisfaction and aversion to corrupt regimes and have become a priority.

In this vein, “Moderate” Islamic movements, who were once deprived from their rights, expelled and may be executed by their own regimes, lined up to present their credentials as the new accepted “model” or alternative of the old fashioned and infamous dictatorships, which appeared in the eyes of Arab people as a stooge, too attached to the West and excessively dependent on the US.

According to this viewpoint, the rise of the current Arab revolts demonstrated the solemn declaration of this new American plan, by inserting democratically elected new “moderate” Islamic movements in power. The new Islamic regimes will serve as good as previous regimes, yet they will be more accepted by their people and hence interests, business and flux of oil will be secured. The warm relations between these Islamic movements and the US in particular, and being hosted by the West when they were escaping from the oppression of the previous regimes, bolstered such way of thinking.

I believe this treatment of such state of affairs is fulsome yet requires further investigation. Failing to take into consideration the various contexts of these events would bring about inaccurate results, and this will take us to the second group of views. Many people tend to see in the Arab revolts a definitive outcome of an increasing frustration among Arab Youth. This generation, which constitutes the majority of Arab population, inherited stories of glory and magnificent history of modernity, development, advancement in civilization, arts, science and might.

But these stories hit day after day the wall of a frustrating reality as they (Arab youth) found themselves in fully dependent states (on the West), experiencing successive defeats and living bleak economic and difficult social conditions. This accompanied with the continuation of the oppression of their regimes and the lack of democracy and freedom of expression. The rulers exaggerated in their grip and confidence, and their hyperbole made Parliamentary elections a joke and a scene of irony, while the issue of inheritance of power to their sons (in “theoretically” Republican regimes) became a mixed material of comic and bitterness.

More distressingly, Arab youth saw progress, development and success in other countries, and coveted for themselves good economic and social conditions other nations experienced. With the assistance of internet social networks and the development in communications technology, such facts are not hidden anymore, and the new Arab generation started to share their findings, concerns, fears, ambition and dreams with each other through such platforms. Meanwhile, aged regimes were still busy with old fashioned techniques, undermining the effect and importance of such technology, which was described by one of their statesmen as “children toys”.

The moment of truth has arrived, catching every expert, analyst and politician off guard, as the eruption of the Arab Spring started from Tunisia the Green “the term Arabs call Tunisia”, which people are well-known for quite temper, calmness and gentleness. It was only few days until the spark of revolution spread as fever, and other people followed suit, turning the fantasy world on the Internet to a reality that ushered in a new era different of the previous distasteful epoch. Thus, the crux of this view is the rejection of any external role in moving or encouraging Arabs to change their regimes.

What supports this view a number of facts; the first is close relationship between the West in general and previous autocratic regimes. Another important fact is Western flopping and hesitation on the eve of the eruption of the revolutions. Michele Alliot-Marie, former French Foreign Minister, had to resign after expressing few days after the escape of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali the willingness of France to provide the Tunisian government expertise in the field of security.

U.S. position was also marked by confusion with the first spur of the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia. BBC correspondent in Washington, Kim Ghattas described the first reaction of US State Department officials as “seemed to be caught unaware” adding they had not been briefed about Tunisia recently. Ghattas referred to the following reaction of the US administration as focusing mostly on the advisory issued to American citizens in Tunisia.

Noteworthy in this context is to refer to the fact that despite first-blush confusion, time was ample to make foreign powers restore their balance and ride the crest of wave as they began to evaluate and reassess their positions based on these new developments, in a clear attempt to secure interests and cooperation with new emerging regimes. The US, along with many other powers, has all necessary resources and variety of powers to attract or coerce others. For soft power, new regimes can be attracted through development projects, aid, cultural and academic cooperation, scientific and technical support. As per hard power, flexing muscles with strong military force can make new regimes consider their options and polices, while economic sanctions and embargo can be loomed if it is deemed necessary. However, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton prefers the use of what she calls “smart power”, which is a mix between soft power and hard power, especially when it comes to the Middle East region, as Massimo Calabresi describes in his article “Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power” in the TIME MAGAZINE on November 7th, 2011.

As the events unfolded, a third group finds in the new Arab revolutions or the Arab Spring a rich scientific material, worth studying and investigating. It can be a good venue to examine old theories and a critical platform to initiate new theories of international politics. On the one hand, some linked the aspects and events of the Arab Spring to the school of realism as per the interpretation of the state of chaos, alliances and the use of force. Others explain the Arab Spring from a neo-liberal approach as to explain the role of soft power of some regional countries and superpowers, the role of diplomacy that influenced the course of events and finally the interdependence among countries of the Arab Spring. Another approach tries to validate the theory of revolutions and its components and contours as per the trajectory of Arab revolts. Last but not least, other scholars see the role theory dovetails with the events and the most appropriate approach to explain the role and leverage of regional and global powers in the course of such events.

On the other hand, another novel approaches appeared on the surface, trying to interpret the Arab Spring into new theories. For instance, some scholars, like Larry Diamond and Ali Sarihan see in the Arab revolts “the fourth wave of democratization”, with reference to the concept developed by Samuel M. Huntington, yet the latter believes the third wave is still ongoing. Other scholars consider the current Arab revolts the third stage or wave of modern Arab revolutions- as addressed in our previous article entitled “New Spring: Middle East between Date of revolutions and the future of the country.”

Inter alia, one can say that the Arab Spring represented a glimmer of hope for Arabs, albeit alas the longevity, failure at times, and escalation of violence and bloodshed, along with unfavorable repercussions permeated the sense of frustration, leading to a loss of zeal, questioning the purposes, motives and even the goals of these revolts. Doubt started to creep and uncertainty began to haunt hope, especially with the explicit and overt foreign scramble in the region after the current transformations. Nevertheless, it would be so naïve and superficial to qualm the motives of those who initiated these revolts and the remaining responsibility will be upon the new leaders and regimes that collected the fruits of this spring to fare well and serve their own people, while maintaining good relations with the others and dislodging the dichotomies that have poisoned the Middle East for ages.

May, 2013

Twitter @FElhusseini

On April 26 2013, I had the great honor to attend a lecture on Democracy, Solidarity, and the European Crisis by one of the foremost thinkers of our age, Professor Jürgen Habermas. The event, which can now be watched online, took place at the premises of a very important center of knowledge in Belgium, if not worldwide, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and was introduced by the President of the European Council, Mr. Herman Van Rompuy.

The purpose of the present blog post is not to put forward a eulogy to Habermas, nor to engage in a hermeneutical exercise of the meaning underlying his pronouncements, but only to isolate some of the key remarks in his speech and use them as an impetus for propounding my own thoughts on the subjects concerned.

Without willing to dwell on introductory remarks, I shall proceed with the present post that is divided into thematic sections that are based on quotes excerpted from the transcript of Habermas’ lecture. Please note that this is a very long piece of text, containing a number of ideas I have on a range of issues and, as such, I would recommend that you consider each section as an article in its own capacity, even though all of them are constituent parts of the same architecture of thought and should be treated as such (I allowed each section to have its own permanent link which you can copy, bookmark or share separately). Parts I, II and III are closely related to actual European politics, whereas IV falls under the realm of political theory, most probably in the Aristotelean sense of the term “political”.

Contents:
I. “Postponing democracy is a rather dangerous move”
II. The politics of the Eurocore
III. Germany in the context of an asymmetric Europe
IV. Of the organic democracy and its tension with the heteronomy of the existing nation-state

I. “Postponing democracy is a rather dangerous move”

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On the tension between technocracy and democracy that is inherent in European integration and especially on the Blueprint towards a Deep and Genuine Economic Monetary Union that was put forth by the Commission in late 2012, Habermas spoke thus:

Supranational democracy remains the declared long term goal on paper. But postponing democracy is a rather dangerous move. If the economic constraints by the markets happily meet the flexibility of a free-floating European technocracy, there arise the immediate risk that the gradual unification process which is planned for, but not by the people will grind to a halt before the proclaimed goal of rebalancing the executive and the parliamentary branches is reached. Uncoupled from democratically enacted law and without feedback from the pressing dynamics of a mobilized political public sphere and civil society, political management lacks the impulse and the strength to contain and redirect the profit-oriented imperatives of investment capital into socially compatible channels. As we can observe already to-day, the authorities would more and more yield to the neoliberal pattern of politics. A technocracy without democratic roots would not have the motivation to accord sufficient weight to the demands of the electorate for a just distribution of income and property, for status security, public services, and collective goods when these conflicted with the systemic demands for competitiveness and economic growth. [...]

[T]he steering capacities which are lacking at present, though they are functionally necessary for any monetary union, could and should be centralized only within the framework of an equally supranational and democratic political community.

In as far as technocracy is concerned, I certainly agree with the distinguished professor. Besides, I have already published a scathing critique on the rise of technocracy in Europe(December 15, 2012), as a reaction to the Commission’s blueprint and the European Council’s corresponding roadmap for the completion of the EMU. Today, under the profoundly intergovernmental principle of “shared sovereignty” or “joint responsibility”, decision makers have emphasized on the rules and institutions governing the fiscal conduct of individual Member States. The deficiencies of the original Stability and Growth Pact, namely the effective non-enforcability of its provisions on an ex ante basis, are now being addressed by means of secondary legislation that have introduced such confederal arrangements as the European Semester and which have placed the ideocentric foundations for the installation of a permanent “troika” mechanism of surveillance and economic control, manifested in the euphemistically branded “reform contracts” for “competitiveness and growth”.

There is no doubt whatsoever that institutions must be set in place to provide for the application of laws and agreements and to ensure the predictability and foreseeability of political action at the Community level, as well as guarantee a degree of coordination and homogeneity. What has been meticulously omitted from this much-needed reformulation of the legal-institutional context, is the corresponding legitimacy that derives from the sovereignty of the citizens. The reconstruction of the EMU has been limited to the reinforcement of the preemptive and corrective arms of fiscal discipline and macroeconomic symmetry, exemplified in the fiscal compact, the two-pack and the six-pack. In this regard and without having improved the input legitimacy of the institutional architecture, Europe quatechnocratic abstraction presents itself as the arbiter of economic prudence and the enforcer of budgetary orthodoxy, without any citizen or collective of citizens having a direct say on the matter; for while the EU is a “Union of Democracies”, at least in principle, it nonetheless is not a democracy as such, since as the fallacy of composition clearly demonstrates, the aggregation of the parts is not necessarily equal to the whole; and the “whole” that is the EU unfortunately has as its executive function, the Commission, which is non-electable by the citizens, and the European Council that is a platform for intergovernmental deliberations which on their own capacity are devoid of input legitimacy, let alone transparency, as they are an amalgamation of often opaque governmental interests, rather than having an organic form, as ought to be the case in any fully integrated polity, where the popular will is transmitted via the numerous media of political action to the decision-makers and vice versa, in a manner that represents a unified entity in which one part cannot operate without the other; or in other words, in which secrecy and democratic illegitimacy are not tolerated and cannot withstand the test of time.

Underpinning these shifts in European diplomacy from looser inter-governmentalism to tighter confederalism, is the static rationale of incrementalism to integration, which presupposes the passivity of the electorate vis-à-vis the harmonization or approximation of the technocratic aspects of the EU, the corresponding concentration of power at the EU level and the concomitant erosion of democracy at the national level and in whole, manifested in the incapacity of an elected government—any government at any level of power—and a politically-conscious populous to conduct, inter alia, economic policy on a self-determined basis. The most visible change that the Great Recession and the Eurocrisis brought upon Europe is the realization by the people that the European Union, apart from being heavily exposed to the vicissitudes of global finance, shadowy banking and the increasing complexity of financial and fiscal engineering, is of utmost importance in the daily life of each citizen, even at the local level, which suggests that the pervasive indifference that once allowed European politicians congregating some European institution to determine policy in the absence of popular will or even against such a volksgeist, is about to become—or already is—a legacy of the old, probably defunct modus operandi of European integration.

As I have noted before in my critique of European meta-nationalism and the usually oneiric exogenous impetus to integration it makes judicious reference to, the magnificent phantomality of “More Europe”, the vagueness and nothingness it entails, cannot delude vigilant citizens for much longer, for it has already been understood that state power must be counter-balanced by popular control and meaningful participation, rather than the pitiful scaffolds appended to the EU architecture on the institutional “involvement” of citizens within the framework of the year 2013, the “European year of citizens”; implying that a thoroughgoing democratization of the EU edifice is necessary in present time, not as a groundless wish or a figment for the years to come; because as soon as citizens witness, for instance, the annual budget of their elected government being vetoed against by the Commission, following the proceedings of the European semester, they will no longer be keen to proceed with “more Europe”, as that phraseology will rightly offer them the impression of granting even more power to unelected overlords and economic tzars. A genuine EMU pre-requires the institution of a true European democracy—and it needs it now, before the euroscepticism of our time blends naturally with the exuberant europhobia that technocratic oversight over daily political life will certainly engender.

Alas, if one is to read through the aforementioned Commission Blueprint for the EU, will see on page 35 the clear intention to obfuscate and to hide the fact that the we are already living in a democratically inadequate European entity; in a piece of text which, in addition, provides the grounds for the derision and vilification of anyone willing to extend a critique to the citadel of technocracy that is gaining shape in Europe. The said text of page 35 of the Blueprint reads as follows (emphasis mine):

The Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EU’s unique model of supranational democracy, and in principle set an appropriate level of democratic legitimacy in regard of today’s EU competences. Hence, as long as EMU can be further developed on this Treaty basis, it would be inaccurate to suggest that insurmountable accountability problems exist.

I am afraid to point out that such Olympian pronouncements have nothing to do with reality and as a matter of fact they are a panoply of misinformation and falsehoods. The EU’s democratic legitimacy is largely inadequate and if there is no Treaty change, ideally a true European constitution, or at least a proto-contistution, it will be impossible to remain silent to the accountability and power asymmetries that will arise or be aggrandized and the problems resulting from them be exacerbated. Professor Habermas is certainly correct in saying that postponing democracy is a rather dangerous move, especially in these times where people across the land are becoming ever more loud and vociferous in asking for justice and democratic legitimacy, properly understood.

II. The politics of the Eurocore

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Habermas clearly is in favor of a European democracy and he believes that this can or must emerge within the EU rather than being a democracy of the EU. He stated the following:

What is necessary in the first place is a consistent decision to expand the European Monetary Union into a Political Union (that would remain open, of course, to the accession of other EU member states, in particular Poland). This step would for the first time signify a serious differentiation of the Union into a core and a periphery. The feasibility of necessary changes in the European treaties would depend essentially on the consent of countries preferring to stay out. In the worst case a principled resistance had to be overcome only by a re-foundation of the Union (based on the existing institutions).

I term this kind of approach, which I essentially disagree with even though it is the zeitgeist in many influential circles, the politics of the “Eurocore”, for it clearly advocates the formation of a politically integrated core that will stand against or in juxtaposition to the rest of the EU’s Member States, presumably exerting a power of attraction on them, which is nonetheless a mere hypothesis of an optimistic sort. I have taken note of this tendency in many of my previous articles, such as “The (euro)crisis of nationalism” (August 6 2012) and “The failure of ideology, not Germany” (December 12, 2012).

The very existence of the Euro area, as a stage of closer state cooperation within the European Union, constitutes a turning point in the history of European integration. Its significance exists in the shift in approach the governments of Member States adopted with respect to the diplomatic means used for the further development of the European project. The principle of unanimity, which once was the condicio sine qua non for integration, was decisively swept into the dustbin of history with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht and the consequent Treaties, which introduced the possibility of a number of states to proceed with further integration, leaving others behind in the process. The creation of the Euro as ade facto “enhanced cooperation” of certain Member States was the manifestation of this change in principles.

The euro was and is a stateless currency, yet it is crystal clear that the imaginary institutions of a fiat monetary system and a sovereign state are so inextricably bound up together, both conceptually and historically, that no monetary union per se may ever be made sustainable on a long term basis, as has already been proven to be the case with the eurocrisis; and, conversely, no unified state may ever be truly sovereign as state without a fully and properly functioning common currency in place. Historically, logically and practically the Euro has always been the conduit to a European federation, with the tacit understanding that “federation” in this respect means nothing more than a mere re-allocation of state functions across the various layers of government, without entailing some of the ideologically-intensive elements that the original federalist and democratic movements envisioned. Should a federation of this de-conceptualized version emerge in Europe in the years to come, it will most likely spring from the Euro area and might not necessarily encompass the EU as a whole but only a collective of states, who will effectively usurp the European Union or completely reshape its institutional morphology.

In light of the politics of the Eurocore and to appreciate the significance of the Euro in the concatenation of events leading to a European federation, it is of paramount importance to remind our selves of the original approach governments had to European politics. Ever since the early years of European integration, from the 1950’s onwards, the governments of the six founding Member States of the European Community thought it expedient and politically pragmatic to proceed with incremental and orderly steps for the harmonization of certain economic policies along the lines of the Aristotelian golden mean or, more fully, by adhering to the principle of unanimity as the only suitable way for the materialization of the project for an ever-closer community of states in the post-WWII Europe.

The process was excruciatingly slow, sclerotic and inefficient, requiring laborious efforts from all sides involved, in finding common grounds for agreement between all six governments whose commitment to economic protectionism was still quite strong and readily apparent. Protectionist mentalities did indeed hamper European integration in its early decades, preventing the implementation of important agreements on the single market. Had it not been for the broad interpretations of the Treaties from the side of the European Court of Justice, it could well be said that the political deadlocks could persist for years, making an already cumbersome process ever more inflexible and unworkable.

For reasons that transcend the boundaries of the present essay, this approach was effectively, though partially, discarded with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 1990’s. It then became possible, especially theoretically or rather in terms of political strategy, for certain Member States to proceed with deeper integration while other states could choose to remain outside of the process, clinging on to their sovereignty and the specificities of their national agenda. This change in diplomatic conduct did in effect signify the end or the beginning of the end of the principle of unanimity or consensus as the precondition to integration. Most importantly it effectively separated the European Union as such from the objective of a European federation. The two were no longer considered identical or necessary parts of one another, litanies to the contrary notwithstanding. Though never admitted in the open, it was implicit in the 1990′s agreements that European integration could and would thenceforth mainly be predicated on the basis of the intergovernmental cooperation of a number of consenting states, who would in effect establish a permanent majority within the broader European Union architecture, to forward their own understanding of a European political union. Such a permanent majority has been no other than the euro area’s Member States, which in the passage of time have shown signs of acting more like a unified bloc rather than an amalgamation of otherwise squabbling states; in spite of occasional differences in opinion, approach, tone and objectives. The opt out clauses from the euro area that the UK and Denmark received were the first signs of this seemingly timid and cautious yet profoundly radical shift in political approach. Their exclusion from the monetary union made it evident, even though it remained tacit, that under certain perhaps pressing conditions some states could choose to proceed further in pursuit of any common objective deemed essential for the continuation of the European project, while others could decide not to be involved, remaining therefore at an outer ring, so to speak, of the evolving European Community.

The inferences that could be drawn—and were drawn—from the application of this principle were and still are quite far-reaching. For if it were legitimate or expedient to introduce opt-out clauses for certain states under a given political, economic, social and legal context, with the aim of allowing other Member States to commit to further integration, then it could be claimed, using the same tenets of reasoning, that a complete federation of a sort could emerge within the European Union, not necessarily from or of the European Union. The creation of the euro had set in place a precedent that would—and did—put two irreconcilable world views on European integration, in a collision course, where only one would prevail, leading us to either a loosely confederated, slightly hermaphrodite political system centered around the single market and its related areas of policy; or throwing us into a political milieu where the states in support of full integration would gain the upper hand, and by exercising their majority power, would gradually but systematically usurp the existing complex, multi-tier European superstructure.

Such a scenario can be particularly plausible once considered within the framework of the institutional but mostly political dichotomy within the European Union architecture between Euro area Member States and non-members. The EU as a whole, the one which transcends the boundaries of the monetary union, has in fact no real reason—no pressing need—to pursue any ambitious political end, for its very existence is not directly dependent on the degree of harmonization of policies its Member States may achieve, nor on the scope of such policies. As amiable as the EU, this sui generis political entity, may be for many people, as lofty as the principles underpinning it undoubtedly are, it must be stressed that its very form or main function is rather limited to the maintenance of a certain degree of conformity to some general guidelines of economic policy. The EU’s raison d’être is in practice to maintain a relative free trade zone in Europe, a quasi-single market, always by respecting one of the oldest meta-ethical doctrines of European political thought, that of the national sovereignty of all of its Member States. It is almost impossible for the EU qua single market organization to circumvent the obstacles that national sovereignties pose towards a transitory process for genuine federalization.

In contrast the euro area, for it to be economically but mostly socially and politically sustainable as a monetary union or as a union per se, may sooner or later only follow either of the two paths:

• the suboptimal one: the one leading to the orderly disintegration of the euro and the gradual re-introduction of national currencies, or to the creation of two or more homogeneous currency unions, to cater to the particular needs of the states involved, as a counter-measure to the impracticable one-size-fits-all approach in the absence of a surplus recycling mechanism,
• the optimal one: to the genuine federalization of the euro area, which implies the formation of a banking union, a fiscal union and a democratic political union to complete and to render workable the euro as a common currency and as a shared political cause.

With the above in mind, it is crystal clear that what Habermas suggests, is but a re-affirmation of the principle that has been carefully and consistently applied over the last two decades or so. The politics of the Eurocore are the standard of our time, be it a desirable one or not, thus the problématique which arises, at least for those willing to remain open to the greater picture, is to make them as workable as possible, so that they do not end up being divisive and to result in the kind of fission that characterizes European political history. Understandably the implicit “we-they” approach to integration and the accompanying introduction of ad hoc opt-outs or other institutional arrangements that compound the complexity of the broader edifice, shall place a time bomb at the foundations of the European polity, by producing varying and inconsistent classes of states and of citizens.

III. Germany in the context of an asymmetric Europe

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Habermas also elaborated on his views about solidarity and the role of Germany in the present European context, saying that:

The leadership role that falls to Germany today for demographic and economic reasons is not only awakening historical ghosts all around us but also tempts us to choose a unilateral national course, or even to succumb to power fantasies of a “German Europe” instead of a “Germany in Europe”. We Germans should have learned from the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century that it is in our national interest to avoid permanently the dilemma of a semi-hegemonic status that can hardly held up without sliding into conflicts. Helmut Kohl’s achievement is not the reunification and the reestablishment of a certain national normality per se, but the fact that this happy event was coupled with the consistent promotion of a policy that binds Germany tightly into Europe.

If one wants to preserve the Monetary Union, it is no longer enough, given the structural imbalances between the national economies, to provide loans to over-indebted states so that each should improve its competitiveness by its own efforts. What is required is solidarity instead, a cooperative effort from a shared political perspective to promote growth and competitiveness in the euro zone as a whole.

The element of correctness of this proposition exists in the fact that it recognizes the correlation between national unity and European orientation and that it stresses the importance of the formulation of a European social imaginary that shall provide the foundations for the political solidarity that citizens across countries will show, in having a normative obligation to provide to their fellows whatever they can afford in times of need, expecting for reciprocity in time.

Solidarity, in its political and meta-ethical sense, only exists as the outward manifestation of the imaginary collectivity, as the primordial commandment for political action in the name of the collective, the milieu which furnishes one with all there is, in the socio-political order of things. In that sense, it has nothing to do with the altruistic teachings of wise people of the past and present, but with a tacit political obligation that is embedded deeply in the shared or common tissue of fixed perceptions that pseudo- a prioristic incorporealities bestow upon the acting subject. Solidarity as a self-instituted political act constitutes the cornerstone of the primary rules that ensure the integrity of the polity, along the lines of a constant reaffirmation of the commitment to the political process.

Against this backdrop, one is permitted to proclaim that in the absence of a European shared political perspective no solidarity of the political sort can be sustained, for the present reality of ad hoc fiscal transfers, conducted under the duress of markets and economic constraints, may only give rise to essentially xenophobic and fractionalistic tendencies.

Nevertheless, the formulation of a shared meta-narrative per se cannot be perceived as a remedy in its own accord and in an ex ante sense, for the quality and content of this imaginary is of cardinal importance in determining the longer-term effect on the community, the fusion or fission it will bring about. In line with what was elucidated in the previous section on the politics of the eurocore, the tendency of the present is to provide the first elements to a European metanationalism that necessitates a European identity, unfortunately brought about through the application of the methodological means of nationalism, in the identification of the people with a state of affairs and a given territory.

It is indeed correct to emphasize the need for all participants to account for the others, but this ought to be embedded in an understanding of the whole, rather than as a sectarian power surge that seeks to unite the “us” as against the arbitrarily defined otherness.

The kind of shared political perspective that the German government and others are molding is one that stems from the further integration of the Euro area, along the lines of an ordoliberal conception of the politico-economic order and in the framework of a confederated European institutional environment that introduces different classes of Member States and their people, thus providing grounds for contradiction and separation, instead of offering a benign impulse for the harmonious combination and infusion of the parts into the whole.

Germany cannot have a hegemonic role in Europe, even if that is depicted as a pressing necessity of the times, for that shall bring about the beginning of the end of the community element that is needed to construct a European democracy. There can be no hierarchies of this sort in a Europe that has been plagued by hegemonic syndromes and nationalistic antagonisms, underpinned by superiority complexes and the exuberant or banal racism they entail.

That granted, it is not enough to speak of the need for Germany to proceed with genuine solidarity, in the sense Habermas ascribes to the term, but to call for a novel approach to European politics, one that is inclusive and which is the product of deliberations among equals, rather than a set of edicts from a superior to an inferior in a typical power structure that cannot withstand the pressures a freedom-seeking people will exert upon it.

As such, the idea of a presumably enlightened “leadership role” for Germany is a pernicious folly, as it places the seeds of hegemonism at the heart of the European project, even if the intention is towards the opposite direction. The role Germany and all others need to conform with, is that of members of a community of equals, at the governmental and citizen level; as a collective of people who ought to define mutually beneficial ends, freed from national prejudices and stereotypical perceptions of policy and polity. This differs fundamentally from what we are currently witnessing or from what may be furnished upon us in the years ahead, should a state or group of states decide to impose upon the rest their understanding of “the good”, in the name or under the pretense of some mystical “historical” responsibility of theirs to act with an iron will (and fist).

IV. Of the organic democracy and its tension with the heteronomy of the existing nation-state

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Habermas also touched upon the presumed function of the nation-state in the supranational structure of a European democracy and suggested something which appears to be very similar, in terms of substance, to a position that moderately conservative leaders such as Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso have put forth before. The following quote is one that I, a libertarian federalist, will subject to criticism:

On the other hand, the step to supranational democracy need not be conceived as a transition to a “United States of Europe.” “Confederation” versus “Federal state” is a false alternative (and a specific legacy of the constitutional discussion in 19th century Germany). The nation states can well preserve their integrity as states within a supranational democracy by retaining both their roles of the implementing administration and the final custodian of civil liberties.

Superficially the argument is plausible, for it suggests the mere addition of a democratic layer on top of the existing administrative architectures across Europe; and in some way, this is already happening to a considerable degree with the piles of European legislation being infused into national law. The presumption is that the democratic legitimation of the European political level can be achieved without substantial material and meta-ethical changes; that is to say without a root and branch reformulation of the imaginary institutions and meta-narratives underpinning the European polity. Such an essentially statist position rests on the age-old perception of the social contract as a pseudo-pragmatic manifestation of an agreement among citizens incorporated in a constitution from whence political legitimacy—sovereignty—springs from. The antecedence of the state and its presupposed legitimacyex ante was introduced to the history of “Western” thought in Plato’s “Crito”, in which Socrates justifies his acceptance of the death sentence against him on the grounds of a tacit contractual obligation of his to the polity of Athens. In a similar sense, the constitutionalization per se of the EU edifice which does not necessitate the profound reorganization of the political order across Europe, can provide the legal fundament upon which European democracy will be erected, as yet another application of a theory that attributes sovereignty to the incorporealities emerging from the trapping of the imaginary named “social contract”.

The tension, if not antinomy, inherent in that conception exists in the indirectness in which legitimacy is achieved as a one-off deal rather than a continuous process of affirmation and self-institution through inclusive and substantive action on a popular level, via participation and interaction; for if the phantomality of the social contract qua legal fundament provides the patina of legitimacy to the state as such, then the organic interrelation of an autonomous polity is rendered obsolete, by virtue of the hetero-institution of legitimacy as an hegemonic and a prioristic, ex cathedra commandment, which transcends the specificities of self-will and time.

The phantasmagorized hetero-institution of society as a passive recipient of enlightened legality has been the standard method for the allocation of power among the members and classes of the arbitrary collective and has had varying forms throughout its long history, either as theocratic totalitarianism, secular imperialism or liberal statism, as in all cases the logos of legality has been the fictionalized emanation of the upper source, of the elite, in its theological, meta-ethical and meta-political context, as that which stands in contradistinction to the self-determination of the citizen qua individual or collective who is bound by—and who operates within—the specificities of locality, culturality, institutionality and temporality.

Politics as the distribution of power among the members of the organized human society, can only be of an autonomous, organic form once founded upon the basis of a self-instituted-and-instituting collective of sovereign citizens, of self-conscious political actors who are fully aware that legitimacy stems from within, as a continuous affirmation, a confirmation of the popular will, as an ongoing process of creative-and-creating change in the imaginary institutions that permeate and penetrate political conduct, in the primary rules that establish primordial relations and in the secondary rules that stipulate specific conditionalities for given actions.

Organic democracy as the polity of an autonomous society cannot withstand the hetero-institution that constitutionalism, nationalism, theocracy or other emanations of the incorporeal universal collective bestow upon the minds of the participants in the political process. A democracy that springs from the top, or from an exterior source that is indirectly related to the existing citizens cannot be anything than an enlightened version of the oligarchies and other heteronomous concoctions of political control that have dominated the history of humankind; as in those arrangements the meta-political element is that of a robust hierarchy, with legitimacy concentrated in an elitist center of a kind, whereas in contrast the organic polity is the self-determined society that always exists in the present as a continuous affirmation of legitimacy stemming from each and every citizen and which is free from any influence that spectralized collectives may impose upon political drasis and theorisis.

The “who” and the “what” in an organic democracy are determined from within, without any power structure determining the order and manner of that which is, in the way and extent that it is. Consequently, the preservation of the nation-state as the effective conservation of the meta-ethical incorporeality of the nation qua ontology cannot be perceived as anything but a permutation in the spectrum of heteronomy, as yet another manifestation of the exterior “who” and “what” that shapes and animates the society of citizens in ways that transcend individualities, space, time and related particularities. The hetero-institution of this nationalism can only be a hierarchical structure that places the locus of sovereignty in the fantastic realms of nationality and supra-nationality, whose being is postulated as anterior to the citizen and whose superiority to them is perceived as a given, as a quasi-religious conviction whose ethical veneer cannot be penetrated by the logic of the will to autonomy. The nation-state as being the “custodian” of civil liberties is but another application of the heteronomous doctrines that dominate history; it is, in other words, a reconfiguration, perhaps a relative rationalization, of the suboptimality that already exists.

An organic democracy in Europe cannot exist in the presence of such meta-narratives that are attached to the now-exalted notions of “nation” and “state”, for their being fictitious universalities introduces the heteronomous element to political action, undermining the self-determination and auto-institution of the citizens’ society.

One may only pause to ponder on all of the above, thinking of our present predicament, to choose the kind of future we wish to make out of it, for us.

Picture credit: Protesilaos Stavrou, Creative Commons BY-NC-SA

Footnotes on Jürgen Habermas lecture in Leuven about the European crisis | Protesilaos Stavrou — Originally published on April 28, 2013.

By Graham Bishop, economic analyst and founder of www.grahambishop.com The authors of the HMG paper ‘Scotland analysis: Currency and monetary policy’ (23 April 2013) faced a fundamental difficulty from the outset: If they were wholly non-partisan, then any merits in the case for Scotland joining the euro could be turned round and applied correspondingly to the [...]

By Brian Gardner Whatever dreams environmentalists may have of a world fed by a chemical-free organic agriculture, the hard reality is likely to be something very different. Laudable though the green farming paradigm may be, it is certain that a largely increased and more prosperous world population will only be fed by increased agricultural output. Such increase can only be achieved by the increased inputs of fertiliser, crop protection measures and better technique.

Euractiv has a piece on the clinical trials proposal that has attracted a number of comments – including one from me.

It would be great if more people joined in – on any side of the question.

Here is the link

A lot has been written in recent years since the crisis started about values and the European Social Model. Although funnily enough, most of these are the same values as they were over a century ago in the progressive movement and are still very relevant today. The European Union states six core values in its Charter of fundamental rights: Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ rights and Justice. To be noted here, that is the fundamental rights and not the fundamental values of the EU. Nevertheless these are all widely accepted as the being the basis for European society.

However, there is a clear difference between values, rights and principles. When progressives define their values, they speak on the three core values of equality, solidarity and freedom.

Thus, we have to distinguish this from principles and rights. For instance, equality is a value but equality of opportunities is a principle. Values are generally sets of beliefs about good and bad, right and wrong, and about many other aspects of living and interacting in the society with others. Principles can be described as rules or laws that are universal in nature.

Whilst policy talks on values take place in times of crisis, often the meaning of values and principles is misused. When conservatives are talking about Social Europe they talk about a Social Union. This is different from the progressive approach. Social Europe is at the root of the European approach of the labour movements. Social Europe stands for the understanding of European integration as a way to ensure that there is sustainable growth for all citizens in order to ensure better living and working conditions. Social Europe stands for all the three core values of the progressives. Social Union stands only for harmonisation of social standards and welfare programmes. There is a huge difference!

Very easily we can elucidate that Europe needs a paradigm shift in economic policy and governance. When we discuss alternatives to the current austerity policies we have to get a better understanding of the roots of the crisis and the threat of neo-liberalism towards core values of equality and solidarity. The crisis policy of the European Union and the conservative governments is a policy of emergency measures in order to re-establish the system. This has led us to a situation of the so-called “TINA-approach”. But TINA will not give us the expected results. Europe needs to embark on a new trajectory where job creation, equity and growth are at the centre across all areas in Europe to ensure the core value of European integration, which is solidarity.

Also fiscal policy has to ensure sustainable levels of aggregate demand and therefore serve our values. The two famous post-Keynesian economists Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer have long argued that a budget deficit will continue as long as investment is not strongly recovering and as long as households are not able to spend without incurring high levels of debt.

When the disastrous debate on the European budget took place last year it came out very clearly that a cut in the budget cannot assure increase in investment and promote job creation growth policies. This is a threat on the core European values of equality and solidarity and I could continue evoking such examples for a lot longer.

The need however is to be clear about what the values are and their meaning. In this respect it is even more obvious that currently Europe is turning its back on its citizens. It is simply not responding to the core values set out within society and established at the creation of the European Union. As a consequence the citizens distrust its policies.

This is the trap we are in at the moment. Europe needs to re-engage in its core values in order to regain citizen’s trust and move forwards!

By Jana Hainsworth At least the EU institutions have understood the urgency of the issue: child poverty is rising and we need to invest now to avoid long-term social and economic decline. Today one in four children in the EU is at risk of poverty or already experiencing it. That equals 25.3 million children. The [...]

La ministre des Sports, de la Jeunesse et de la Vie associative Valérie Fourneyron et le ministre délégué chargé de la Ville François Lamy ont signé le 4 avril, dans le quartier politique de la ville de la Grand’Mare à Rouen, la première convention triennale d’objectifs entre ministères en faveur des quartiers populaires, comme l’avait souhaité Jean-Marc Ayrault dans sa circulaire du 30 novembre dernier.

Les objectifs de cette convention : Permettre aux jeunes des quartiers populaires un meilleur accès aux installations sportives, aux clubs et à la pratique d’un sport individuel, mais aussi les informer et les  motiver quant aux possibilités qu’offre le service civique, tout en simplifiant les lourdes procédures auxquelles sont confrontées les associations des quartiers politique de la ville.
A terme, les résultats escomptés sont l’égalité d’accès à une pratique sportive pour tous les jeunes, que 7.500 jeunes des quartiers s’engagent en 2013 dans un service civique, une meilleure connaissance des associations en renouvelant le dialogue et le travail des associations de quartier facilité.
Sport et Citoyenneté, qui s’attache à favoriser l’accès au sport pour tous et toutes a notamment développé le sujet dans une précédente revue, parue en mars 2009 (revue 6 Sport et Insertion sociale)
Revue consultable en libre accès

Plus d’information

By Marek Siwiec MEP Information on the settlement of the Cypriot crisis hit today’s press covers. Articles feature pictures of furious people, most of whom are mad at Brussels. It was bad Brussels who ordered to close the banks and is actually to be blamed for everything. Angry Cypriots and sympathetic citizens of other countries deserve a few words of truth.

Süleyman Çelebi, CHP İstanbul deputy, Member of Health, Family and Social Affairs Commission I would like to provide you with a summary of CHP’s appeal to Constitutional Court for cancellation and stay of execution of the relevant articles and provisions of the Law on Trade Unions and Collective Agreements (Law 6356). Süleyman Çelebi CHP Deputy [...]

The parliament of the Republic of Cyprus has approved a total of nine new pieces of legislation aiming at restructuring the domestic banking system by, inter alia, granting more powers to the Central Bank and providing a backstop to the disorderly disintegration of the unsustainable economic model that has hitherto been lauded by local politicians as a “grand achievement”, a “milestone of strategic importance” and other such obscurantist apologetics to the otherwise crony-capitalist financialization of the economy. Two of these new laws are of significant importance in terms of their ramifications. Those namely are the law imposing capital controls and the law establishing the euphesticaly-branded “National Solidarity Fund”.

Capital controls and the loss of credibility

The law envisaging restrictive measures on transactions in case of emergency (see the law in Greek) effectively places stringent capital controls and limitations on daily market operations. Its content can be summarized thus (fellow blogger Euronomist has also published a post on this):

• Restrictions on withdrawals, with a robust ceiling of €10.000 per month,
• Ban on premature termination of time savings deposits,
• Compulsory renewal of all time savings deposits upon maturity,
• Conversion of current accounts to time deposits,
• Ban or restrictions on non cash transactions,
• Restrictions on the use of debit, credit or prepaid debit cards,
• Ban or restriction on cashing in checks,
• Restrictions on domestic interbank transfers or transfers within the same bank,
• Restrictions on the transactions of the public with credit institutions,
• Restrictions on movements of capital, payments, transfers,
• Imposition of any other measures which the Finance Minister or the Governor of the Central Bank consider necessary on the grounds of promoting public policy and of safeguarding public security.

Understandably, the state is using its monopoly of coercion to impose severe limitations on the broader population, which in conjunction with the direct and indirect losses that will derive from the haircuts that will be imposed in the context of the restructuring of Cyprus’ two mega-banks (Popular and Cyprus bank), will confirm what I noted before concerning the Eurogroup’s suboptimal decision, namely that: the cost for the downsizing of the Cypriot banking system will be borne by those who had no substantive gain from the speculative bonanza that preceded the economic crisis.

Without prejudice to the efforts of economists to penetrate the hermeneutic patina of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with regard to capital controls, it has become readily apparent that the credibility of both the domestic banking system and the political establishment have been reduced into insignificance. On the one hand, the banking system will be in no position to bestow upon clients the confidence that is necessary for the mobilization of private capital in investments, while on the other hand the domestic political class will have great difficulty convincing anyone of its capacity to regulate the economy in a manner that is transparent, predictable and just.

The former’s chilling effects will be fully realized over the medium-to-long term; and even though one could expound on the theory that only the bubble-proness will be contained, there still is a substantial amount of sustainable and productive transactions and ventures that will be irreparably hampered, whatever that may entail in terms of opportunities forgone.

As for the latter, this has already been made manifest in the unwillingness of the Russian government to proceed with the agreement on a “full package” for the macroeconomic adjustment of the Cypriot economy. If the Russian elite, whose hegemonic ambitions in the broader region cannot be underestimated, is not willing to effectively buy out Cyprus at this stage, then how can we expect other players on the theatre of international relations to act in a decisive fashion? Doesn’t this also raise profound questions as to the actual geo-economic value of these much-touted gas reserves to the south of the island, at least for those states whose alternatives can be less demanding in financial, diplomatic and strategic terms? Should that be the case, then we would have to take note of another egregious error from Cyprus’ political system in placing a preposterously disproportional amount of political capital in an otherwise risky, perhaps chimerical, enterprise.

The so-called “National Solidarity Fund”

With the afore-mentioned in mind, let us proceed to a critical exegesis of the assumptions and political orientations underpinning the law establishing the legal person known as the “national solidarity fund” (see the law in Greek). The raison d’être of this fund is to infuse capital to Cyprus’ failing banks and, in general, to participate in their recapitalization. As for the resources that this fund will command, these can be enumerated thus:

• revenues of the Republic of Cyprus deriving from the (future) exploitation of gas reserves,
• ownership titles or bonds that it issues, tacitly backed by the gas reserves and, presumably, the capacity of the state to impose further taxes, arbitrary restrictions etc.
• acquisition, management and disposal of equity, bonds or ownership titles from any corporation or other legal person,
• donations or contributions that are made by any legal or natural person,
• any other source or legal activity

I personally am highly skeptical of the sustainability and quality of this pitiful scaffold that has been erected to provide support to the collapsing Cypriot architecture. At first, its capital appears to me as being of a dubious quality, for it is effectively attached to a phantasmagorized elevation of the natural gas; to a promise that cannot be met with certainty or in full for a number of reasons:

1. Technical difficulties of mining the gas reserves at the great depth that they are in the middle of the sea, accounting also for the earthquake-prone region of the Levant;
2. Upfront investments that are required to establish the facilities, pipelines, platforms, infrastructure necessary for the exploitation of the reserves and which are estimated to cost up to €30 billion in net present value. Clearly the government of Cyprus will not have anything near that amount for years (decades!) to come, suggesting the need for public-private ventures as well as cooperation with the governments of other countries. Whatever the modalities, it is crystal-clear that the Republic of Cyprus will have to forgo a substantial percentage of the expected profits;
3. Rising competition in the future energy market both in terms of new suppliers of natural gas or increased supply of and demand for alternative energy sources, coupled with the rise in the use of renewables; all of which will exert downward pressures on the market price of Cyprus’ gas reserves, casting to the wind whatever exaggerations the Cypriot political class has consecrated in its desperate effort to cling on to its empty promises towards the public.

The second thing about this fund, which concerns me, is that a major political investment as well as the concoctions for the short-term support of the domestic banking system are placed on a highly-controversial issue which is directly connected to the Cyprus dispute, the Aegean dispute, as well as the Greco-Turkish-Israeli-Cypriot relations with all their facets and permutations (I will write a full analysis of this conundrum in the near future). In as far as the Cyprus dispute is concerned, the present government, in its decision to proceed with the exploitation of the natural gas reserves, is effectively and unfairly pre-empting negotiations with the Cypriot community of the North (known as the “Turkish-Cypriots”).

In particular, the appalling injustice underlying the decision of Mr. Anastasiades’ government is found in the evident discrimination against the Turkish-Cypriots, for even though they officially are recognized as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, they are de facto excluded from any benefits that the exploitation of the natural gas will yield. If the Republic of Cyprus, whose effective sovereignty only extends over the South of the island, is allowed to unilaterally exploit this natural endowment, then how can anyone expect its political class to be willing to develop a spirit of honest consensuality when heading to negotiate a share of these revenues with their compatriots in the North?

To cut the longer story short, the politics of the gas reserves, in the way these are now being shaped by Mr. Anastasiades, seem to me as suggesting three possibilities:

• The effective exploitation of the reserves only by the Greek-Cypriot community (the South), which clearly introduces a preferential treatment towards a part of the Cypriot citizens as to the detriment of others;
• The concomitant reinforcement of the drift towards the de jure partition of the island that will be suboptimal for all sides involved;
• The recrudescence of the problématique of acknowledging the right to self-determination the Turkish-Cypriot community has, something that no state in the world, bar Turkey, has been willing to do heretofore.

Concerning the last issue, I am of the iconoclastic opinion that the Turkish-Cypriots are fully entitled to self-determination, given the unjust treatment they have been subjected to for several decades; and I am uttering thus in full knowledge that some timid souls will consider it a sacrilege to the hallucinatory meta-ethics attached to the notions of the “fatherland”, the “ancestors”, the “nation” etc.

Concluding remarks

Several delays and inane decisions have contributed to a situation that is rather toxic. In social and economic terms the present generation is sacrificed in the name of rectifying the strategic errors of previous governments, especially with respect to the institution of the financial system as the central pillar of the economy. The lower and middle parts of the income distribution, as well as the youth and the entrepreneurial persons, will all be faced with rigid constraints brought upon them by the systemic failure of the politico-institutional order in Cyprus and the Euro area.

On the political front, the Cyprus dispute, already a highly complex problem, has just become even more difficult to solve; which for people like myself, who would happily labor for the reunification of the Cypriots, is a lamentable setback. The community of the North is deprived of its legitimate claims and rights, while the South seems to gain an asymmetric benefit from the exploitation of gas reserves that should in principle belong to all, not just the Greek-Cypriots, or, a fortiriori, the bankers and their cliques, whose interests are inextricably bound up together with the stratagems of the domestic political establishment.

It’s a pity for the people of that patch of earth called Cyprus, because all this could and should have been avoided…

Originally published on March 23, 2013.

By Protesilaos Stavrou In the early hours of March 25, the eurogroup reached an agreement on the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus, which is in my humble opinion more just than the previous deal that placed asymmetric losses on small depositors while not touching senior bondholders when dealing with the downsizing of the banking system. The new agreement focuses at the heart of the problem, namely Cyprus’ two mega-banks, Popular (Laiki) and Bank of Cyprus; and the decisions agreed upon will lead to measures that will greatly diminish the size of these two banks that now comprise the largest part of the domestic banking system.

L’influence n’est pas une chose  facile à définir.

Qu’est-ce qu’un niveau d’influence efficace ? La notion peut être cadrée de façon à la fois subjective et objective.

L’influence de quelqu’un ou de quelque chose peut s’évaluer à l’aune d’un succès commercial, de la réputation que s’est construite un opérateur ou du réseau de contacts professionnels bâti par un individu.

Chaque individu ou organisation peut juger de son niveau d’influence en prenant  en considération un de ces critères.

L’influence sur les réseaux sociaux peut surgir de n’importe qui

A l’heure des médias sociaux, la notion d’influence évolue.

Sur les réseaux sociaux, n’importe qui peut demain devenir, très vite, un influenceur. Le degré d’influence n’est pas lié à un passé.

Les influenceurs sur les réseaux sociaux sont souvent des personnes passionnées qui se métamorphosent en experts. Ils tirent profit de leur présence sur les réseaux sociaux pour cueillir des dividendes personnels ou des dividendes pour la marque ou l’organisation qu’ils représentent.

L’un de leurs principaux mérites est de déclencher des discussions et des échanges susceptibles d’influencer la compréhension d’une problématique et/ou ds comportements.

Influence objectivable

De par leur transparence, les réseaux sociaux permettent d’évaluer l’influence à partir d’éléments objectifs : nombre de personne dans le réseau, nombre de fois où l’information qu’ils diffusent est relayée…

Encore faut-il s’entendre sur des axes de comparaison.

Plusieurs nomenclatures d’influence existent.

La matrice de Klout

L’outil d’analyse Klout, par exemple, a réalisé une matrice classifiant différents types d’influenceurs sur les réseaux sociaux.

Cette analyse identifie une quinzaine de profils principaux, répartis selon les axes suivants :

• informel <=> substantiel
• écoute     <=> participation
• partage   <=> création
• général   <=> spécialisé

Il en découle les profils d’influenceurs tels que le spécialiste, l’activiste, le socialisateur, l’observateur, le diffuseur ou le curateur (voir tableau ci-dessus).

Cinq autres profils

Une autre cartographie d’influenceurs sur le web, développée par Outspoken, rappelée par le site Yourbrandinc, réduit la description à cinq profils principaux.

Cette liste de profils d’influenceurs est composée comme suit :

1. Le réseauteur

Il est celui qui dispose de la plus longue liste de contacts et qui est omniprésent sur toutes les plates-formes en ligne. Il ou elle connaît tout le monde et il ou elle est connu(e) de tout le monde

2. Le leader d’opinion

Il ou elle est celui ou celle qui peut devenir les meilleurs ambassadeurs d’une marque. Il ou elle a bâti une crédibilité forte dans son domaine d’expertise. Les publications des leaders d’opinion sont souvent très largement commentées et re-tweetées.

3. Les découvreurs de tendance

Il s’agit de celui ou de celle qui est en général le ou la première à utiliser un futur outil, une future plate-forme populaire ou à mettre en avant un nouveau concept. Ils sont en permanence à l’affût. Ils ont un talent rare pour dénicher et comprendre les modèles qui rencontreront le succès quelques mois plus tard.

4. Le partageur

Il/elle collecte l’information pertinente dans un domaine et la canalise pour qu’elle parvienne à bon port auprès de journalistes, décideurs ou blogueurs qui comptent dans leur sphère d’activité. Il ou elle ont un rôle d’amplification pour certaines informations.

5. Le consommateur quotidien

Ils sont des usagers lambdas de produits ou services. Ils ont toutefois un rare talent pour narrer les expériences qu’ils ont du quotidien. Lorsqu’un problème survient, ou lorsque quelque chose leur semble extraordinaire, ils ont tendance à rapidement en faire part sur les plates-formes en ligne. Leur réseau de contacts est, en général, assez étendu.

Tenir compte de la cible de l’influence

L’influenceur est une chose… L’influence n’existe toutefois pas sans influencé….

Michael Wu, analyste spécialisé dans les interactions sociales, met en avant une série de critères qui rendent l’influencé réceptif à l’influence. Les voici :

1. La pertinence de l’information

A quel point le besoin d’information de l’ « influencé » coïncide-t-il avec l’expertise de l’influenceur. Si l’information manque de pertinence, la cible de l’influence n’y prêtera pas attention.

2. Le timing

Le fait de diffuser l’information au bon moment, au moment où la curiosité de l’influencé sur le sujet est maximale, est un élément clé de l’influence. La fenêtre est parfois étroite. En dehors de celle-ci, la même information peut ne plus trouver la moindre oreille attentive.

3. Le bon endroit

Si l’influencé n’est pas actif sur la plate-forme sur laquelle l’influence s’active, aucune chance que l’un et l’autre se trouve. Trivial, mais facteur indispensable.

4. La confiance

Il ne suffit pas que l’influenceur soit crédible dans son domaine. L’influencé, pour être réellement sensibilisé, devra également témoigner d’une certaine confiance en lui. Il doit être convaincu des intentions nobles de l’influenceur…