What should the EU’s overall priorities be? Or those of the next Presidency? And what should the EU Council really be talking about when they next meet.

A level-playing field for European foundations is a step closer to becoming a reality with the European Commission’s adoption of a proposed Regulation on a European Foundation Statute on 8 February 2012. In these tough financial times, with increasingly tightened purse strings and every cent scrutinised, it is vital that foundations have the right tools to allow them to leverage their valuable resources.

A European Foundation Statute would reduce the amount spent on needless administration and instead allow the money to be spent furthering foundations’ philanthropic work.

A European Foundation Statute is a vital element in cultivating the right European environment for public-benefit foundations – and the citizens’ initiatives they support – to flourish. A new European legal tool, it would be both additional to existing national legislations and optional, i.e. used by those who need it to expand or start cross-border activities and collaborative ventures. Accessible and tailored to foundations’ needs, this tool would enable them to pool resources and give a European scale to their work, while also reducing costs and legal uncertainties

The Statute has won the backing of the sector – through members of the EFC and the 22 national associations of foundations that make up DAFNE. In addition, the Statute has secured the support of the European Economic and Social Committee in 2010 and the European Parliament in a recent written declaration. Entering the closing straits, the baton is now passed on to national governments and EU decision makers to get the European Foundation Statute across the finishing line. The demand is clear: that national governments and the European Parliament adopt the European Foundation Statute before 2014.

Devaluation was invariably the path to survival for weaker European economies in the days before the euro. But when devaluation is no longer an option, there is evidently no choice for failing economies but to squeeze public spending and slash labour costs in the hope of paying off debt and restoring competitiveness. A striking aspect of the Greek case is the attack by the troika of ECB, IMF and European Commission on wages and non-wage costs in Greece’s private sector, with the aim of cutting employment costs by 15 per cent. This also means an attack on Greek trade unions, which have always been extremely powerful players. I well recall a meeting with the CEO of a major firm in Athens which was having trouble with Brussels, and being told that the trade union chief had his office just down the corridor. That was a big problem for the client!

Europa lleva casi dos años asistiendo al drama de Grecia, de su bancarrota, de su primer rescate, de sus baldíos intentos de ajustes y recortes, de sus huelgas generales, de su larvado estallido social, de su segundo rescate y, finalmente, o al menos así parece, a la decisión final de si se quedan o se van de la eurozona y, porqué no, de la Unión Europea. El problema de la decisión que finalmente adopte el eurogrupo no es otro tan egoísta como el posible contagio que producirá en el resto de Estados del euro que se encuentran en dificultades – Irlanda y Portugal, ya rescatados, España e Italia con elevados déficits y altas primas de riesgo en su deuda pública -. Del sufrimiento al que se está sometiendo a base de medidas de empobrecimiento de las rentas familiares y de desmantelamiento de la asistencia social a los griegos, de eso ya ni hablamos. A nadie o casi nadie en Bruselas les importa la suerte a que abandonamos a más de 11 millones de habitantes, al territorio que en su día alumbró la cultura y la civilización clásica y, en la actualidad, a un enclave geopolíticamente crucial en el escenario mediterráneo y, por ello, en la relación con Turquía y Oriente Medio. Así de pacatos y cortoplacistas se han vuelto nuestros políticos obsesionados por el vil metal.

Es Grecia presa de su propia paradoja. Allí se creo la tragedia griega que hoy en forma de pesadilla irónica viven sin máscaras, ni teatros, en plena calle. De ahí que me permita la licencia de recordar que la tragedia helena está estructurada siguiendo un esquema rígido, cuyas formas se pueden definir con precisión. Se inicia generalmente con un prólogo, que según Aristóteles es lo que antecede a la entrada del coro. Las características generales son que se da la ubicación temporal y se une el pasado del héroe con el presente, pueden participar hasta tres actores, pero sólo hablan dos y el otro interviene o puede recitar un monólogo. Se informa al espectador del porqué del castigo que va a recibir el héroe y en esta parte no interviene el coro. Verdad que nos suena: el héroe el pueblo greigo, dos actores, Merkel y Sarzoky, con el monólogo de la Canciller, con el coro del eurogrupo. El castigo se anunció tras el primer rescate. Prosigue la párados, que son cantos a cargo del coro durante su entrada en la “orchestra”. En esta parte se realiza un canto lítico, donde se dan danzas de avance y retroceso. En la realidad que vivimos, se escenificó con las primeras huelgas y violencia en las calles de Atenas, mientras su clase política trataba de dar pasos hacia adelante y hacia atrás sin alcanzar acuerdos.

Luego comienzan los episodios que pueden ser hasta cinco. En ellos hay diálogo entre el coro y los personajes o entre personajes; es la parte más importante por ser la dramática por excelencia y expresa el pensamiento e ideas del personaje. Entre los episodios se hallan los estásimos, que son intervenciones del coro en las que se expresan las ideas políticas, filosóficas, religiosas o morales del autor. Aquí nos encontramos tras dimitir Papandreu y forzar la UE un gobierno de coalición presidido por el tecnócrata Lukas Papademos. Por último, el éxodo es la parte final de la tragedia, hay cantos líricos y dramáticos; el héroe reconoce su error. A veces es castigado con la muerte por los dioses y es allí donde aparece la enseñanza moral. A punto estamos de dictar esta trágica sentencia contra el pueblo griego y con ello condenarnos eternamente a la derrota del proyecto europeísta.

Volviendo a la cruda situación conviene analizar qué está exigiendo la troika de acreedores – Comisión Europea, FMI y BCE – al gobierno griego. El acuerdo sobre Grecia se basa en tres pilares. El compromiso de nuevos ajustes sociales por parte del Gobierno y los partidos políticos griegos, un acuerdo con la banca por el que acepte unas pérdidas o quita de la deuda de hasta el 70% de su inversión en Grecia y la aceptación por parte de la UE y el FMI de conceder un segundo paquete de ayudas que podría oscilar entre 130.000 y 145.000 millones de euros. El capítulo de recortes es especialmente traumático para un país que empieza su quinto año de recesión y que está cada vez más próximo a la explosión social. Los ajustes que se debaten ahora, muchos de los cuales son compromisos anteriores no aplicados aún, incluyen una reducción de gastos sanitarios de 1.100 millones; recortes en Defensa y en la Administración local, de 400 millones en cada caso; reducción del salario mínimo en 22% (pasaría de 750 euros brutos a 586 en 14 pagas), reducciones del 15% en las pensiones complementarias y aplicación del acuerdo anterior de eliminar 15.000 empleos del sector público.

La encrucijada a la que se está sometiendo a Grecia es tan simple como quedarse en el euro para sufrir décadas de pobreza e inestabilidad social o salirse y pasar a ser los parias de la Unión. Además, desde el punto de vista jurídico comunitario, no está regulada la salida del un miembro del euro, mientras que sí lo está cuando se sale Unión Europea, por lo que la caída de Grecia podría suponer que el Estado heleno se viera expulsado del club europeo. Hecho que podría convertirle en un oscuro objeto de deseo de potencias hostiles a los intereses europeos, dado el caos social que produciría quedarse en tierra de nadie en el escenario internacional.

El éxodo griego, de producirse, tendrá indudables efectos sobre la imagen de la Unión Europea y su ya tocada credibilidad en los mercados financieros. Así lo reconocía el ministro de Economía español Luis de Guindos al manifestar que “si Grecia va a la quiebra, puede haber contagio”. El temido efecto dominó sobre países con sus cuentas públicas cuestionadas alarga su sombra sobre el continente. De ahí que todos debamos ser muy conscientes de la trascendencia de cualquier decisión que se tome sobre Grecia porque del final de la tragedia griega depende en gran medida el futuro de Europa.

Greece will have to be built anew otherwise more of the same malpractices will continue to hinder the country’s prospects. Image source: The Guardian

Greece has been missing one “critical deadline” after the other, without achieving any real progress on its troika programme. Ever since the European Council summit of July 21, 2011, when the first debt restructuring plan was agreed upon — the so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) — the Greek people have been the recipients of an unprecedented psychological war that sows the fear of bankruptcy/default every few weeks. The reasons Greece has been failing to cope with its troika programme can be divided into internal and external.

External factors:

• Greece was the first country to fall in the domino effect that commenced in 2008 and is still underway. For that the country has received most of the attention all these years, as it is (correctly) considered the weakest link in the euro chain. As such the treatment of Greece should “necessarily” have the following features:
  • The European Union needs to show that it does not violate its own rules – the no-bailout clause for instance, or the “prohibition” of debt monetization or eurobonds by the ECB.
  • Any support to Greece must be done in such a way so as to avoid moral hazard. In other words Greece must not be given away money which might seem like a “reward”. Instead it has to be “punished” (though such a word will never be used officially) for not complying with the rules governing the Euro architecture.
  • The European Union needs to handle the situation in such a way that markets do not lose faith in its capacity to deal with its own issues. Therefore even if the situation in Greece deteriorates, it will be because of the “special” circumstances that apply to Greece – not due to the narrow-sighted troika policies.
  • For as long as the broader eurozone is facing its systemic crisis (listen to 30-minute podcast) Greece must not be allowed to default on its creditors as that would (a) trigger a payment of the CDS contracts, with negative implications for the financial system, (b) would mortally wound several European banks that are directly or indirectly exposed to Greek debt, (c) it would create uncertainty about the prospects of other countries mired in recession or under bailout programmes.
• The troika officials are focusing only on the fiscal finances of the state without any real concern about the effects of their policies on the real economy. For instance they only ask for the reduction of the budget deficit even if that requires unprecedented tax hikes that increase costs, decrease demand and create uncertainty about the tax regime, hence new investments are held back.
• European politicians who will soon be running for elections, have found an easy victim in Greece that they can attack in order to raise their “popularity”. As such many have “threatened” to kick the Greeks out of the euro in case they do not comply with what “leaders” say, even though that will never happen (see Greece will not exit the Euro – Groundless threats and speculation).

To conclude on the section of the external factors, Greece is trapped in — or is part of —  a highly complex political system, namely the EU. For as long as this system lacks all those mechanisms/institutions/tools that would allow it to function as a unified entity, instead of the now-sectarianated patchwork of squabbling states; the situation will remain extremely difficult and more failures will definitely follow.

Internal factors:

• For reasons that go far beyond the scope of this article, the Greek state has always been ill-designed. The public administration of the country is very big and highly inefficient, while the resulting bureaucracy creates several problems:
  • It retards economic activity as even routine procedures require considerable time to materialize.
  • “Fakelaki” and “miza” (Greek words for corruption payments) become the only way for citizens to get their job done. As such corruption becomes a “vital part” of the broader political system.
  • Because political parties and the main body of the state’s public administration operate in Athens, the Greek state has gradually become Atheno-centric, since exponentially more powers are brought to the capital, leaving the periphery underdeveloped and thus the country less competitive and productive on aggregate.
• Decades of ill advised policies have created series of distortions in the economy, in the political system and the social order; while they have produced perverse incentives that lead to several unpleasant phenomena – such as the ongoing strikes of civil servants or special interest groups who wish to cling on to their privileges; or a highly ineffective and unfair tax system that puts the burdens only on the lower parts of the income distribution; or even economic cartels that do not wish to see their state-sponsored monopolies/oligopolies be liberalized (professional drivers, pharmacists, public universities etc.).
• Greece entered the EEC in 1981 even though it never complied with the criteria. The decision back then was political and had to do with the balance of power between “West – USSR” in the broader region of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.  Nonetheless, the European funds that suddenly started flowing in to the underdeveloped country, gave the impression that the European Community is a cornucopia, an infinite source of wealth that will be feeding the Greeks for decades to come. In short Greece started growing (not a robust growth, but a bubble really), without making any reforms in its economy and state. As such the European funds ended up in unproductive expenses, instead of improving key sectors of the economy, or accumulating technology and other industrial goods that increase productivity.

Conclusion:

Decades of malpractices cannot change within a few months, especially when several interests are involved. For Greece to escape from the greatest economic crisis of its history the entire Greek polity will need to be redesigned. This requires deep reforms in the economy, so that individual genius replaces bureaucratic interventionism; changes in the internal structure of the state, allowing peripheries to control considerably more power that will allow for balanced growth all across the country; modernization of the public administration so that procedures become fewer and faster and costs diminish.

The Greek nation will have to be constructed anew. The problem is that the Greeks are not willing to accept that, while the inane policies of the troika are only making things worse, as the crisis deepens, thus supporting the (insane) idea that Greece would be better off outside the Euro. The Greek failure represents a conundrum that none seems able to solve.

External and internal factors of the Greek failure | Protesilaos Stavrou.

By Petros Fassoulas

For a while now the rhetorical narrative of those that advocate leaving the EU has been accompanied by a variety of alternatives to EU membership. Many ideas have been put forward, some quite ‘exotic’ or outright unrealistic, but there are two paradigms that are held up as the best possible options for Britain: Norway and Switzerland.

But upon closer inspection both options fail to stand up to scrutiny. They are both very different to Britain and not an appropriate model for how a country like the UK conducts its affairs on the world stage. Both Norway and Switzerland are small and peripheral states, with specialised economies and limited aspirations for influence at the global stage.

Take Norway for example, as a member of the European Free Trade Association it is part of the European Economic Area, which does give it access to the Single Market, with all the economic advantages that come with it. But here lays the catch, to be part of the Single Market and enjoy the benefits that affords you, Norway has to abide with its rules (not to mention contribute handsomely to the EU budget). But since Norway is not a member of the European Union it does not have the right to take part in the decision-making structures that decide the rules that govern that Single Market. Not a particularly advantageous state of affairs and the Norwegian government had the following to say in a recently published report: ‘The most problematic aspect of Norway’s form of association with the EU is the fact that Norway is in practice bound to adopt EU policies and rules in a broad range of issues without being a member and without voting rights. This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making processes that have direct consequences for Norway, and neither do we have any significant influence on them. Moreover, our form of association with the EU dampens political engagement and debate in Norway and makes it difficult to monitor the Government and hold it accountable in its European policy’ (Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union).

This is a damning verdict for those that call for withdrawal of the EU. Asking to relegate the UK to such an associate membership status is catastrophic and it does an enormous disservice to Britain, limits its influence on the international stage and undermines its ability to form the decisions that have an impact on its economic wellbeing.

The case of Switzerland is no different. It has to abide by the rules that govern the Single Market if it wants its companies to trade within it but it has no representation in the institutions, the EU Council and the European Parliament, which make those rules. Perhaps this is a satisfactory situation for a country with 2% of the EU population that might have compromised with the fact that its ability to influence the things that affect it is limited.

But Britain is one of the largest EU member states, smaller only to Germany and Poland, and of similar size to France. It has considerable influence over EU policies that affect it. Its views, when argued with confidence and convincing arguments, are respected and listened to. Very rarely has Britain lost a vote on matters governed by qualified majority voting, it is always consulted by the European Commission when it comes, for example, to rule-making in financial services and it has repeatedly and successfully argued its case before the European Court of Justice, which has ruled in its favour in cases that have to do with single market issues and liberalisation of trade.

Leaving the EU would mean removing ourselves from where decisions are made. Britain’s place is not outside the room, with its face pressed against the window, watching others take decisions that affect us, without us. Britain’s place is at the heart of the decision-making structures that govern one of the biggest economies of the world.

The benefits of EU membership are numerous and have often been repeated by pro-Europeans. Britain gains both in economic terms and in terms of its standing in the world. Our ability to influence the things that affect us, like Iranian nuclear aspirations, negotiations on climate change, international trade agreements, energy security, illegal immigration, international crime is enhanced when we act together with our EU partners, using the institutions of the EU as a vehicle to pursue our common interests. Leaving the EU will remove us not just from the biggest and wealthiest common market in the world. It will set us apart from an organisation (and its institutions) that share our aspirations for a liberal and peaceful world where democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and environmental protection reigns. The globalisation of our world and the rising power of developing countries are both full of challenges and opportunities. Britain can either try to make the most of these challenges and opportunities by standing together with its EU partners or risk having its influence fade by standing apart from them. This is no time to contemplate leaving the EU. The EU is a platform upon which we can all stand taller. We must make the most of that platform to increase our influence in the world and promote the principles that are important to us.

Petros Fassoulas is chairman of the European Movement UK.

This article was first published in the January issue of The European www.euromove.org.uk

Amid international media acclaim, the European Council on Foreign Relations has recently released the results of its innovative EU foreign policy research project, the 2012 European Foreign Policy Scorecard.

The ECFR’s researchers have assessed the EU’s foreign policy performance in 2011 in six major areas: the relationship with China, Russia, the US, Wider Europe (Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood and Turkey), crisis management handling and the EU’s support for multilateralism. The Scorecard proves that the EU’s influence as a global player has diminished significantly as a result of the mishandling of the sovereign debt crisis. With an average unemployment rate of some 10,5 percent, the EU’s soft power model has lost its lustre, the continent being currently viewed as the main source of economic instability in the world, instead of as an active participant in providing solutions to the current crisis.

Whilst in some areas the EU’s foreign policy initiatives have earned decent marks (relationship with the US, crisis management or participation within multilateral institutions), in some others (diplomatic relationship with China, Russia, Turkey or the Western Balkans) its performance was below average.

The authors have also highlighted in the report the EU’s slow and inadequate response to the 2011 Arab Awakening, as well as the fact that to this day the EU has failed to frame a functional and comprehensive Southern neighbourhood policy.

The EU’s foreign policy leaders have traditionally been France and the UK. Recently, however, Germany, Poland and Sweden have also positioned themselves in the lead, with the rest of the member-countries falling into the «slackers» category. A common, coordinated EU-wide foreign policy is yet to emerge, as a consequence of the continent’s obsession with its internal woes and the inability of its leading countries to adopt adequate pro-growth, pro-employment economic policies. More often than not, as Justin Vaisse, co-lead author of the Scorecard has noted, EU countries prefer to conduct foreign policies which reflect their national interest at the expense of the general interest of the Union. Not surprisingly, the EU’s influence as a multilateral, multi-national model has lost most of its appeal in Asia and Latin America alike. (sources: ECFR, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, NYT)

The fiscal compact, the new international treaty that will impose stricter budget rules on its signatory states, is considered by many as the only realistic solution to the ongoing crisis. The political forces pushing for the ratification of this treaty have identified the causes of the crisis in the excessive fiscal finances of some states. They advocate that the debts/deficits of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain are what create uncertainty about the integrity or even the viability of the eurozone. Though it is an undisputable fact that certain fiscal finances were/are not in good shape and could indeed be the weak spot of the euro edifice, the assertion that these alone have brought us to this point is misleading as it omits several parameters of the actual crisis, while it completely neglects the dynamics in the real economy and the financial sector, clinging only to a few fiscal indices – which by the way show little and mislead a lot as they are imperfect macroeconomic aggregates.

In recent years, social innovation has become a buzz word in the corridors of public-benefit foundations and their partners, and yet the concept is far from new. In fact, social innovation has been around as long as humans have walked the Earth. Just consider the creativity that was harnessed by our forefathers in the Paleolithic era to develop stone tools for hunting and gathering.

Social innovation today takes many forms, from the development of new technologies, such as nanotechnologies, to new production and decision-making processes.   Because of their close links to society and their independence, foundations, particularly those funding research, are well placed to foster new models for improving the lives of citizens. However, as technologies and society as a whole continue to evolve ever more rapidly, the question arises: How can foundations keep up with and facilitate social innovation?

This is the question that will guide discussions at the upcoming European Foundation Centre’s Research Forum, which will take place 9-10 February in Barcelona. Hosted by the “la Caixa” Foundation, the conference will aim to drill down beyond the buzzword and consider some key areas that are driving social innovation forward. One such area is Open Access, which is revolutionising and, some say, democratising access to scientific information. However, this new approach to the dissemination of scientific data and results also opens a Pandora ’s Box of issues such as how to ensure quality and financially sustainable publishing models.

The shift in data ownership and new publishing models will undoubtedly affect how foundations make their funding decisions. It is therefore incumbent on foundations to not only keep abreast of the changing trends in this regard but to be at the forefront of these developments. These questions are pertinent not only to the world of science and research, but also to the wider world. The recent black-out of Wikipedia, the fifth most visited website in the world, pays testament to the larger issue of information sharing and who are and will be the gatekeepers to scientific and other knowledge.

Foundations like to consider themselves innovators, risk takers and independent thinkers, ready to spearhead innovative ideas. The conference aims to really challenge these badges of honour and examine to what extent foundations’ work leads to positive change in people’s lives. It will also look at what proactive steps foundations can take, in partnership with governments and other stakeholders, to ensure that they remain ahead of the game and may wear their social innovation badge with pride.

For more information about the conference, visit:

www.efc.be/researchforumconference2012

There is a systemic crisis affecting most countries on the planet. It is not restricted to capitalism and in fact extends far beyond it. It is a crisis that has been in the making for decades and one that results from our disregard for nature and one another. The crisis is one of unsustainable business and it is most easily explained by the systemic thinking of Karl-Henrik Robert, Founder of The Natural Step. Twenty years ago, Robert defined four basic rules of engagement with mother earth:

1. Substances from the Earth’s crust cannot systematically increase in the biosphere.
2. Substances produced by society can not systematically increase in the biosphere.
3. The physical basis for the productivity and diversity of nature must not be systematically deteriorated.
4. In order to meet the previous three system conditions, there must be a fair and efficient use of resources to meet human needs.

 

With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty all Member States agreed that the EU should become a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In light of this obligation it is alarming that the accession is currently being sidetracked by political objections from the UK and France. On 25 January 2012, Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 47-nation Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament have urged national governments – notably the UK and France – not to stand in the way of the EU signing up to the European Convention on Human Rights.

In the light of these appeals it is worth recalling at what stage are the negotiations on the EU accession to the ECHR. This question was addressed during a conference in Brussels, organized by the Academy of European Law.

The legal obligation to accede to ECHR is enshrined in article 6 of the Treaty on EU. On the side of the Council of Europe this goal is mirrored in Protocol No. 14 to ECHR that entered into force on 1 June 2010 which amended Article 59 of ECHR, however the reflection is not identical: while the EU according to its primary law is legally obliged to become a party to the ECHR, the CoE law only created an opportunity for that to take place.

During the conference it was highlighted by all speakers that the appearance of these provisions in two legal orders was not triggered by an impulse, but is an effect of a long process which started already in the seventies, when the talks about the Community becoming one of the High Contracting parties commenced.

This became even more urgent with the gradual transference of sovereign powers to the Community and, later, to the Union, which was accompanied by the transference of the responsibility. The result was that certain acts, which have direct effect on the situation of an individual, escape the scrutiny of the Strasbourg court. The accession would be a remedy to this situation.

After the legal basis was created, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers asked the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) to draft  the modalities of the accession. The negotiations took place within an informal working group equally composed of experts representing EU member states and non-EU member states, together with the European Commission which has a negotiating mandate from 27 EU member states.

It has been decided that the accecion of the EU to the ECHR will be based on a international treaty between all 47 Council of Europe member states that will enter into force upon ratification by all parties. As a result of the treaty the EU will accede to the ECHR and for the time being to the protocols which all EU member states are parties to (Protocols Nos 1 and 6 to the ECHR). The ECHR will be amended accordingly.

Negotatitons were based on the following principles: firstly, the EU should join as the 48^th High Contracting Party on an equal footing with the other 47 Parties; secondly the existing ECHR mechanisms should be changed as little as possible; thirdly EU accession should be to the advantage of applicants, not to their detriment. The accession of the EU shall not affect its competences or powers of its institutions.

According to Dr Hannes Kramer, who is the EU Chief Negotiator on Accession to the ECHR, one of the most difficult issues during the negotiatiots was the so called co-respondent mechanim that will allow the EU to become a co-respondent in proceedings against an EU member state, or vice-versa. Second controversial aspect was ensuring prior-involvement of the Luxembourg court in the Stasbourg proceedings in cases in which the ECtHR will rule on conformity of an EU acts with human rights without the Court of Justice of the European Union had no previous possibility to do so.

At the same time, professor Christiaan W. A. Timmermans recalled that the relation between the two legal order already has a long history. The provisions of the Conventions have constituted the principles of the EU law. The relationship is also reflected in the dialogue between the two Courts – the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg. This takes the form of a dialogue of the case law, as well as the dialogue of the judges, both formal and informal. Thus, it should be once again highlighted that the accession of the EU to the Convention is a natural and logical consequence and result of a certain process and not an exotic idea that appeared out of nowhere.

Daniele Cangemi, the Head of the Human Rights Law and Policy Division, summed up the current stage of negotiations. The technical negotiations are finished and the draft accession agreement is ready. Next stage will be the adoption of the agreement by the Steering Committee for Human Rights, consultation of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly. Further on, the ECJ will be asked for an opinion whether the agreement does not violate the EU primary law. If the opinion is positive and the Committee of Ministers adopts the agreement, it will become open for signature for the 47 member states of the Council of Europe and the EU.

In this context it is also worth reminding that sidetracking the EU accession to the ECHR by governments violates the principle of sincere cooperation (art. 4 of the Treaty on European Union), according to which the Union and the Member States shall in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. According to the Treaty  the Member States shall take any appropriate measure to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. In addition the Treaty obliges the Member States to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objective.

The accession to the ECHR is undoubtedly a task flowing from the Treaties. Therefore, in light of the principle of sincere cooperation any attempt to obstruct it should be condemned.

Zuzanna Warso, lawyer at Europe of Human Rights

Sie habe eine politische Union vor Augen – diese Äußerung Angela Merkels in einem Interview in der Europa-Beilage sechs europäischer Zeitungen verdient in mehrfacher Hinsicht unsere Aufmerksamkeit. Die deutsche Bundeskanzlerin nannte dieses Ziel bereits auf dem CDU-Parteitag, aber noch nie vorher so unumwunden und mit einer so ausführlichen Darlegung der institutionellen Struktur dieser zukünftigen Union.

Ihre Äußerung ist zunächst bemerkenswert, weil sie eine Frage beantwortet, die bereits seit einiger Zeit gestellt wird: ob die europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs und vor allem Merkel selbst als einflussreichste unter ihnen eigentlich eine Vorstellung von der Zukunft Europas haben. Ihr Zaudern und ihre Ad-hoc-Entscheidungen während dieser ganzen Krise scheinen eher das Gegenteil zu beweisen.

Zweitens weil durch die große Aufmerksamkeit für ihre noch nie so unzweideutig ausgesprochene Unterstützung die ” Vision” der Bundeskanzlerin jetzt in ganz Europa bekannt ist, in erster Linie bei ihren Kollegen, die sie nicht so ohne weiteres ignorieren können, und das bringt uns zum dritten Punkt: Nachdem Merkel jetzt endlich gesagt hat, wohin sie mit der EU will, wird es Zeit, dass sie den von ihr skizzierten “langfristigen Prozess” in Gang setzt.

Das würde allerdings bedeuten, dass Berlin sich anders aufstellen muss, denn die Zurückhaltung, mit der auf einige von den Partnern vorgeschlagene Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der Krise reagiert wird – wie die Eurobonds und die Stärkung der Rolle der EZB und der EFSF -, oder die Hartnäckigkeit, mit der von ihnen sowohl Disziplin als auch Einsparungen verlangt werden, während sie immer weiter in die Depression absacken, gehen eher in die einer engeren Union diametral entgegengesetzte Richtung.

Wenn es Angela Merkel aber gelingt, ihre “Vision” ihren Kollegen genauso überzeugend zu vermitteln, wie sie das mit dem Kurs tut, der in Krisenzeiten gefahren werden muss, dann könnte diese politische Union doch noch einmal kommen. Man möchte fast rufen: Los komm’, Angela.

In France we can observe a political campaign, in which strange things happen. Nicolas Sarkozy has two major rivals. These are François Hollande and Marine Le Pen. Studies show that the representative of the Socialists is slightly winning (over 20%), Sarkozy is just behind him, and a little further – Le Pen from the far-right National Front.

The current President more or less from the beginning has started running a reasonable campaign, which means that he broke with theatrical gestures and began to talk about the real problems of the French. Too late though, according to specialists.

Everything indicates that the first round of the elections will not be decisive. So what can happen in the second one? If there are Hollande and Sarkozy, then the Socialist can be sure that none of the representatives of the extreme left will not give their vote to the current President. Sarkozy, in turn, will certainly not get votes from Marine Le Pen. Holland would therefore have a serious chance to win.

Hollande will be soon hosted in Poland at a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza. There will be therefore an opportunity to hear about his vision of Europe, and we know already that we do not like Sarkozy’s vision at all. But Donald Tusk will have a problem since the loyalty within the EPP will oblige him to support Sarkozy while Hollande would be probably a better partners for making deals. 

Last night the European leaders Summit finished early, before 10pm and last month’s bust-up with Britain, this event was uneventful, even amicable. Agreement was reached on the fiscal compact, the new treaty to toughen budget rules, in record time: less than two months.

A final row between France and Poland was resolved with a complicated compromise. This involves variable configurations of meetings involving 17 countries (the euro zone), 23 (the largely-forgotten Euro-Plus Pact, 25 (the signatories of the fiscal compact), 27 (all EU members states, still in charge of the single market) and 28 (involving soon-to-join Croatia).

It shows that, at the very least, European leaders can negotiate rapidly when they have the political will to do so—and when the British and the Czechs decide to step aside.

But did the leaders achieve anything useful to stem the crisis in the latest of their interminable summits? Their compact—now called the “treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the Economic and Monetary Union”, has as its main aim the imposition of balanced-budget rules on members.

This may to be worry that, at a time of widespread crisis, such pro-cyclical rules risk imposing too much austerity too widely, thus deepening the looming of recession and making it even harder to balance budgets.

Nevertheless, Angela Merkel hailed the treaty as a great success. Many others, though, dismiss the compact with so much faint praise. Even Mario Monti, these days everybody’s favourite Italian, thought the compact was little more than “a decorative song-bird”.

Germany parried demands, from Mr Monti and others, to enlarge the firewall by merging together the existing temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the permanent new European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This would enlarge the fund from €500 billion to €750 billion. Mrs Merkel said the matter should be discussed in March, as decided in last December’s summit.

The British have decided not to be awkward about the compact, despite the falling-out at the previous summit.

Mr Cameron is under pressure from Eurosceptic backbenchers to wage legal warfare to prevent signatories to the pact from using EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

That said, Mr Sarkozy and Mr Cameron are still sparring. The French president’s barb in a television interview a day earlier, when he mockingly said that Britain had “no industry left”, prompted Mr Cameron to rattle off a list of great British car companies—among them Honda, Toyota and Nissan (all Japanese).

Perhaps the most interesting dynamic was between France and Germany ahead of May’s French presidential elections in May. Mrs Merkel said that she would campaign for the re-election of Mr Sarkozy, saying he had done the same for her in the past.

Le 26 janvier s’est tenue à Bruxelles un conférence préparatoire au lancement. Elle marque une étape décisive dans les derniers préparatifs consacrés à l’initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE). Parmi les intervenants, citons le vice-président de la Commission européenne et responsable de cette initiative, M. Maroš Šefčovič, le ministre danois des affaires européennes, M. Nicolai Wammen, des députés européens qui ont joué un rôle important dans l’élaboration de cet instrument, ainsi que des représentants à haut niveau de Facebook, Google, Twitter et Dailymotion.Ils veulent s’engager et apporter leur expérience  

Les menaces  sur le Conseil de l’Europe sont bien connues des lecteurs de Nea say qui en a relaté quelques unes. Ce peu de considération pour le Conseil de l’Europe est ancien quasi atavique. Un instant mis en veilleuse car voyant dans cette institution un contre exemple des institutions communautaires, le Conseil de l’Europe aurait pu  se révéler utile à l’usage. Mais force est de constater que les institutions du Conseil de l’Europe est en tout premier lieu la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) ont été contaminées dans ses pratique par l’Union européenne. Ces attaques interviennent au moment où s’engagent les négociations pour l’Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Le premier ministre britannique plaide pour une réforme de l’institution européenne et souhaite l’adoption de nouvelles règles de sélection des juges et de saisine de la Cour. Au bout du compte ne vise-t-il pas la mise en cause d’un des fondements de la Cour : le droit pour quelques 800 millions de citoyens de 47 pays réunis au sein du Conseil de l’Europe de porter plainte individuellement contre leur gouvernement après avoir épuisé toutes les voies de recours dans leur pays. Autre objectif, la jurisprudence de la Cour devenant la référence ultime, incontournable c’est à la longue rendre le droit national obsolète, inutilisé et donc n’évoluant pas.

 Après son veto à Bruxelles en décembre, David Cameron s’en prend à une autre institution européenne, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH).Invité  à présenter le programme de la présidence britannique à l’occasion de la session d’hiver de l’assemblée parlementaire, il a confirmé que c’est bien  la réforme de la Cour qui sera le pivot de sa présidence. D’emblée, il a tenu à rappeler  l’attachement séculaire de son pays aux droits de l’homme,  en citant la « Magna Carta » (XIIIè siècle), la « Bill of rights » (XVIIè siècle) et l’engagement autant politique que militaire de son gouvernement dans le printemps arabe. Une manière de légiférer et d’agir qui, dit-il, « tient au caractère national britannique, à son goût de la liberté, et à sa haine de toute autorité trop puissante (…) la Cour n’a jamais eu un rôle aussi précieux et difficile, cela n’implique pas un statu quo pour une institution née de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme née il y a plus de 60 ans dans un continent qui venait de se libérer des totalitarismes. Il a insisté sur le « phare » que la Cour doit continuer à être.

Mais Cameron estime que «ce concept est en danger d’être détourné». «La cour devrait être libre de traiter les violations des droits de l’homme les plus graves et ne pas se laisser déborder par l’accumulation des demandes en attente», a-t-il insisté. « On lui demande de trop faire ».Il part du constat que la cour est noyée sous un flot de 150.000 requêtes en attente d’instruction, menaçant son efficacité et sa crédibilité. Le premier ministre britannique a cité  l’exemple de passagers d’un bus entre Bucarest et Madrid réclamant 90 euros de dommages et intérêts au motif que les sièges n’étaient pas inclinables. Il a forcé le trait et pratiqué le sport national britannique quasi quotidien qu’adorent  les tabloïds : ridiculiser les mœurs continentale et leurs pratique véritables ou inventées. Le premier ministre oublie qu’aucune jurisprudence ne peut se créer sans procès et sans jugements  dont la valeur va bien au-delà de la matérialité des faits incriminés. Ce faisant il dévoile sa peur que la Cour devienne une « quatrième instance » pour des citoyens insatisfaits des jugements nationaux pourtant satisfaisants.

«La cour devrait être libre de traiter les violations des droits de l’homme les plus graves et ne pas se laisser déborder par l’accumulation des demandes en attente», a-t-il insisté. Il plaide pour une modification des procédures pour établir un meilleur filtrage des requêtes et l’adoption de nouvelles règles de sélection des juges. Dénonçant le fait que la cour soit devenue une instance de dernier ressort quand tous les recours nationaux ont été épuisés, il souhaite qu’elle cesse de réexaminer les décisions nationales «lorsque ce n’est pas nécessaire» et que «les États aient la responsabilité primaire de protéger leurs citoyens». Si le constat est largement partagé et si certains États membres, comme l’Allemagne, soutiennent sa volonté de réforme, l’unanimité requise pour toute modification est toutefois loin d’être acquise. Londres serait prêt à forcer les négociations en menaçant de se retirer de l’institution faute d’accord.

Mais la précarité de cette position fait planer le soupçon que le sujet relève de tactiques de politique intérieure, désignant une fois de plus l’Europe comme un bouc émissaire. Plusieurs décisions de la cour de Strasbourg ont été perçues comme un camouflet par les Britanniques. Pas plus tard que la semaine précédente, elle a refusé l’extradition vers la Jordanie du terroriste Abou Quatada, (cf. Nea say) arrêté à Londres en 2005, estimant que cela risquerait de le priver d’un procès équitable. En 2005, la cour a imposé à la Grande-Bretagne d’autoriser le droit de vote aux prisonniers (cf. Nea say). Une décision -toujours pas appliquée- qui «rend malade» David Cameron et a motivé la croisade des conservateurs contre Strasbourg. De telles décisions  entraînent le discrédit  « des droits de l’Homme auprés des sociétés européennes » ce qui  le préoccupe. Mais, contrairement aux fantasmes des eurosceptiques, sur 950 décisions l’an dernier concernant le Royaume-Uni, seules 8 violations de la convention sur les droits de l’homme ont été relevées . « Le moment est dés lors venu d’entamer une réforma pratique et raisonnable impliquant, entre autres points, que la Cour n’intervienne que lorsque des « grands droits » de l’Homme ne sont pas respectés », à charge pour les gouvernements nationaux « d’assumer la responsabilité du droit primaire pour la protection de leurs citoyens »

Le fait que la CEDH soit présidée par un Britannique n’aide pas David Cameron dans ses visées. Dans une tribune vigoureuse  au quotidien The Independent, le juge Nicolas Bratza a accusé le gouvernement de céder aux sirènes anti-européennes des tabloïds. Mais lors de la conférence de presse annuelle consacrée au bilan de la CEDH il a tenté  de ramener le conflit à des proportions plus mesurées. »Il n’y a pas de conflit ouvert entre nous et le Royaume-Uni et nous sommes d’accord sur de nombreux points. J’ai lu le discours modéré du premier ministre prononcé hier devant l’assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe et nous nous retrouvons pour dire que la Cour, surchargée d’affaires irrecevables ou répétitives souffre d’un arriéré élevé (…) la CEDH ne doit effectivement pas être un tribunal de quatrième instance, nous avons été les premiers à le dire, elle n’est pas un tribunal de l’immigration et nous sommes d’accord pour nous concentrer sur les affaires importantes. Mais il est faux de dire que nous envoyons le message d’une réduction de la marge d’appréciation des Etats ». Mais il regrette qu’un seul arrêt concernant le refus du droit de vote aux prisonniers ait été utilisé au Royaume-Uni « pour lancer une attaque générale contre la Cour » du simple fait qu’il heurte le gouvernement et l’opinion publique. Nicola Bratza attend les propositions de la présidence britannique du Conseil de l’Europe sur la réforme de la CEDH. La Cour sera consultée et présentera son avis officiel.

      -. TEXTE DU DISCOURS (EN) http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/european-court-of-human-rights/

      -. Texte de la résolution de l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe (APCE): «  Garantir l’autorité et l’efficacité de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme » http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/ATListingDetails_F.asp?ATID=11398

      -. Texte de l’article de Nicolas Bratza dans the Independent http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/nicolas-bratza-britain-should-be-defending-european-justice-not-attacking-it-6293689.html

 

 

Classé dans:DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Questions institutionnelles