When people in Brussels look out to the 27 EU countries, they tend to forget that hardly anyone looks back. Polls and election turnouts confirm that for vast parts of the EU population, the national perspective prevails a long time before the European one. What lessons for the European Union to be learnt?

Events over the last few days should not come as a surprise. Mr Cameron has for a while now been unable to impose his authority upon his party on the issue of EU membership. Even though he has expressed the wish to keep Britain in the EU (albeit the reduced, one-dimensional and irrelevant EU he [...]

By Marek Siwiec MEP You could say – this is a model operation with the use of national and European “forces and resources.” When David Cameron warned that he will be turning the bolt for immigrants, including immigrants from the EU, there was an unusual silence. The exception was the inquiry to the Prime Minister from Janusz Palikot (the second inquiry so far).

In the last three years I have visited Warsaw regularly. It is interesting to follow the evolution of this country and its connection to the mechanism of the European Union. In Poland, the leaders of the institutions, corporations, unions, media, NGOs and think-tanks are concerned and discuss topics such as the euro in 2016, the [...]

Since its reunification 22 years ago, Germany has become the leading economic power in Europe. The sovereign debt crisis has offered it the opportunity to translate economic might into political clout within the EU. Problem is, as the austerity policies currently ravaging the continent illustrate, German politicians – from both the right and the New Left – are rather ill-prepared for such a responsible role.

This assessment belongs to former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who in 2011 cautioned his party and conationals against issuing economic diktats and against insensitivity to the plight of other, economically less fortunate, EU members (speech re-published by Alternatives Economiques in 2012). He mentioned the fact that the German trade surplus had been obtained at the expense of other countries’ deficits. (Gerhard Schröder labour market reforms prevent Germany from acting as consumer of last resort in Europe, as the purchasing power of millions of Germans has suffered severe reductions over the past few years. The current leadership’s refusal to introduce a minimum hourly wage and its insistence on the imposition of draconian austerity packages in Southern Europe have greatly unsettled a majority of its partners within the Union).

In this election year, German politicians would therefore be wise to keep in mind Helmut Schmidt’s sensible advice:

“Taking into account our central geopolitical position, our unfortunate role in European history until the middle of the 20th century, as well as our current economic performance, the German government has to take the particular care of the interests of our European partners. Such altruism is indispensable.”

Mercredi 17 avril, à Strasbourg, à la demande de l’ALDE, le Parlement européen a débattu de l’état de la démocratie hongroise et des derniers amendements apportés à la Constitution du pays, amendements que l’on accuse de limiter les prérogatives de la Cour constitutionnelle et les libertés civiles en Hongrie. Les députés européens ont exprimé encore une fois toute leur inquiétude et le Parlement prépare une nouvelle résolution.

C’est la troisième fois en un peu plus de deux ans que le Parlement européen a débattu de l’état de la démocratie hongroise et plus précisément des changements constitutionnels qui ont été apportés à la Charte fondamentale du pays. Depuis son arrivée à la tête du pays en Janvier 2012, le parti au pouvoir en Hongrie – qui représente deux tiers des sièges au Parlement – a limité les lois sur le système judiciaire, les déplacements, l’enseignement supérieur, les campagnes électorales et les droits de la famille.

Le Parlement a débattu de ce qui se passe en Hongrie en présence de la ministre irlandaise des affaires européennes, Lucinda Creighton, et de la Vice-présidente de la Commission, Viviane Reding. Cette dernière, en charge de la question, a parlé très franchement et a promis à la Hongrie de nouvelles actions contentieuses si les doutes n’étaient pas levés. La Commission de Venise du Conseil de l’Europe doit rendre mi-juin un avis sur cette quatrième révision de la Constitution hongroise, mais Mme Reding a déjà prévenu qu’elle n’attendrait pas le mois de juin.

La responsable luxembourgeoise a rappelé plusieurs fois la lettre que le président de la Commission européenne Barroso a envoyée à Viktor Orban le vendredi 12 avril : la première analyse légale des amendements avait en effet soulevé de sérieuses interrogations quant à la compatibilité de ces amendements avec le droit européen et le principe de l’État de droit. Il avait donc demandé aux autorités hongroises d’éclaircir au plus vite ces questionnements, sous peine de voir la Commission plancher sur de nouvelles procédures d’infraction. « Je demande instamment à vous et à votre gouvernement de régler ces problèmes et de les résoudre de façon déterminée et sans équivoque. C’est sans doute dans le meilleur intérêt de la Hongrie et de l’Union européenne dans son ensemble », avait insisté le président Barroso.

La Commission des libertés civiles du PE avait elle aussi examiné encore une fois la situation hongroise, lors de la réunion du 8 avril, avec un nouveau document de travail du rapport TAVARES pour évaluer la compatibilité de ces changements législatifs en Hongrie avec les droits et valeurs fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.

Les préoccupations concernent toujours les mêmes questions : le fait que la Hongrie, comme l’a fait observer aussi le Conseil de l’Europe, réintroduise des dispositions transitoires qui avaient été annulées par la Cour constitutionnelle ; le fait qu’elle contredise le droit européen quand elle entend faire reposer sur les citoyens le paiement d’amendes/sanctions infligées par la Cour de Luxembourg ; le fait que l’on ait étendu les pouvoirs du président de l’Office national de la justice en matière de transfert des cas d’un tribunal à l’autre ; le fait que les juges qui avaient été obligés de partir à la retraite à 62 ans, en vertu d’une loi qui avait fait l’objet en 2012 d’une procédure d’infraction, n’ont pas tous retrouvé leur poste, malgré l’annulation de cette loi ; enfin, le problème des restrictions posées aux publicités politiques, qui pourraient aussi avoir des conséquences sur la campagne pour les européennes de 2014.

Pendant son intervention, Mme Reding a fermement souligné l’importance de ce dernier point : elle a souhaité plus de clarté sur la limitation de ces publicités aux seuls médias de service public qui restreignent la liberté d’expression. En Hongrie, a-t-elle ensuite fait remarquer, les médias privés captent environ 80% de l’audience.

 Dans un premier temps, le Premier ministre hongrois Orban avait répondu aux inquiétudes de l’UE, en déclarant que le pays était bien disposé à faire quelques concessions pour ce qui concerne les questions soulevées. « Je suis ouvert au compromis sur le texte empêchant les grands partis de mener une campagne électorale sur des chaines de télévision privées et sur celui autorisant la seule présidente de l’Office national de la justice à déplacer les procès dans le pays. […] Si l’UE veut que ce déplacement ne concerne pas le cas où l’UE est impliquée, nous proposerons une solution avec plaisir ». En plus, en ce qui concerne la publicité, il avait affirmé : « nous  sommes  prêts à introduire une exception stipulant que les nouvelles règles ne concerneront pas les élections européennes ».

Par contre, le Premier ministre hongrois n’a fait aucun geste en ce qui concerne la mise en place d’un impôt spécifique sur la population dans l’hypothèse où Budapest devrait payer une amende suite à une procédure d’infraction de l’UE : « nous ne sommes pas prêts à augmenter notre déficit public à cause d’une amende ou d’un dédommagement international » a-t-il ajouté.

Après le débat en plénière, M. Orban s’est  à nouveau posé en victime, se plaignant d’être « sous les attaques constantes [de l'UE] qui visent à maintenir la pression sur le pays pour le faire dévier de la voie économique qu’il a empruntée. [Cette pression est exercée seulement] parce que le gouvernement a osé marcher sur les pieds des grandes entreprises multinationales », a-t-il jugé, faisant référence aux taxes de crise imposées aux groupes étrangers des secteurs bancaires ou des télécommunications.

 C’est pour cette raison que pour certains groupes politiques, la patiente de l’UE doit avoir des limites.

Le Président de l’ALDE, Guy Verhofstadt, a déclaré : « En Hongrie, nous voyons une majorité se comporter comme un bulldozer défiant toute critique, diffamant ses adversaires, modifiant sa Constitution presque chaque semaine. [...] La Commission répète sans cesse qu’elle procède à une "analyse juridique approfondie" et s’appuie sur une véritable coopération avec le pays. Ce n’est pas la première fois que la Commission a dû intervenir en Hongrie. Comment peut-on ainsi que la Commission, sincèrement continuer à croire un gouvernement qui, au mépris de tous nos avertissements, conserve l’introduction de nouveaux amendements incompatibles avec la législation européenne et nos valeurs européennes. La Hongrie piétine nos valeurs communes et les refuse à ses citoyens ». « C’est pourquoi il est clairement souhaitable de déclencher l’article 7.1 du traité, car il existe en Hongrie, un risque évident de grave violation des valeurs fondamentales européennes énoncées à l’article 2. Selon moi, il y a déjà violation, mais nous pouvons au moins être d’accord sur le fait qu’il y a un risque de violation. La Commission devrait lancer la procédure sans délai, sinon nous au Parlement devrions avoir le courage de le faire nous-mêmes », a-t-il enfin ajouté.

Comme a fait noter Rebecca Harms, co-présidente des Verts/ALE, cet article 7 est cependant considéré comme l’ « arme atomique », quasiment impossible à mettre en œuvre.

Mme Reding a donc observé qu’à ce stade, à coté des procédures d’infraction actuelles ou à venir, l’hypothèse la plus réaliste serait de plancher sur un instrument intermédiaire, à mi-chemin entre l’article 7 et les procédures d’infraction, instrument dont l’UE a besoin.

En effet, le sujet a été discuté aussi lundi 22 avril au conseil des Affaires générales, où le Danemark, la Finlande, l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas ont présenté une initiative en vue d’un nouveau mécanisme, plus efficace, visant à garantir les valeurs fondamentales dans les États membres. La commissaire et vice-présidente de la Commission, Viviane Reding, a donné un aperçu des mécanismes existants pour la protection des droits fondamentaux et l’État de droit. Elle a ensuite promis de présenter un examen plus détaillé de cette question en mai.

Sophie in ‘t Veld, vice-présidente de la commission des libertés civiles a conclu le débat au Parlement : « Les droits fondamentaux et l’Etat de droit ne sont pas facultatifs, ils sont essentiels. Après avoir marqué une certaine réticence en la matière, la Commission européenne doit d’agir et indiquer clairement que dans l’Union européenne, non seulement les règles du marché unique sont appliquées, mais aussi celles des droits fondamentaux. C’est une étape très importante dans le développement d’une véritable communauté de valeurs et d’une union politique ».

 

Maria Amoroso 

 

Pour en savoir  plus:

 -            Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

(EN)http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/932/932303/932303en.pdf

 

 

-          Press release – European Council

(EN)http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/136915.pdf

 

 

-            Debates -  Plenary Session

(FR)  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.dopubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+CRE+20130417+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//FR&language=FR

 

(EN) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.dopubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+CRE+20130417+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN

 

 

 

 

 

 

Classé dans:Dignité humaine, Droit à l'intégrité de la personne, Droit à l'information, Droit à la liberté et à la sûreté, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Liberté d'expression

Polskiej dyplomacji często zarzuca się porażkę na wschodnim odcinku polityki zagranicznej. Wiadomo: na Białoruś wciąż nie przybyła demokracja, a Tymoszenko nadal przebywa za kratkami. Sztandarowy projekt – Partnerstwo Wschodnie – stoi z kolei pod znakiem zapytania. W dodatku Donald Tusk i Radosław Sikorski mieliby rzekomo nie rozumieć sytuacji za naszą wschodnią granicą, w wyniku czego nie doszło jeszcze do podpisania unijnej Umowy Stowarzyszeniowej z Ukrainą, a luksusowe hotele w Mińsku budują przedsiębiorstwa z Litwy. Zarzuty pod adresem polskiego rządu wydają się jednak co najmniej chybione, jak się bowiem okazuje, Donald Tusk rozumie sytuację na Ukrainie lepiej niż ktokolwiek inny. Rozumie i nie zawahał się nawet o tym powiedzieć. Ukraina coraz lepiej rozumie europejskie standardy – przyznał polski premier, dodając, że i sam Janukowycz “lepiej i głębiej rozumie potrzebę humanitarnego traktowania Julii Tymoszenko”. Ale nie tylko. Zdaniem Tuska, Polska i Ukraina w ogóle rozumieją się nawzajem coraz lepiej, o czym świadczyć ma chociażby uwolnienie Jurija Łucenki.

Ze słowami polskiego premiera polemizować niezwykle trudno. Ukraina, chcąc nie chcąc, rzeczywiście coraz lepiej rozumie europejskie standardy. Wiktor Janukowycz wyrósł wszak na jednego z najzdolniejszych uczniów, jakich wychowała sobie Bruksela. Doskonale rozumie, że odbywająca wyrok Julia Tymoszenko nie stanowi już żadnej przeszkody na drodze do Umowy Stowarzyszeniowej (jeżeli w ogóle kiedykolwiek tak było), a przebywający na wolności Łucenko to oczywisty “dowód łaski Pana”. Ukraińska dyplomacja zrozumiała równocześnie, że brak jednomyślności w gronie państw członkowskich UE to zarówno przeszkoda w integracji z Europą Zachodnią, jak i karta, którą można wielokrotnie rozgrywać dla doraźnych korzyści. Mimo, iż w Kijowie niekoniecznie rozumie się znaczenie umowy o strefie wolnego handlu, działania, dzięki którym można ją jeszcze będzie uratować, wydają się jak najbardziej zrozumiałe. Janukowyczowi zarzucić można wiele, ale do jakiego stopnia może się posunąć w relacjach z Brukselą rozumie on doskonale.

Jak pokazują ostatnie badania Europejskiego Instrumentu Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa, problem ze zrozumieniem Unii Europejskiej mogą mieć natomiast obywatele krajów Partnerstwa Wschodniego. W przeciwieństwie do państw starej ’15′ uważają oni bowiem Unię za istotnego partnera, który powinien odgrywać w ich krajach zdecydowanie aktywniejszą rolę. Ponad połowa Ukraińców ufa Unii Europejskiej bardziej aniżeli NATO czy też ONZ, a ponad połowa Białorusinów większym zaufaniem darzy Brukselę niż krajowy rząd i parlament. W pozytywnym świetle postrzega Unię również ponad połowa Mołdawian. Fakt, że z kolei obywatele krajów Europy Zachodniej coraz częściej oceniają działania Brukseli negatywnie, świadczyć może jedynie, iż rozumieją oni specyfikę UE o wiele lepiej. 50 lat członkostwa we “wspólnej Europie” to w końcu prawdziwy szmat czasu. Najwyraźniej jednak wciąż zbyt mało, aby odnaleźć nić wzajemnego porozumienia.

By Georgi Gotev Interview with Sir Graham Watson, President of the liberal ALDE party, 7 May 2013, Brussels. The European Parliament Civil Liberties LIBE committee will vote today (7 May) to decide what follow up the European Parliament and the EU in general should decide on the unfolding eavesdropping scandal in Bulgaria, which was dubbed by the foreign press “the Bulgarian Watergate”. This is happening just before the early parliamentary elections on 12 May. What is your comment?

Par Alessandra Flora, en Italie Le nouveau gouvernement Italien présidié par Enrico Letta se trouve face à des nombreaux défis. La coalition composée par le Partito Democratico, par le Popolo della Libertà e par Scelta Civica doit, avant de tout, combattre la plaie du chômage, surtout le chômage qui atteint les jeunes générations. Un problème [...]

by Lord Liddle – Chairman, Policy Network A lot of what has been said since Mr Cameron’s Europe speech in January seem to make an assumption that he is going to be Prime Minister after 2015, and that therefore the referendum promised for 2017 is going to take place. This is by no mean a [...]

The German political system is  known for its general stability. Generally there is not a great deal of fluctuation in terms of political parties.This however might be changing recently. After the success of the ‘Pirate Party’ over the last two years (bringing them into four state-parliaments), a new party has stepped onto the scene in April this year.

The Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), short AfD was initiated by a group of (well-known) Euro-sceptics, academics as well as former members of Angela Merkel’s CDU party. The central and so far only recognizable party goal is the abolition of the euro in its current form. What should step in its place is however left vague. Both a smaller currency union involving mostly ‘Northern’ states as well as a return to the D-Mark seem to be under consideration. Exactly how such a transition would be handled is also not made clear. But the mantra of the party is, that there is an alternative to the Euro and that such an alternative should be embraced because the euro is bad not only for Germany, but for other European countries and Europe as a whole.

What are we to make of a party such as the AfD and how should we deal with it?

Does it have a real chance of success?
If success is defined as gaining seats in the German parliament (the Bundestag), for which a minimum of 5% of the vote is necessary, success is a possibility. At the moment polls see the AfD at around 3%, but support for its core political aim, the exit from the Euro, is supported by over 20% of Germans. It will thus be important to what extent these people cast their vote with ‘the Euro’ being the decisive issue for them.

How should other parties (and pro-Europeans) deal with it?
It does not make any sense to ridicule the party and its voters or to continuously portray it as extremely right-wing. This might even help the AfD and lead to a greater extent of protest votes from those wanting to send a message to the political establishment.
Free speech and the freedom to form political opinions should be truly valued, also when it comes to the AfD. In the long run, this can even help the cause of those wanting to maintain the Euro. John Stuart Mill held that we ought to allow those who disagree with us to speak up freely, because only in that way does what we hold to be right not become a ‘dead dogma’. For many the continued existence of the Euro has become a sort of a dead dogma. The mantra that the Euro is not to be abandoned because doing so would have disastrous consequences for Europe is more often said than explained. The challenge from groups such as the AfD should  lead those in favour of the Euro to engage in an open argument. The logic for an abolition of the Euro is compellingly simple and the arguments for its continued existence are complex. But if we believe that they are right, we should not shy away from making use of them in open exchanges with the Euro’s critics.
Such an approach offers greater chances for success than the current dogmatic repetition of sound-bites.

 

After the end of World War II the United States assumed the burden of restructuring Europe from the beginning. At that time, Germany was defeated -if not humiliated in the eyes of the Europeans- and entirely devastated, France was supposed to be the new prominent power in Europe, and the United States could build on the leverage they acquire after contributing fundamentally to the end of the war and the win of the Alliances. Do we have something relevant today? Are there any given comparisons looking so similar in 1950 and 2013?

The Marshall Plan was one of the biggest investment plans ever prepared in modern history. It was assumed by the United States and it was destined to first restructure the devastated European market, and then assisting on the revitalizing of the European economy, focusing on Germany, the biggest and most robust industrial country of the continent. The United States had many to earn from this effort as dollar would be the currency that would be soaring up the European market, increasing therefore the influence of the United States. In addition to that, there was also the plan that after the first steps, Bundesmark would substitute the intrusion of dollar in the European market and starting get established as the most powerful currency of the European market. French were undermined from this development as they were expecting that their currency could be the one dominating in Europe. Nonetheless, as European development and growth should also be supported by the French economy, Paris could not handle solely such a big plan, and therefore France agreed to play equal terms with Germany through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was lately developed into what we know as the European Community (EC), and then the European Union.

Even if it was agreed that Germany and France would be considered as primus inter pares in the European continent, in fact what was finally developed was a robust Western Germany that was constantly supported in every respect by the United States. This was the first sacrifice of France.

The second sacrifice of France came after the unification of Germany in the beginning of 1990s when the United States, after securing that the communist threat was no longer imminent in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, pressed towards this development despite the deep concerns of France. The unification of Germany was invested symbolically as the unification of Europe and the win of the liberal axis led by the United States, and pragmatically as the first significant effort for Europe to set aside the nazist ghosts of the past and the legacy of Hitler, and move towards the creation of a single market that could assist the global race of dollar.

The third sacrifice of France came when the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was established in 1979. The basic idea behind this mechanism was to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe. In fact, ERM had empowered Bundesmark in such a degree that Germany’s currency was synonym to monetary stability in Europe. Stability was achieved in the sense that threats against the global monetary and financial crisis, mainly affecting the dollar, could be handled more efficiently as both the ERM and the European Central Bank’s reserves would be linked with Bundesmark. After all, Germany grew immensely, and the experiment of the single currency through the establishment of the European Monetary Union and Eurozone was considered to be a safe step towards a more centralized monetary system controlled by Berlin and aligned by US dollar and the Breton Woods system.

The creation of the EMU was invested with hopes that the European economy could finally work in the mutual benefit of every member-state of Eurozone. Nonetheless, Eurozone has ended up to be a privileged field for development and growth for the German economy and the member-states that are inextricably interwoven with the German economic mindset, such as Austria and Benelux. The rest of Eurozone has been trapped into a vicious circle of sovereign debt crisis and none of them seem capable for the moment to provide or at least articulate an alternative to exit the crisis, including France. This is the fourth sacrifice that France made in favor of Germany.

Nonetheless, why euro is not weakening tremendously against dollar after such a recession and austerity in Eurozone? Answers vary, but let us try to gather different variables into one single paragraph. First, while austerity engenders fears for tough social unrest, it creates a safe environment for low-cost investments with the minimum labour cost. Here comes the term “dumping”, but it is something it really does not matter for markets and investors. In this respect, while US monetary policy is not tightening up, fears against a possible fall of dollar might increase, and chances for traders to buy dollars are falling. In the contrary, euro reserves and holdings remain high, even after the recent, joint statement of the BRICS that there were no longer determined to nourish transactions using euro. Second, there is a lot of positive news since 2012 to keep euro from collapsing. In this respect, despite the constant dickering across Europe, Germany has long supported overdebted states with continuous bailout plans, managing to diminish the cost and the falling of euro in the international markets. Third, there is also the Middle East markets that as crude oil is surging, there is a growing effort for diversifying dollar holdings instead of euro holdings in order to increase stability of investment and do not let portfolios go down due to dollar’s potential fall (i.e. as crude oil prices are counted  in / linked with dollar). Bottom line: everything seems to be controlled. This is the safe (?) bet of Germany.

But what if Eurozone disintegrates? It is very likely that in this scenario it will not be only Germany to lose, but also France. And this will be the fifth sacrifice of France. Let alone the chain of events in the global market and the reaction of the United States, Switzerland, the Middle East, the BRICS and so on. The bet of Germany might seem even weaker as Berlin has decided to retrieve its gold reserves from the Federal Reserves Bank in New York, which is mainly the gold accumulated during and after World War II and kept there for safety reasons. Therefore, is Eurozone disintegration close or far? Is the bet of Germany safe or not?

For already more than 20 years Romania has adopted the European way – there is no doubt about that. The declaration signed on June 21 1995 at Shttp://blogactiv.eu/wp-admin/edit.phpnagov by representatives of all political parties at that time in Romania, clearly expressed its intention to support European integration. It was a huge step on the road [...]

This is the title of Bulgarian daily “24 chasa” yesterday (25 April). I thought this was a decent newspaper, but I was wrong. The article was included in the daily press review of the European Commission (see photo).

I know how the Bulgarian press works. This is a publication commissioned from very high places, which the newspaper had no other choice but to write according to specifications from the client and publish.

The aim of the publication is to discredit the European Commission. Without any doubt people in high places fear that messages from the Commission could make them feel very uncomfortable ahead of the 12 May early parliamentary election.

So whatever the Commission will say, they would respond: “Before you accuse us, look at yourselves, you bunch of Maoists, Communists and totalitarian secret police agents!”

Will badmouthing the enemy do the trick this time?

Those who commission such publications are from the former ruling party GERB, which is embroiled in an eavesdropping scandal of Biblical proportions.

Media in Bulgaria have dubbed the unfolding eavesdropping scandal “the Bulgarian Watergate”, alluding to the 1970s secret taping of the Democratic party headquarters, which led to the downfall of President Richard Nixon.

In recent developments, a minister from the GERB government, Miroslav Naydenov, confirms that all ministers and other personalities have been illegally spied by former Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov, who is the N.2 in the party after Boyko Borissov and the engineer of GERB’s election campaign.

The leader of the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party Sergei Stanishev, who is also leader of the Party of European Socialists (EPP), called Tsvetanov “toxic to Bulgarian politics”. He also said that the support of the European People’s Party (PES) to GERB had become “untenable”.

Meanwhile, an eavesdropping recoding was sent anonymously to several Bulgarian media, including to the daily Sega where I have worked for several tears. The audio file, the authenticity of which leaves no doubt, features Borissov, Naydenov and Sofia’s prosecutor Nikolai Kokinov. Leaving aside the many cynicisms in their gangsters’ language, this is what is been said:

Naydenov complains to Kokinov that he is been harassed by the prosecution (Naydenov is in the centre of several corruption cases. I have reported about one).

Kokinov too complains to Naydenov that he is not in command any longer, that somebody is trying to isolate him from the important issues.

Naydenov says he had asked Borissov who is after him. He adds Borissov told him it is probably Tsvetanov.

Kokinov replies that in fact this is probably the recently elected prosecutor general Sotir Tstatsarov. He adds that Naydenov’s case is been hidden from him, so he cannot help.

Borissov arrives. Kokinov complains to him as well about the “repressions” which he suffers. He tells Borissov he wants to be moved from Sofia prosecutor to the job of Appellate prosecutor. Follows a long exchange in which they discuss the homosexual inclinations of various magistrates.

Borissov asks Naydenov for advice regarding the court proceedings against Naydenov.

Naydenov says he is not optimistic and warns Naydenov that the woman he lives with has been promised a plea bargain if she testifies against him.

Borissov interevenes and says he warned Naydenov about that woman.  (She is one of the beneficiaries of the Twitter-Facebook affair.)

Before leaving, Kokinov gives Borissov the results of prosecution inquiries which are not yet made public.

At the end, Borissov tells Naydenov that his problems are serious, because there is European money involved.

As I was writing this text, Kokinov resigned, following a meeting with Prosecutor General Tsatsarov. It also became known that the recording was made on 15 April in Borissov’s house.

Borissov basically confirmed that the conversation took place, blaming “parallel structures” for being “impudent enough” to spy in his house.

A suivre…

By Dimitris Rapidis French daily Le Monde issued last week a chart of unemployment in the European Union.  The facts are extremely disappointing for the entirety of the Union, but especially for the peripheries. South Europe scores the highest rates followed by Ireland, two of the three Baltic states (i.e. Latvia and Lithuania), Bulgaria, Hungary, and France.