Es Grecia presa de su propia paradoja. Allí se creo la tragedia griega que hoy en forma de pesadilla irónica viven sin máscaras, ni teatros, en plena calle. De ahí que me permita la licencia de recordar que la tragedia helena está estructurada siguiendo un esquema rígido, cuyas formas se pueden definir con precisión. Se inicia generalmente con un prólogo, que según Aristóteles es lo que antecede a la entrada del coro. Las características generales son que se da la ubicación temporal y se une el pasado del héroe con el presente, pueden participar hasta tres actores, pero sólo hablan dos y el otro interviene o puede recitar un monólogo. Se informa al espectador del porqué del castigo que va a recibir el héroe y en esta parte no interviene el coro. Verdad que nos suena: el héroe el pueblo greigo, dos actores, Merkel y Sarzoky, con el monólogo de la Canciller, con el coro del eurogrupo. El castigo se anunció tras el primer rescate. Prosigue la párados, que son cantos a cargo del coro durante su entrada en la “orchestra”. En esta parte se realiza un canto lítico, donde se dan danzas de avance y retroceso. En la realidad que vivimos, se escenificó con las primeras huelgas y violencia en las calles de Atenas, mientras su clase política trataba de dar pasos hacia adelante y hacia atrás sin alcanzar acuerdos.

Luego comienzan los episodios que pueden ser hasta cinco. En ellos hay diálogo entre el coro y los personajes o entre personajes; es la parte más importante por ser la dramática por excelencia y expresa el pensamiento e ideas del personaje. Entre los episodios se hallan los estásimos, que son intervenciones del coro en las que se expresan las ideas políticas, filosóficas, religiosas o morales del autor. Aquí nos encontramos tras dimitir Papandreu y forzar la UE un gobierno de coalición presidido por el tecnócrata Lukas Papademos. Por último, el éxodo es la parte final de la tragedia, hay cantos líricos y dramáticos; el héroe reconoce su error. A veces es castigado con la muerte por los dioses y es allí donde aparece la enseñanza moral. A punto estamos de dictar esta trágica sentencia contra el pueblo griego y con ello condenarnos eternamente a la derrota del proyecto europeísta.

Volviendo a la cruda situación conviene analizar qué está exigiendo la troika de acreedores – Comisión Europea, FMI y BCE – al gobierno griego. El acuerdo sobre Grecia se basa en tres pilares. El compromiso de nuevos ajustes sociales por parte del Gobierno y los partidos políticos griegos, un acuerdo con la banca por el que acepte unas pérdidas o quita de la deuda de hasta el 70% de su inversión en Grecia y la aceptación por parte de la UE y el FMI de conceder un segundo paquete de ayudas que podría oscilar entre 130.000 y 145.000 millones de euros. El capítulo de recortes es especialmente traumático para un país que empieza su quinto año de recesión y que está cada vez más próximo a la explosión social. Los ajustes que se debaten ahora, muchos de los cuales son compromisos anteriores no aplicados aún, incluyen una reducción de gastos sanitarios de 1.100 millones; recortes en Defensa y en la Administración local, de 400 millones en cada caso; reducción del salario mínimo en 22% (pasaría de 750 euros brutos a 586 en 14 pagas), reducciones del 15% en las pensiones complementarias y aplicación del acuerdo anterior de eliminar 15.000 empleos del sector público.

La encrucijada a la que se está sometiendo a Grecia es tan simple como quedarse en el euro para sufrir décadas de pobreza e inestabilidad social o salirse y pasar a ser los parias de la Unión. Además, desde el punto de vista jurídico comunitario, no está regulada la salida del un miembro del euro, mientras que sí lo está cuando se sale Unión Europea, por lo que la caída de Grecia podría suponer que el Estado heleno se viera expulsado del club europeo. Hecho que podría convertirle en un oscuro objeto de deseo de potencias hostiles a los intereses europeos, dado el caos social que produciría quedarse en tierra de nadie en el escenario internacional.

El éxodo griego, de producirse, tendrá indudables efectos sobre la imagen de la Unión Europea y su ya tocada credibilidad en los mercados financieros. Así lo reconocía el ministro de Economía español Luis de Guindos al manifestar que “si Grecia va a la quiebra, puede haber contagio”. El temido efecto dominó sobre países con sus cuentas públicas cuestionadas alarga su sombra sobre el continente. De ahí que todos debamos ser muy conscientes de la trascendencia de cualquier decisión que se tome sobre Grecia porque del final de la tragedia griega depende en gran medida el futuro de Europa.

Greece has been missing one “critical deadline” after the other, without achieving any real progress on its troika programme. Ever since the European Council summit of July 21, 2011, when the first debt restructuring plan was agreed upon — the so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) — the Greek people have been the recipients of an unprecedented psychological war that sows the fear of bankruptcy/default every few weeks. The reasons Greece has been failing to cope with its troika programme can be divided into internal and external.

External factors:

• Greece was the first country to fall in the domino effect that commenced in 2008 and is still underway. For that the country has received most of the attention all these years, as it is (correctly) considered the weakest link in the euro chain. As such the treatment of Greece should “necessarily” have the following features:
  • The European Union needs to show that it does not violate its own rules – the no-bailout clause for instance, or the “prohibition” of debt monetization or eurobonds by the ECB.
  • Any support to Greece must be done in such a way so as to avoid moral hazard. In other words Greece must not be given away money which might seem like a “reward”. Instead it has to be “punished” (though such a word will never be used officially) for not complying with the rules governing the Euro architecture.
  • The European Union needs to handle the situation in such a way that markets do not lose faith in its capacity to deal with its own issues. Therefore even if the situation in Greece deteriorates, it will be because of the “special” circumstances that apply to Greece – not due to the narrow-sighted troika policies.
  • For as long as the broader eurozone is facing its systemic crisis (listen to 30-minute podcast) Greece must not be allowed to default on its creditors as that would (a) trigger a payment of the CDS contracts, with negative implications for the financial system, (b) would mortally wound several European banks that are directly or indirectly exposed to Greek debt, (c) it would create uncertainty about the prospects of other countries mired in recession or under bailout programmes.
• The troika officials are focusing only on the fiscal finances of the state without any real concern about the effects of their policies on the real economy. For instance they only ask for the reduction of the budget deficit even if that requires unprecedented tax hikes that increase costs, decrease demand and create uncertainty about the tax regime, hence new investments are held back.
• European politicians who will soon be running for elections, have found an easy victim in Greece that they can attack in order to raise their “popularity”. As such many have “threatened” to kick the Greeks out of the euro in case they do not comply with what “leaders” say, even though that will never happen (see Greece will not exit the Euro – Groundless threats and speculation).

To conclude on the section of the external factors, Greece is trapped in — or is part of —  a highly complex political system, namely the EU. For as long as this system lacks all those mechanisms/institutions/tools that would allow it to function as a unified entity, instead of the now-sectarianated patchwork of squabbling states; the situation will remain extremely difficult and more failures will definitely follow.

Internal factors:

• For reasons that go far beyond the scope of this article, the Greek state has always been ill-designed. The public administration of the country is very big and highly inefficient, while the resulting bureaucracy creates several problems:
  • It retards economic activity as even routine procedures require considerable time to materialize.
  • “Fakelaki” and “miza” (Greek words for corruption payments) become the only way for citizens to get their job done. As such corruption becomes a “vital part” of the broader political system.
  • Because political parties and the main body of the state’s public administration operate in Athens, the Greek state has gradually become Atheno-centric, since exponentially more powers are brought to the capital, leaving the periphery underdeveloped and thus the country less competitive and productive on aggregate.
• Decades of ill advised policies have created series of distortions in the economy, in the political system and the social order; while they have produced perverse incentives that lead to several unpleasant phenomena – such as the ongoing strikes of civil servants or special interest groups who wish to cling on to their privileges; or a highly ineffective and unfair tax system that puts the burdens only on the lower parts of the income distribution; or even economic cartels that do not wish to see their state-sponsored monopolies/oligopolies be liberalized (professional drivers, pharmacists, public universities etc.).
• Greece entered the EEC in 1981 even though it never complied with the criteria. The decision back then was political and had to do with the balance of power between “West – USSR” in the broader region of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.  Nonetheless, the European funds that suddenly started flowing in to the underdeveloped country, gave the impression that the European Community is a cornucopia, an infinite source of wealth that will be feeding the Greeks for decades to come. In short Greece started growing (not a robust growth, but a bubble really), without making any reforms in its economy and state. As such the European funds ended up in unproductive expenses, instead of improving key sectors of the economy, or accumulating technology and other industrial goods that increase productivity.

Conclusion:

Decades of malpractices cannot change within a few months, especially when several interests are involved. For Greece to escape from the greatest economic crisis of its history the entire Greek polity will need to be redesigned. This requires deep reforms in the economy, so that individual genius replaces bureaucratic interventionism; changes in the internal structure of the state, allowing peripheries to control considerably more power that will allow for balanced growth all across the country; modernization of the public administration so that procedures become fewer and faster and costs diminish.

The Greek nation will have to be constructed anew. The problem is that the Greeks are not willing to accept that, while the inane policies of the troika are only making things worse, as the crisis deepens, thus supporting the (insane) idea that Greece would be better off outside the Euro. The Greek failure represents a conundrum that none seems able to solve.

External and internal factors of the Greek failure | Protesilaos Stavrou.

Con una oferta así, no es de extrañar lo ajustado del resultado, la tensión vivida en los días anteriores y los temblores de piernas que muchos compromisarios socialistas debieron sentir al meter la papeleta en la urna entre fortísimas medidas de seguridad para evitar pucherazos. El miedo se adueñó del sevillano hotel Renacimiento – el nombre del escenario no se escoge con más guasa ni a posta – y entre acusaciones mutuas de coacciones y juego sucio, llegaron los discursos de los candidatos dejando claras las intenciones de ambos. Rubalcaba ofrecía un tránsito lo más seguro posible para travesía del desierto y Chacón pretendía, sin perder un segundo, poner rumbo a la tierra prometida cruzando desiertos y montañas hasta llegar al oasis y degustar el ansiado maná del poder. Uno garantizaba flotar una patera para cruzar el estrecho que separa la muerte segura de un partido bajo mínimos en cuotas de cargos electos y la otra una expedición en galeras por mares desconocidos y horizontes lejanos en pos de tesoros de incalculable valor pero de ubicación incierta. Y como era natural, en un ejército diezmado y derrotado, triunfó la triste realidad de Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba ante la onírica y volátil figura de Carmen Chacón.

De ideas para qué hablar, cuando lo que toca es poner al mando a las personas que dirijan el naufragio. Entregados a la cita latina - Primum vivere deinde philosophari -, los socialistas han decidido primero vivir y luego filosofar. Tienen primero que reconstruir el partido federación a federación de un partido con un ERE en marcha dado el alto número de cargos que han perdido su cargo y con ello su puesto de trabajo. Tienen que recoser cada girón que en los territorios ha supuesto un enfrentamiento cainita entre dos bandos alineados a muerte cada uno con su candidato a secretario general.  O mejor dicho, los vencedores aplicarán su concepto de integración cortando a cuchillo la cabeza de los derrotados que es como se suelen debatir las diferencias personales en el seno de los partidos políticos.

Por delante tres años – hasta las próximas elecciones municipales y autonómicas – para recuperar el crédito perdido en la sociedad española, el apoyo dilapidado por no reconocer primero la gravedad de la crisis y después en un giro copernicano de sus políticas, aplicar las recetas más duras y ortodoxas del centro derecho europeo. En ese difícil navegar de la patera en las turbulentas y frías aguas del estrecho, en algún momento tendrán que reparar en la necesidad de lanzar una propuesta socialdemócrata y europeísta, desde un pensamiento renovado, capaz de afrontar los retos de la globalización y el diálogo con Estados emergentes que claman por su derecho a ser protagonistas en la toma de decisiones del mundo. Algún día, mejor pronto que tarde, deberían pensar en salir de las posiciones meramente defensivas del Estado del bienestar, para hacer una ofensiva de conquista de derechos, recuperando el discurso tradicional de la izquierda europea de trabajar por el progreso sin mirar al retrovisor. Deberían ponerse a la labor de ser alternativa, aunque solo sea porque deberían recordar que no solo de pan vive el hombre, si es que aún quieren ser útiles a la sociedad y no seguir siendo un mero centro de colocaciones plagado de nepotismo.

Además tendrán la responsabilidad de ser el principal partido de la oposición al recién nacido gobierno del Partido Popular. Eso para bien y para mal, es decir, para alcanzar acuerdos en cuestiones de Estado – que suelen interpretar como sinónimo de apaño – y para fiscalizar con contundencia la acción del Ejecutivo de Mariano Rajoy. Y no sé la verdad si la patera y sus tripulantes darán a basto a tanta tarea como tienen por delante o caerán exhaustos por la borda antes de pisar tierra. De momento hay que reconocer que han optado por la vía más realista que se les ofrecía, lo cual dice mucho de su capacidad de supervivencia que avalan los más de 130 años de existencia del partido contra viento y marea, dentro y fuera del mismo. No tienen un líder indiscutible, ni ilusionante. Rubalcaba es un dirigente para los tiempos que corren, para tratar de evitar un naufragio en medio de una tempestad. Ni nada más, ni nada menos.

Con todo le queda el reto de no ensimismarse en la turbulencia del oleaje, tratando de buscar un horizonte cierto para cuando la tormenta amaine. Porque por mucho que sus problemas internos le ocupen gran parte de su trabajo, fuera seguirá habiendo un Estado plurinacional que demanda nuevas fórmulas de convivencia con legítimas reivindicaciones de pueblos con identidad, realidad económica y culturas propias. Fuera seguirá habiendo una sociedad que anhela soluciones a sus demandas de quienes dicen representarles. Porque como nos cantó Serrat,

Detrás de los héroes y de los titanes,
detrás de las gestas de la humanidad
y de las medallas de los generales.
Detrás de la Estatua de la Libertad.

Detrás de los himnos y de las banderas.
Detrás de la hoguera de la Inquisición.
Detrás de las cifras y de los rascacielos.
Detrás de los anuncios de neón.

Detrás, está la gente
con sus pequeños temas,
sus pequeños problemas
y sus pequeños amores.

Today it is opposing the austerity measures promoted by Mario Monti’s government, accusing him of stealing money out of Italians’ pockets. However, yesterday it acted as protagonist as a key ally of Berlusconi’s coalition which was about to bring the country into the mire, with an alarmingly high public debt and peaking interest rates on ten-year sovereign bonds (over 7%) and increasing spread against the German state’s bund.

That is the Northern League, one of the most rooted Italian parties (especially in the North East), born in the nineties with the clear objective of separation from the rest of the peninsula. One of the most famous slogans used by its leaders is “Roma ladrona” (“Big robber Rome”), blamed of retaining the whole taxation due by Northerners to the central government without receiving appropriate redistribution or even wasting resources for sterile expenses in the South. Nevertheless, providing an account of the national debates over bad administration and clientelism in the South against better policy-making in Northern Italy is beyond the scope of this article.

The alarming side of the rise of the ‘greens’ within the Italian political system is instead its unquestioned appeal to many working class people who feel penalized by a ‘lazy’ South producing only debt, as well as by an increasing number of immigrants who are accusing of invading their country to find a job. Regions such as Sicily, Campania and Apulia are depicted as burdens for Italy’s productivity, with a high level of tax evasion and penetration of organized crime and whose people take advantage of Northerners comply with their fiscal duties and fund the State’s investments.

Among the other things, the whole concepts of regionalism contributed to a great extent to fervid confrontations over the Unification of Italy, seen as a catastrophe. In reality, regional disputes over interpretation of historical events and local peculiarities are still very common in the Belpaese, which unfortunately appears much divided even after 150 years of formal amalgamation. The fact that the former Prime Minister Berlusconi did not intervene publicly to stigmatize Bossi’s (Northern League’s leader) statement “I clean my arse up with the tricolor flag” says a lot on the deep-seated divisions over the Italian identity.

Most critics argue that the Northern League’s supporters propagate a sterile populism made of aggressive slogans and vulgar language, yet in the last years this party has experiences a significant mount in voting support, reaching around 15% in some areas in 2008 elections. Since its first participation in Berlusconi’s government in 1994 Bossi’s party has never seen its major proposal – federalism – implemented, instead it has steadily become part of the centralized administration which it had disapproved vehemently in the early 1990s.

The Northern League has found consensus among many citizens because its exponents blended issues of regionalism as an aged winning strategy in Italian politics – a similar political experiment led the MPA (Movement for Autonomy) to win Presidency of Sicily Region in 2008 – with extremely xenophobic positions and overt racism. Being incapable of tackling the economic challenges affecting the North, as it has been the case with the whole country, with increasing unemployment and diminished opportunities for youngsters, the leaders of the Northern League diverted attention to concerns of wild immigration and loose barriers, especially after many Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004. This situation has led to much uncertainty among people over the actual causes of the crisis Europe is undergoing, but the old “those foreigners stealing our jobs” slogans generate still empathy in many citizens who would not consider low-salary, labor-intensive jobs that Bulgarian or Polish people would instead accept.

Today every political party is supporting Monti’s government of technicians as the moment for austerity reforms and difficult decisions has come thus most political leaders can provide an external support without being criticized as unpopular by the public opinion. The plan of the main political groups (Party of Freedom and Democratic Party) is unambiguous: since a considerable disaffection and explicit attacks on political leadership have emerged over the last months, the decision to let technicians do the “dirty job” would mean taking breath and gain experience so as to get ready for next elections in 2013 when Monti will have to leave his post as Prime Minister.

In this case, the Northern League’s strategy may seem to have a good rationale in considering the upcoming vote, by accusing the government of rising taxation and postponing retirement age. However, most Italians are bravely accepting responsibly those urgent measures since they are aware of the high debt provoked by decades of bad administration and lack of fiscal discipline. Hence, this strategy could backfire on Bossi’s strategy in the long run. This view can be strengthened in case Monti succeeds in dealing with the spread, thus increasing the confidence of American rating agencies and investors to pour fresh money into Italy’s cash desk.

To this respect, the next weeks will probably be crucial as the EU Member States will decide how to produce growth, because years of austerity and spending cuts only will not be enough to save the European countries from depression.

Nonetheless, putting aside the political discourses brought about by the Northern League in Italy, it remains to be seen to what extent issues of immigration, regionalism and xenophobia would turn into broader considerations on the role of the European Union as an aggregating organization which, by tidying not only economies but also cultures, risks to pave the way to a degenerating future in terms of social cohesion.

In other words, it is not only the economic interdependence affecting the stability of the Union, but also the lack of communication and common understanding between Europe’s sections of society which may trigger further rows.

If the Northern League represents intolerance, other political organizations across the old continent – such as Le Pen’s front in France, the Nigel Farage’s UKIP in the Kingdom, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom in the Netherlands, the True Finns in Finland – are spreading fanatic right-wing narratives focusing on the rejection of “the other”. In times of economic and social crisis, these divergences have the potential to lead to forms of ‘balkanization’ in the territories represented by the most liberal, open and rights-guardian organization worldwide. On contrast, around a decade ago a similar case, after the ethno-populist claims made by the nationalist leader Jörg Haider in Austria, was followed by wide condemnation and EU-led sanctions imposed on the Austrian state .

Most agree on the fact that those considerations are appropriately defining the current European society, and given this moment of unstoppable austerity and low (if no) growth for many European countries, it seems legitimate to wonder to what extent those ‘separatist’ issues will interact in next European elections in 2013. Evidence seems to suggest that a drop in citizens’ participation and climbing abstention will be deeper.

As the Utøya tragedy shows, one of the most demanding challenges in the future for the EU is internal terrorism and social degradation, since hostile tendencies of anti-Marxism, anti-Islamism, anti-multiculturalism are likely to emerge more and more, representing a fundamental threats for the entire Union. Among the other things, this politics of the enemy and intolerance against “the other” (this being very difficult to classify nowadays into an ethnic, cultural or national model) has generated in Italy the creation of so-called “ronde“, namely spontaneous organizations of citizens vigilante groups patrolling quarters overnight to look for and punish possible aggressions and thefts committed by foreigners .

As for the EU and its citizens, it is time to wonder how to stop such episodes of separatism, anti-EU demonstrations and violence among frustrated and angry people. Although good economy and healthy balances of payment are key factors in providing nations with stability, it seems also legitimate to cast doubt over social cohesion in a Union which appears more violent, more divided, definitely on the wrong track.

Finally: if political parties are the representation of people, and right-wing intolerant political groups are on the rise, what comes next?

Duran´s opinion prevails over Mas-Colell´s criticism regarding income tax rise

CiU vote for GOS (Government of Spain) anti-crisis measures has not been fully understood in Catalonia. Not even for a large number of CDC rank-and-file members, according to several CDC militants close to RCAT associates.

These members have started to press the party’s leaders. They don’t quite understand the yes vote, specially after voting against Mr.Mariano Rajoy´s election as President. And also after Mr. Andreu Mas-Colell, the Minister for Economy and Knowledge, categorical words opposing to those measures -that include a rise of the income tax. According to the Minister´s words, tax income rise risks to place Catalonia’s fiscal burden at a suffocation level. In critics opinion “if they didn´t want to to vote against, they could have just abstained“.

Having that in mind, it is quite obvious the motivation of former president Jordi Pujol‘s article posted in his website. Mr. Pujol would have written it to try to appease the unease of militants. In the piece, Mr. Pujol acknowledges that

“ Catalonia as a country could be driven to unviability, (…) not because of the economic consequences of independence, but the impossibility – as a result of economic discrimination –of Catalonia to respond not only to the needs of wealth creation or the support for our language and culture, but also to build a truly bona fide society for all her citizens. This, as much or more than any other argument, would be a valid reason to opt for independence. “

However, some analysts consider that the yes vote can also be read having in mind the traditional tensions between CDC and UDC. And more specifically as a Mr. Duran‘s victory not only over Mr. Mas-Colell, but over the whole Catalan Government. Mr. Duran, as CiU´s top figure in Madrid, in this sense, would be setting the political line of the Government of the Generalitat, without paying the costs that entails to head a department.

Authored: RCAT Web Team

Translation: MA

Since the beginning of this crisis, ministers have expressed contradictory views, sometimes saying complete nonsense. So has Prime Minister himself. Someone should take responsibility for this mess, someone should apologise and this is a necessary condition, though not sufficient to sit down together at the table.

Meanwhile, Donald Tusk does not see such a need. He has simply changed his mind and he wants to talk. The debate proposed by the government is like if one gave aspirin to a patient sick with pneumonia. While what he rally needs is a hospital and an antibiotic.

The current President more or less from the beginning has started running a reasonable campaign, which means that he broke with theatrical gestures and began to talk about the real problems of the French. Too late though, according to specialists.

Everything indicates that the first round of the elections will not be decisive. So what can happen in the second one? If there are Hollande and Sarkozy, then the Socialist can be sure that none of the representatives of the extreme left will not give their vote to the current President. Sarkozy, in turn, will certainly not get votes from Marine Le Pen. Holland would therefore have a serious chance to win.

Hollande will be soon hosted in Poland at a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza. There will be therefore an opportunity to hear about his vision of Europe, and we know already that we do not like Sarkozy’s vision at all. But Donald Tusk will have a problem since the loyalty within the EPP will oblige him to support Sarkozy while Hollande would be probably a better partners for making deals. 

It was agreed that the countries from outside the euro zone would also participate in the meetings that will define the new rules of the common market of the competitiveness. This is a sign that the signatories of the pact approach a serious politics. Fortunately we will be there.

I am waiting for responses of Polish conservatives, Z. Ziobro and J. Kaczynski. I will especially follow their comments on the decision of Hungary, which also joined the fiscal pact.

A total success (they invite us, we sign, Sarkozy smiles) would give a reason for fanfare and an evidence of our country’s powerfulness and and its enlightened leadership. But this is not true. In turn, a lack of Polish signature under the treaty would be the actual exclusion of the country from the hard core of the Union. Probably Jaroslaw Kaczynski would then be rubbing his hands and, who knows, maby he would even praise the Prime Minister!

There is probably a room for a third solution – neither at the table, nor on the menu, but for example in the kitchen. This is a good place, because although you cannot nibble, but at least you can learn how meals are prepared.

Así es que tras deslizar en los medios de comunicación afines, en los días previos al encuentro, que acudiría a la cita solícito y valiente dispuesto a demandar a la gobernanta de Europa una moratoria de mínima flexibilidad en el objetivo de déficit para 2012 marcado para España – el 4,4% – el frío invernal berlinés debió arrugar su voluntad inquebrantable y todo quedó en “lo que tú digas Angela porque uno no puede gastar lo que no tiene”. Y es que ya se sabe que uno no debe pasar revista a las tropas a cuerpecito gentil para lucir palmito a dos grados bajo cero en la húmeda ciudad del Spree.

El resumen de la primera reunión entre la Canciller y el nuevo presidente español es que nadie se atreve a salirse del guión rígido del ajuste duro y severo merkeliano, que nadie se atreve a amorcillar siquiera una frase original a los márgenes de los recortes, por más que cada vez sea más evidente que esa política unidireccional nos está sumiendo en la recesión sl tiempo que supone el desmantelamiento de nuestro Estado del bienestar. Ningún gobernante tiene el arrojo necesario para plantar cara al desastre y decir basta al emprobrecimiento del concepto público de la política. Prefieren administrar miseria de la cosa pública y convertirse en una suerte de orden mendicante ante los ciudadanos a los que recortan derechos mientras les subem los impuestos (p.ej. primeros meses de acción de gobierno del Partido Popular en España).

Tenía Rajoy, sin embargo, buenas razones para plantarse ante Merkel. Incluso uno de sus dos ministros económicos – en esa suerte bígama de dirigir la economía que tiene el presidente – el de Hacienda, Cristóbal Montoro, había anunciado la imposibilidad de cumplimiento del objetivo de déficit este año y, por ende, pidió arnica o lo que se dice de un poquito de por favor a los que mandan en el euro. Tenía Rajoy nada menos que 5.273.600 poderosas razones, las del número de parados españoles para tratar de hacer otra política. Pero al escuchar el “very well” de Angela trató de ganarse sus favores susurrándole al oído promesas de austeridad, con el sonido de fondo de gaitas por supuesto gallegas.

Caminaron de la mano física y tácticamente Angela y Mariano,se juraron fidelidad doctrinal eterna y de nuevo la Canciller hizo un amigo para siempre, dócil y sumiso rendido a los encantos de la Dama de Hormigón Armado. Funcionó la química – que para algo ella se licenció en esa ciencia – y el presidente español se volvió a su país dispuesto a poner rostro de circunstancias al día siguiente a los dramáticos datos de la Encuesta de Población Activa del año 2011. Como si lo del empleo no fuera con él volvió a las preocupaciones de moda generadas por la moderna versión de la Inquisición que representan hoy las agencias de rating y, en este caso Ficht, degradara dos peldaños la nota de solvencia de España.

Confiemos, pues, que esta incipiente amistad llena de desparpajo y aderezada con las habituales brumas retóricas del presidente Rajoy – de puede que sí o no – dé los frutos anhelados y para cuando superemos los seis millones de parados no nos echen del euro si en vez de registrar un déficit público del 4,4% nos hemos quedado en un ramplón 5%. La pena es que para entonces probablemente el verdadero déficit, el déficit de lo público, lo que es de todos y es para todos, nos habrá dejado el catálogo de servicios básicos en sanidad – es decir una salud de mínimos – y una educación sin educadores. Y para entonces también, ni siquiera podremos demandar a nuestros gobernantes en segunda instancia porque no tendremos dinero para pagar la tasa del ministro Gallardón. O sea, lo dicho Angela, que estamos “very well”.

Each day brings a new embarrassment. Today you can see a list composed of dozens of social organisations that were consulted on the agreement. They all represent artists and protect their rights. It is more or less as if while changing the conditions of animal slaughter you asked for opinion butchers but not animals…

Meantime, it could and still can be different. After all, ACTA gives possibility of a more radical execution of law but does not force to do so. I applies not only to the Internet but to all counterfeits – pants, trousers, sneakers, watches, etc. But no one speak about it with the Poles.

The government is stubborn. So are the people. As a rule, in such a confrontation both parties lose, but only one pays the political price.

• October 2007 – USA, EU, Japan and Switzerland start negotiations on ACTA (soon joined by other counties: Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, UAE and Canada)
• October 2010 – work on ACTA is completed (in the same year WikiLeaks publishes the text of the agreement)
• December 16, 2011 – The EU Council chaired by Poland adopts the content of ACTA. The EU official document informs laconically about this fact on page 43 of a press release on agriculture and fisheries
• November 25, 2011 – Council of Ministers adopts a resolution granting consent for the signing of ACTA by Poland
• January 26, 2012 – planned date for signing the agreement by Poland.

The scale of the problem is reaching the Polish decision-makers very slowly and the chaos is increased by confusion in competences. The negotiations were held by the Minister of Economy, while the Minister of Culture is in charge of the implementation of the agreement but Minister of Administration and Digitalization Michal Boni feels responsible for it as a whole. He reassures the public, saying that although the government adopted a resolution to grant consent for signing, but “Mr. Prime Minister has not so far signed the authorization to sign this document”???!!! Minister Boni also apologized for the lack of public consultations and grieved over this fact. Moreover, he would like to check whether there is a chance for individual Polish scenario of the implementation of this agreement.

The government has little room to manoeuvre. If they sign the agreement, they will validate the whole organizational mess. If they do not sign it, it will turn out that the negotiators had no idea what they agreed on.
I am preparing necessary steps in this case at the European Parliament. The experiences of recent years are not bad. The agreement on exchange of personal data, which was written by the European Commission under the dictation of the Americans, flew in the air. In its place appeared a better agreement, which we adopted.

The government proposes to introduce a statutory register applying only to multi-client lobbying companies, exempting many others engaged in lobbying. The only explanation for this move given is that the clients represented by lobbyists are not included in the list of Ministerial meetings that the government publishes. However such a problem could be easily solved by requiring lobbyists to reveal the identity of their client at the start of a meeting.

Mark Adams, Director of StandUp4Lobbying, said: “This publication is a massive wasted opportunity for the government which should be working with the professional bodies already self-regulating lobbying far more rigorously than the government’s own proposals. The government had the opportunity to bring in a register for all professional lobbyists. Instead, they have chosen to focus on one relatively small section of the professional lobbying sector, those that work for multi-client consultancies.

“There is a real danger that, as a result of these proposals, companies will resign from the existing bodies that publish lobbying registers to avoid being charged twice. However the existing bodies also require members to follow a strict Code of Conduct, whereas the government will not. There is a real danger that the government’s approach will weaken lobbying regulation, not strenthen it.”

Posted on 20 January 2012 by Mark Adams at the StandUp4Lobbying blog (http://standup4lobbying.wordpress.com/)

It has been known for a long time that the right wing, with some reservations, but generally accepts Prime Minister’s policy. From liberals to socialists the critics are very strong. Orban knew about it and he came to Strasbourg to slightly relieve the tensions. He did not withdraw any of his proposals and actions, but he declared what the European Union likes the most – the protection of minorities and his contribution to the fight against communism (he is not bothered though by the fact that some of his former comrades are against him today). So we have a situation where the democracy in Hungary is choked with a silk scarf. I fact, he does not eliminate any institutions. He only restricts the field of action to the independent people and introduces his own people among them.

Erstens hat die Eurozone beschlossen, im eigenen exklusiven Kreis zusammenzutreffen, zu beraten und Beschlüsse zu fassen. Unter anderem ohne Polen. Das untergräbt und beschränkt die Rolle der EU-Kommission, die auf der Grundlage der Gleichheit der Staaten konstruiert wurde und gearbeitet hat, sowie des Europäischen Parlaments, das auf der Grundlage von Bevölkerungsproportionen konstruiert wurde. Sollte der Fiskalpakt in einer Gestalt geschaffen werden, die den gegenwärtigen Vorschlägen nahe kommt, dann wird eine Union in der Union entstehen, die in vielen Angelegenheiten (ähnlich wie Merkozy) den anderen die Bedingungen diktieren wird.

Zweitens muss die Entscheidung über die Herabsetzung des Ratings von neun Staaten zwar nicht direkt die Bewertung ihrer Verschuldung beeinflussen (Einen solchen Einfluss hatte die Herabstufung des USA-Ratings nicht, Italiens Schulden sind heute billiger als zu Zeiten, als das Land ein besseres Rating hatte), doch sie wird die informelle Hierarchie der Staaten sowie die Kraft ihrer Stimme innerhalb der EU verändern. Der Führungsanspruch des nicht von der Herabsetzung betroffenen Deutschlands bekommt zusätzliche Unterstützung. Ähnlich wie seine Politik, den Gürtel vorsichtig enger zu schnallen. Die Deutschen werden künftig sicherlich noch billiger ans Geld kommen und den Markt weiter stimulieren können. Ihre wirtschaftliche Überlegenheit über den Rest Europas wird also weiter steigen.

Die Lissabonner Mengenkriterien (Bevölkerungszahl) werden an Bedeutung verlieren, wachsen wird die Rolle des Qualitätskriteriums (Qualität des Staates und der Wirtschaft). Sogar Merkozy wird schwächer, denn das Gewicht Merkels wird gegenüber Sarkozy wachsen. Es wird noch schwieriger werden, in Europa irgendetwas ohne Deutschland zu unternehmen. Und gegen Deutschland werden die übrigen 26 Staaten nicht mehr imstande sein, irgendetwas zu tun (außer die EU kaputt zu machen).

Die mühsam ausgehandelte Lissabonner Stimmenverteilung sowie die Methode, wie im EP, in der EU-Kommission und dem Europäischen Rat Beschlüsse zu fassen sind, verliert an Bedeutung. Die EU wird zumindest eine gewisse Zeit – so wie im Fußball – in einer Lage sein, wo zwar alle spielten, die Deutschen jedoch immer siegten.

Drittens zeigt die Verschärfung der Rhetorik und der Politik gegenüber Ungarn, dass in der EU nicht allen das Gleiche erlaubt ist. Orban hat zwar eine abscheuliche Rhetorik und betreibt eine dumme Wirtschaftspolitik, doch im institutionellen Bereich hat er nichts getan, was in anderen Staaten nicht toleriert wurde. Seine Übernahme der Medien ist nicht stärker gegen die Freiheit gerichtet als das, was Sarkozy mit dem französischen öffentlichen Fernsehen oder Berlusconi mit den italienischen Medien gemacht hatte. Auch die BBC war immer direkt von der Regierung abhängig. Ebenso wird die ungarische Zentralbank nicht stärker von der Regierung abhängig sein als die Bank of England oder die Fed in den USA…
Im gewissem Umfang hat es solche Unterschiede immer gegeben und sie waren von Bedeutung. Die Änderung besteht darin, dass sie jetzt nicht nur offen zum Ausdruck kommen, sondern auch institutionalisiert werden. Unklar ist, ob. dies langfristig – für Polen und die EU – gut sein wird. Gewöhnlich macht die Anpassung der Form (der institutionellen) an den Inhalt (z.B. an den wirtschaftlichen) die Institutionen effektiver. In diesem Falle zählen aber auch Emotionen, also Politik.

Die emotional, prestigeträchtig und politisch wachsenden, offengelegten und institutionalisierten Unterschiede sind für alle unbequem. Vielen Ländern wird es jetzt noch schwerer fallen, die stärkere Position Deutschlands in der EU zu akzeptieren. Deutschland wird es noch schwerer fallen, seine Opferbereitschaft und Selbstbeschränkung aufrechtzuerhalten.

Das heißt, dass uns neben wirtschaftlichen und innenpolitischen Spannungen innerhalb der EU wachsende transnationale Spannungen und noch größere Entscheidungsprobleme erwarten. Zumindest solange, bis der Gründungsmythos nicht durch irgendeine neue Logik ersetzt wird. Das wird aber weder schnell noch schmerzlos über die Bühne gehen.