Where is Europe set to go after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves? Are the Western Balkans next to join? Can the other ex-Yugoslav republics be kept out once Croatia has become an EU member state? And most controversially: What future for Turkey and Europe?

Guest post by Senka Neuman Stanivukovi?, researcher at the University of Groningen. As a part of novelized Enlargement strategy, the Commission has released a set of short videos to communicate the EU’s widening eastwards to the citizens. I suggest that the campaign not only prejudices against the Eastern members and to-be-members by portraying these as a derivative of the West, but it also verifies the East/West dichotomy as inherent to the EU’s political structure. In view of that, the article speaks up against the Westernization of European identity and the EU’s political order. La révolution dévore ses enfants. Provided that the post-communist transition and subsequent 2004/2007 EU enlargement in conjunction with the pending accession of the Western Balkans was revolutionary, then the ten Central European and the seven Balkan countries are a textbook example of the above-cited Danton’s claim that the revolution devours its own children. In an era when discourses of the PVV, the Front National, and the Lega Nord are becoming part of the mainstream public narrative vis-à-vis the EU’s Ostpolitik, to argue that the Central and Balkan Europeans are victims of the Europeanization process is certainly not without controversy. The enlargement fatigue discourse, de facto euphemism for Western Europeans’ uneasy relationship with their Eastern counterparts, is unfit to grasp that the biggest weight of the accession process has been and continues to be carried by the acceding countries. The West can never be as tired from expanding as the East is tired from transitioning towards the West. I argue that, notwithstanding the political rhetoric, in the context of the EU’s widening eastwards, the act of accession comes closer to Anschluss than to integration with the EU. Semiotics aside, for Central Europe integrating with the EU meant becoming more westernized than the West. Thus, in the same manner as Europeanization qua accession has reproduced the power relationship between Western Europe as certified Europe and Central Europe as its copie conforme, the newest Commission’s video clips on Southeast Europe, as a part of the pro-EU Enlargement campaign, portray this region as a derivative of old Europe and thus worth of EU membership. But is this so problematic? Faced with an institutional vacuum subsequent to the fall of communism, these countries were provided with a brand new set of political and economic institutions and were additionally given the very much needed financial and administrative support for putting these institutions into practice. The role the EU has played and still plays in helping membership candidates in swapping communism for capitalism is undeniable. More importantly, the impetus for joining the EU always comes from the candidate state. Nobody has forced Central Europe to join the EU and nobody has forced these countries to comply with EU rules and norms. Yet now, almost a decade after the 2004 enlargement, while witnessing continuous economic growth and consolidation of democracy in most of the new member states, I dare to call out the EU for victimizing these countries. The trick is that while being the engine behind the Europeanization process, the EU has simultaneously occupied this very process. It claims monopoly over democracy and capitalism, and, more importantly, it claims monopoly over Europe. In 1984, Kundera argued that Western Europe has kidnapped Europe. In the 1990s, by coupling the infamous Return to Europe with EU accession, the political nomenclatura of Central Europe and later of the former Yugoslav republics plus Albania has confirmed the EU’s hegemony over Europe. Put differently, in the same fashion as the West has stolen Europe during the Cold War, it has also stolen Europeanization in the post-Cold War period. In this context, the conformist non-members and to-be-members are labeled as good Europeans, whereas the recidivists are singled out as bad Europeans and, where geographical and cultural variables allow, as non-Europeans. Again, this is still not problematic per se. If the West is the EU and the EU is Europe, by joining the EU, Central Europe and the Balkans confirm their place within Europe and break away from their troubled past. At the same time, for Western Europeans, this means ultimate confirmation of the supremacy of their system, which is no longer vulnerable to internal or external contestation. It seems as a win-win situation, or, to quote Fukuyama, the end of history. But it is not. Scholarship on EU identity teaches us that the idea of Europe is established in opposition to the East. Ergo, Europeanism is not solely constructed in line with a Kantian ideal of a European federation nor does it solely progress towards constitutional patriotism basing itself on a set of commonly shared norms such as democracy, rule of law, solidarity, and respect for human rights. Au contraire, Kant himself sees Western European nation-states as a stepping stone for an emerging cosmopolitan order. European identity is therefore constructed vis-à-vis the Occident/Orient. The 20th century underpinned the West/East frontier awarding the Soviets with the role of the European other. Hereafter, pan-Europeanism was based on liberalism and capitalism and in opposition to an undemocratic and communist East. In 1938, Coudenhove-Kalergi framed the Paneuropa movement as, among others, a response to the emerging threat of Bolshevikization of Europe. This East/West dichotomy was further fortified against the background of the Cold War and was consequently embedded in the EU’s political order. When the founding fathers talked about the core of Europe, they talked of France, Britain, and Germany. Thus, the récidive of European ethnocentrism was sustained and reinforced by the bipolarity of the Cold War order. In effect, today’s EU exists as an artifact of Western Europe, defined in opposition to Eastern Europe. In this scenario, the former Soviet Block and the Balkans are read as the EU’s other or as the Zwischenland, at best. To what extent the fall of the Iron Curtain and subsequent events have made this borderline fussier or have moved the frontier further eastwards is debatable. On the one hand, in 2004, Prodi talked about the unification of the Continent. On the other hand, to many, Vienna still seems much closer than Prague will ever be with the us vs. them mentality continuing to shape the European public and political discourse. Nowadays, we tend to debate the finalité of the European project, but is seems that qua identity, this matter has been settled already with the Peace of Versailles. I argue that by moving the EU’s border eastwards, we have not deconstructed the East-West schism. Rather, we have internalized it. The present debates indicate that the Cold War dichotomies are still very much alive and kicking. While contained by the Iron Curtain, today these divisions have moved into our backyard with the other becoming our first door neighbor. For the countries that have taken the path of EU membership to establish their place in Europe this is tough luck. With EU membership failing to provide one with an external validation of one’s Europeanness, the enduring process of conforming to EU rules and norms is comparable to Sisyphus rolling the immense boulder uphill only to watch it fall down again. In an effort of becoming more Europeanized than the EU, the only thing these countries managed to establish is that they are more European than their first neighbor to the east. Consequently, the Central Europe of today and the Western Balkans of tomorrow are in a schizophrenic state due to a diametrical difference between the Ego and the Alter. Ultimately, this means that transition is a never-ending process. With the above-developed discussion in mind, I would like to reflect upon the current enlargement campaign. The EU’s 2005 enlargement strategy, as a summary of the lessons learned from the big-bang enlargement, highlights the need of improved communication of the future accessions to the citizens. Consequently, in 2012, DG enlargement released a set of video clips under the motto of narrowing the existing democratic deficit by advertising the upcoming new members among the common folks. Particularly interesting is the release on Southeast Europe entitled So Similar, So Different, So European. While escaping the hype of the more notorious Growing Together video, the ad on Southeast Europe is very much representative of the West-centrism in the EU’s order. In short, the add presents sights in Southeastern Europe such as the Lady of the Rock monastery, the Old Bridge of Mostar and the Zagreb National Theater to be identical to sights in Sweden, Italy, and Austria. The campaign is however a backhanded compliment to the essence and the uniqueness of Western Balkan identity. To be blunt, if the enlargement process reproduces the existing power relationships between the superior West and the backwards East writ large, this clip does exactly the same on a small scale. As such, it reinvents the Southeast against the image of the West in the same fashion as Central Europe was manufactured as a western corollary in the East throughout the 1990s. The arising narrative of the Western Balkans being good only if similar/comparable to France, Germany, the Netherlands etc. is stereotyping, patronizing and quite offensive. Unfortunately, however, with Western identity as a benchmark of certified Europe being deeply entrenched in the EU accession discourse, we often fail to see this. The question, however, is to what extent going along is worth it? Already today, the West has monopolized European culture, history, arts, education, the understanding of progress, social order, democracy etc. Now, with the above-discussed clip in mind, we are even witnessing a monopolization of landscape. Sure, it is certainly more rewarding for one to see her country represented as the New France than the villain of European modern history. But, again, I ask, is it worth for the East to become more western than the West, when, in the eyes of those who matter, they will never be good enough?

The Polish history after 1989 is very much bound up with the countries that emerged after the transition in Central and Eastern Europe. We cared about good relations with our neighbours, repeatedly boasting about the fact that all the neighbours were new and we did not have any serious conflict with any of them. Something is changing in this area. The example of Lithuania and the evident coldness is very characteristic.

The Polish authorities have recognised that they can condescend to the Lithuanians. The famous declaration of the Prime Minister that the relations with Lithuania will be determined by the local Polish community, was followed by gestures and counter-gestures. I wonder whether the Polish President is satisfied to hear the Lithuanian partner saying that she did not come to Warsaw before the NATO summit because decisions are made in Washington. In a moment it will turn out that the proud Poland withdraws from patrolling the Lithuanian airspace and in this place will be someone else, such as the Norwegians.

This mechanism works even more acutely in the European Union. Poland is struggling to maintain the Cohesion Fund, which will give us a chance to complete infrastructure projects. The country fights, however, the more and more alone. The Baltic states do not support us. Romania and Bulgaria have other problems (Schengen), the Czechs speak the language of the net payers (?) and on our side so far is Slovakia…

In relations with Lithuania, Poland goes down a blind alley. We assumed that we must force our reasons and yet it appears that the small one finds support much easier than we thought, and not necessarily in Moscow.

‘EU visa policy on Turkey is illegal,’ German-based advocacy group says – March 16th 2012

I quote:

“The Germany-based, non-profit research and policy institute European Stability Initiative (ESI) has said the European Union’s current visa policy regarding Turkey is illegal and in violation of its own legal obligations, not to mention unsustainable.

In a newsletter the ESI posted on its website titled “The time is now: Changing EU visa policy on Turkey,” it says Turkey is the only EU candidate country without a visa-free travel agreement with the EU. Moldova and Ukraine, which have yet to receive any promise of membership, are participating in an EU visa liberalization process. There are even discussions about visa-free travel for Russians, the institute says. Mexicans, Brazilians, Guatemalans, Israelis and Malaysians can all travel to the EU without a visa, while citizens of Turkey — which applied for EU membership in 1959 and has been negotiating with the bloc since 2005 — still cannot travel to EU member states without a visa.

According to the ESI, there are three major problems with the EU’s current policy. First, it violates the EU’s own legal commitments. Second, it undermines the bloc’s vital security interests. Finally, it is based on mistaken assumptions.

In 1963, Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the EU. A protocol to this agreement states that both sides “shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.”

The ESI points out a court decision in the case of a Turkish national arrested by the German federal police at the country’s border with the Czech Republic in August 2009. Even though the man had entered Germany without a visa in order to buy a car, a local court in the city of Cham ordered his immediate release, noting that as a Turkish national he could “rely on visa-free travel according to the so-called standstill clause,” which refers to the aforementioned protocol.

The ESI cites in the newsletter a stream of European court rulings which have confirmed Turks’ right to travel to a number of EU member states in the past few years. In February 2009, the European Court of Justice ruled that Turkish truck drivers Mehmet Soysal and İbrahim Şavatlı, as service providers, did not need a visa to enter Germany. In November 2010, a Turkish tourist entering Germany from Poland without a visa was arrested for illegal immigration and sent to prison. Based on these rulings, the institute has come up with the conclusion that the current Schengen visa requirement, and the EU regulations on which it is based, are illegal and that EU working groups often ignore that when it comes to the visa issue Turkish citizens already have legal rights inside the EU.”

Yours sincerely,

Cem

Kemal Derviş is both Turkish and German. His father is Turkish and his mother is German. I’m proud to be Turkish and the Germans can be proud too because he is the Batman of economics!

Derviş gives three advices to Turkey

I quote:

“Brookings Institute’s Vice President Kemal Derviş made some special remarks on Turkey’s economy following a meeting of the Turkish American Scientists and Scholars Association (TASSA) in which academics working in the US come together. Speaking to the Sabah daily, Derviş said that it was almost impossible not to be affected by the eurozone crisis and that Turkey has become more resistant to foreign disruptions, because it has diversified its export in the last decade. Derviş said he didn’t expect any economic downturn despite the negative course in Europe, adding that the credit policy applied by the European Central Bank could not solve the problem but lessened its strength. Derviş stated that despite the positive outlook of Turkish economy, there were three important points to be watched. “Firstly, Turkey should make more savings and investments. Secondly, it should finance investments by its own resources, and finally it should decrease its current deficit to 5-6%,” said Derviş.”

Always available and ready to help.

Yours faithfully,

Cem

PS. As Ozay Mehmet, Derviş too would say: “Bail out the unemployed, rather than the banks!”.

  No country can be competitive economically and credible democratically without highest standarts of gender equality. The Turkey’s civilisational roots and aspirations to live in an advanced information society and democracy in the 21st Century justify the highest political focus on gender equality. This is why the Turkish government, parliament and all the political parties have an ever [...]

Apparently, a solution has been found today to unlock Serbia’s EU bid, and also make sure that Kosovo participates in regional forums normally. (Until now agreements have been signed by UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo). “Kosovo*” will be the only denomination to be used, and a footnote attached to the asterisk will read “this designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Please see below today’s press release of PES President Sergei Stanishev on Turkey’s accession to the EU and responsibility of European & Turkish conservatives’ responsibility for the current impasse. Twelve years after granting candidate status and six years after the start of accession negotiations, EU-Turkey relations are today at a virtual standstill. It is in the interest [...]

By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA ISTANBUL (AP) — If a project has no deadline, is it really a project? What do you call a negotiation process in which the partners can’t talk about key issues? These are existential times for Turkey’s campaign to join the European Union — an ambitious vision that has become increasingly ambiguous. At [...]

Ethnic Serbs living in northern Kosovo – municipalities of Zubin Potok, Zvecan, northern Mitrovica and Leposavic – have been voting in a two-day referendum on February 14.-15. The question was simple: Voters were asked simply ”Do you accept the institutions of the so-called ‘Republic of Kosovo’ established in Pristina?”. Turnout was at 75.28%. Final results will be made known on February 19th – just after the fourth anniversary of Kosovo’s independence declaration – but early estimate is that 99.74 % were against Pristina’s sovereignty. In Kosovo case the figure probably reflects good the opinion of local Serb population. The result shows that the barricades against EULEX were not just the work of “criminals” and “radicals” but instead have real popular support.

One should note that question about northern municipalities of Kosovo is only one – even if a core one – aspect in Kosovo framework. During NATO-bombing and after ethnic cleansing implemented by Kosovo Albanians, nearly 200.000 Serbs and Romas escaped to Serbia where they are living like internal refugees many of them in temporary conditions. Despite naïve multiethnic ideas in Brussels they have not any intentions to risk their lives by returning hostile environment and their destroyed homes. In my opinion international community – which allowed this problem to happen – should finance a housing program in Serbia for these refugees (or officially IDPs). Second core question is the fate of some half of remaining Kosovo Serbs namely those who are living in isolated enclaves outside northern municipalities in Kosovo. These enclaves are protected by KFOR troops and should be so long as Pristina administrated part of Kosovo is so hostile as it still is.

High Tension in Kosovo North

Tension has been high in northern Kosovo since last July. The situation escalated when Kosovo Serbs put up roadblocks and barricades to stop the deployment of Kosovo customs officers to border points between north Kosovo municipalities and Serbia. Several rounds of violence has occurred; a Kosovo policeman was killed and several NATO troops injured. The north was the scene of unrest in November, when some 50 soldiers from the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force were hurt in a dispute between the two sides over control of border crossings. This Pristina’s failed attempt to seize the northern boundary with support by EULEX and KFOR have demonstrated that using force does not solve dispute.

The governing coalition in Belgrade has called on the Serbs to end the blockade, refrain from violence and abandon the referendum and same time several EU nations, especially Germany, want Serbia’s government to make deals with Pristina so that Serbia could get EU candidate status this Spring.

In Brussels, the EU said it was preparing for a new round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina aimed at easing tensions in northern Kosovo. “There is a particular situation in the north that needs a solution, but neither violence nor barricades, or a referendum contributes to it,” EU spokeswoman Maja Kocijancic said. “Only a dialogue can achieve that.” (Source AP ) Earlier the EU pressured Serbia intensely in November and December, demanding that it force the northern Kosovo Serbs to remove their barricades in the name of “freedom of movement”. KFOR fought several actions against barricades, inflicting – and taking – casualties.

Time to Exit-strategy?

However the western powers have on the drawing board also an other strategy of fostering change to avoid reinforcing the status quo in the north. The press in Pristina has reported about secret meetings between the Kosovo government, the US ambassador and chief of the International Civilian Office (ICO), Pieter Feith,on a new plan to push the UN out of the north. An “EU House” will be established in the north to promote the “European perspective” and to cooperate with “progressive forces” willing to work with Pristina, “parallel” municipalities in the north would remain unrecognized and “Advisory Councils led by moderate Kosovo Serbs” chosen by Pristina taking place from democratically elected bodies in Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan. To make space for these innovations the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Administration in Mitrovica (UAM), that administers north Mitrovica under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, will be closed.

Also the International Steering Group (ISG) had meeting on January 24^th in Vienna to deside its 2012 program for Kosovo. Despite its name ISG represents only countries which have advocated Kosovo Albanian separatism, cover costs of Kosovo Albanian state-building efforts.cover costs of Kosovo Albanian state-building efforts and try to underestimate UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – which btw represents in Kosovo highest international law. Anyway ISG issued a communique calling upon the government of Kosovo to continue to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, aiming to complete outstanding elements so that the period of “supervised independence” could terminate by the end of this year. While the outcome both politically and on operation theatre has been modest as best and the results related to investments almost non-visible, ISG probably his hurry to implement fast exit-strategy.

Marko Prelec from International Crisis Group concludes well the situation now since last summer tensions started in his post Update on Northern Kosovo Barricades. A quote:

The situation shows with crystal clarity the folly of the “freedom of movement” campaign, which cost tens of millions of Euros (flying Kosovo officials to, and from, the border day after day runs into serious money), dozens of injuries, made travel more difficult for real people and achieved nothing. All this started because of the basic disputes between Kosovo and Serbia, over Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity. Trying to use issues like freedom of movement – or the rule of law – as tools to change locals’ minds about sovereignty issues, rather than as ends in themselves, just damages the tool. The dispute isn’t a technicality and cannot be resolved as though it were.

 

… or back to Dialogue?

Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has poor history. Serbs and Albanians have been in negotiations and talks frequently over the past two decades – from the tentative efforts of the 1990s to the doomed talks in Rambouillet, France, in 1999 and the later “status” talks between 2005 (Ahtisaari’s pseudo-talks) and 2007 (“Troika” led talks). None of these has led to tangible results and left outsiders imposing an outcome, be it NATO intervention or proposing the Ahtisaari plan.

The original or better to say official aim of international community was to build “standards before status”, on 2005 the task was seen impossible so the slogan changed to “standards and status”. Even this was unrealistic so Feb. 2008 “European”standards were thrown away to garbage and “status without standards” precipitately accepted by western powers. For international community I don’t see any success story with this backward progress. Thus the multiethnic idea is far away despite EU’s billions. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo are barricaded into enclaves keeping their lives mainly with help of international KFOR troops or in de facto separated Serb majority region in North Kosovo. This has changed former multiethnic province more mono-ethnic one.

The new situation has forced also International Crisis Group (ICG) to admit the defeat of its Kosovo policy recommendations during last decade. ICG has acted as informal extension of U.S. State Department however pretending to be neutral mediator and think tank. During earlier “status” negotiations 2005 it endorsed preconditions before talks and afterwards supported sc Ahtisaari plan. Now in their new analysis ”Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion” ICG sees Kosovo’s partition with land swap one of possible solutions during coming talks between Belgrad and Pristina.

The fact on the ground is that northern part of Kosovo is integrated to Serbia like it always has been, as well those parts south of Ibar river, which are not ethnically cleansed by Kosovo Albanians. Serbia still runs municipalities, courts, police, customs and public services, and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) has been unable to deploy more than a token presence there.

During the course of events, the Ahtisaari Plan was implemented in south Kosovo, the north, however, remained outside Kosovo institutions and the ICO, and the Ahtisaari Plan was not implemented there. The Ahtisaari Plan derived a formula that would allow Kosovo Serbs to have their own local institutions and communal life with continued linkages to Serbia, but within the framework of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. If partition option – which in my opinion is pragmatic, the best and even realistical way to solve Kosovo conflict – is not yet possible so then the Ahtisaari Plan might be temporary base for compromise. The Plan however needs some modification. A new follow-up – entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’ - is presented by TransConflict and it might be achievable as the policy paper is authored by Gerard Gallucci, the former UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica.

My Scenario

“Kosovo … a Serbian province, occupied and now international protectorate administrated by UN Kosovo mission; as quasi-independent pseudo-state has good change to become next “failed” or “captured” state; today’s Kosovo is already safe-heaven for war criminals, drug traffickers, international money laundry and radical Wahhabists – unfortunately all are also allies of western powers”.

(Ari Rusila)

US based Freedom House gave in their last report (2012) rank partly free to Kosovo related to political rights and civil liberties (5,4 points respectively), while Serbia got rank free (2,2) and e.g also Croatia (1,2), Bulgaria (2,2) and Romania (2,2) got rank free, while Bosnia-Herzegovina (4,3) and Albania (3,3) fell to category partly free. (Note: Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.) So even western powers must addmit that despite billions of dollars for Kosovo state-building efforts during last 12 years the outcome is that the protectorate still is among the worst in region related to political rights and civil liberties. One could ask why then Kosovo Serbs should go backwards by integrating to that society when better the alternative could be integrate also officially to more developed Serbia.

In my opinion Kosovo will remain a frozen conflict probably whole this decade. The western powers can not addmit – yet – that their intervention was a mistake, international community can not addmit its failure with capasity-/state-building efforts after squandering billions of Euros, noor that instead of multiethnic democracy the out outcome mono-ethnic tribe-society.  EULEX etc will continue to build some facades and pseudo-activities like it used to do, Pristina pretends that north is integral part of their quasi-independent pseudo-state which the North never has been, the Kosovo institutions do not exist in the north, and it is very unlikely that they will be established there soon. Hard-line Serbs keep claim about Kosovo as Serbian province, which it indeed has been but after 1999 situation on the ground changed; instead the today’s government in Belgrade might change in next elections. What is clear after referendum is that population in Kosovo’s northern municipalities does not want to integrate Pristina lead institutions, they want to continue their living as part of Serbia like they always have been, in short they want reunify northern municipalities with Serbia again.

After this quite pessimistic view one can ask if there is any other way forward. From my point of view there is the negotiation option. But this time negotiations should base facts on the ground instead of high-flown ideas in Washington and Brussels, around negotiation table in addition to Belgrade and Pristina representatives should be also local stakeholders from northern Kosovo and selected by local population. The referendum made positions clear for tripartite approach.

More eg in Kosovo: Two years of Pseudo-state

When General Ilker Başbuğ (a true pro-Atatürk man and soldier) became the Chief of General Staff, the websites created by some traitorous soldiers that aimed at destabilizing the Turkish government already existed.

Therefore he can’t be responsible for that anti-government propaganda.

Furthermore, these sites were closed following an order given by….Chief of General Staff Ilker Başbuğ himself.

Thus for God’s sake who is fooling whom?

I quote the excellent Turkish newspaper Anadolu Ajansı:

“I reject this charge… I, as the chief of the general staff, am the commander of the Turkish armed forces which is one of the most powerful armies in the world,” Başbuğ said in testimony at an Istanbul court Thursday.

Every minute that Mr Ilker Başbuğ has been spending in prison is an insult to his stature and intelligence.

Every minute that he has been spending in prison is a smear on his and Turkey’s integrity.

In other words, by reason of what he has done for Turkey, an insult to the Turkish nation.

As a Turkish citizen I am deeply disturbed and ashamed.

Yours faithfully,

Cem

I knew that one day these two articles regarding Ilker Başbuğ would be useful. I quote some crucial extracts:

Turkey’s top general in ‘challenging mood’ over coup allegations – March 16th 2010

When a journalist asked about speculations that top generals might consider resigning from their posts in reaction to the arrests of their colleagues, Başbuğ did not hide his anger. “Are you going to be happy if we resign? I said I am on the job until the last minute of my term,” he said. “I have been wearing this uniform for the last 50 years and I still feel like a lieutenant.”

Başbuğ continued by explaining the meaning of “teğmen,” the Turkish word for lieutenant: “‘Teğmen’ means the one who attacks. This word was created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself. We’ll sometimes be generals, sometimes lieutenants.”

“I started to wear this uniform in 1957. I was promoted to officer in 1962. My actual service [as an officer] in the military has been 48 years,” he said. “There are some other generals who served 47 or 46 [years]. But 48 years – it’s a record. Why do I say this? I want to emphasize that I stand behind my years in the military. I stand behind what I have done thus far.”

Here is the second article:

Başbuğ hands over reins to Turkey’s new top general – August 27th 2010

Earlier in the day, Başbuğ attended an award ceremony and bestowed a medal of honor and the Distinguished Service Medal upon several military officers for their contributions and service to the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK.

Speaking to daily Milliyet columnist Fikret Bila, Başbuğ, who served in the most stressful period of the army due to the ongoing probes against several army members and accusations against the TSK for alleged involvement in the coup plot, said he did not feel tired.

“I still feel like a young lieutenant because being one means being on the attack,” he said Friday.

I hope that justice will be done. I curse those who are behind that unhealthy conspiracy.

Yours faithfully,

Cem

PS. In this short post in Turkish that dates back to last July I introduced a declaration of Mr Ilker Başbuğ (who besides has never been used to being in front of the cameras). To put it in a nutshell, he said:

The military ought to not interfere in politics.

The military cares about the interests of the whole society.

PPS. Well the next two pictures – taken more than one year ago – aimed at conveying the message that there was no problem between former Chief of General Staff Ilker Başbuğ and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and that the Turkish state is and will be united against terrorism and other foreign threats:

PPPS. I quote myself:

“We all know that the Turkish military protects the republic, but some people within it are traitors. They think that they have some power and that they are able to make the best decisions for the republic, but they are dangerous.

I do not believe that the Turkish military planned to bomb a mosque or hit one of its jets. But I believe that some people within it planned it. But these people don’t represent the Turkish army, they are traitors against the country and Atatürk.

But the Turkish army can’t control everybody.

Following the headlines of Taraf newspaper, the Chief of General Staff Ilker Başbuğ said something very important.

He said that the whole Turkish army can’t be accused.

He said “the whole” (“tümünü”) and immediately he made a break:

Siz bu orduyu tümünü nasıl böyle itham edersiniz?

He insisted on that word, which is very revealing. It summarizes the stance and the opinion of the Turkish army.”

PPPPS. I wrote more than one year ago:

 

 

“Ilker Başbuğ will be on retirement. He is the best Chief of General Staff I’ve ever known. And he succeeded in protecting the credibility of the Turkish army. By reason of the complexity of Turkey and of its sensitive geo-strategic position, is there any foreign Chief of General Staff whom we can compare with him? Ilker Başbuğ is a very intelligent man. I have listened to some of his speeches since 1996. I wish he had been the boss longer. Let’s hope that his successor will be as competent as him.”

 

 

PPPPPS. Eventually, this former short article should be read too:

The Turkish army saved Turkey’s future

Guest post by Fitch F. RICH, Croatian Blogger- Blog: Croatia Calling

After parliamentary elections which haven’t really changed anything despite the defeat of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the time has come for us to decide whether we would like to be a part of (Dis)United Europe. The breaking news is that the referendum on our joining the EU won’t be postponed as previously told! Although there were some announcements from Croatia’s future Minister of Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusi?, President of the State confirmed earlier today that there won’t be any delays. The referendum will be held on 22 January 2012. Oh happy day…

So, here we are, 33 days before that historical decision-making day and still without any real political debate on this matter. It’s funny how this proud nation, after all it’s been through, puts up with being treated like a flock of sheep. What’s even more funny or tragic, depending on how you look at it, is that even those 33 days can’t be used properly for a debate or a fair campaign because of the Christmas holidays and New Year’s Eve that follows.

It’s obvious that there won’t be almost any debate and the campaign will be reduced to political leaders’ messages for their voters to vote not by their conscience but by political establishment’s suggestion. Pro and contra arguments won’t even be presented to the public, even though Croatian citizens know so little about the Union that it seems to be so distant and unreal as if it’s some sort of Wonderland and our country is the poor little Alice.

The European Union has given our politicians a great pile of money to persuade Croatian citizens to vote ‘Yes’ on the referendum. Video spots that have been made for the official pro-EU campaign in Croatia clearly show what our political elite think of us. Those spots ‘professionally explain’ that we’ll still be Croats when we join the EU, we’ll continue to speak Croatian language and that no one is going to colonize our land.

Crucial info… for a medieval society without any national consciousness maybe. For a European nation in the 21st century that sort of information is hilarious. While being brainwashed with this bull, many still don’t have even the slightest clue what really awaits us if we join, so I expect the adaptation time will be pretty long and painful. If we add a neverending economic crisis to this charade, it’s obvious that some Chinese guy must have cursed us to live in such ‘interesting times’.

This lack of proper political debate in Croatia has made Nigel Farage a sort of Eurosceptics’ hero despite of our nation’s resistance to the British foreign policy for almost a century. Maybe his nationality really is an obstacle for his corageous messages (especially if we consider some sort of Balkan integrations to be an alternative to the EU accession), knowing that Balkan integrations have always been cooked in the British foreign policy kitchen.

For a Croat, everything is better than Balkan integrations, even the 9th circle of Dante’s Inferno is lesser evil. Hell, I’d rather find myself in the 10th circle that’s been opened especially for us than to be part of such project once again.

British policy on Balkans has always been integrative, putting Serbia in a privileged position over Croatia, so it’s not unusual that there are doubts in Nigel’s good intentions. Nevertheless, over the last few months he’s been telling things that just couldn’t be heard in our public, so one should really be thankful for his words.

Herman Van Rompuy spoke a few days ago of 2011 as “annus horribilis”, which perhaps one day could be seen as an “annus mirabilis”, year of wonders.

We’ve seen many horrors in 2011, like the Japan tsunami and the Norway mass killing. And a couple of wonders too: the end of the Berlusconi era, the indignados-Occupy Wall street movements, and the Arab spring. And the US left Iraq.
I’m not optimistic about the Arab spring and I’m not proud of how it’s been handled by European capitals. Sorry Mr. Van Rompuy, but I don’t think that we would change any time later our opinion about 2011. But in spite of the gloomy recession mood, I wish 2012 could be a better year.
Politically Europe needs change, as the current attempts to reform capitalism are unconvincing. The French Presidential elections provide a big opportunity; however, the Socialist candidate François Hollande has so far disclosed no real project. If he does, that would be a miracle. If he doesn’t, the surge of Marine Le Pen will be even more frightening.
A surge of democracy is looming in Russia on the occasion of the presidential elections. The EU is just an observer to the downslide of democracy in Russia, Turkey and many other places on earth. If the EU was more straightforward with its own problems, if it could stop for example the authoritarian tendencies in Hungary, it would be more credible in its external action.
It’s difficult to imagine a miracle happening in the Berlaymont these days. But I remember the Delors years, when the Berlaymont was a factory of ideas and big projects for Europe. And that was several EU treaties before. That’s why I say the EU institutions don’t need treaty change. They need political courage, or continue their decline into irrelevance. One can be indifferent about their fate, but our continent will be quite insignificant without the EU.

Sometimes stupid conflicts between people, families or countries persist over many years because of intransigence of the parties or lack of proper outside mediators. The conflict between Greece and Macedonia is one of these. It lasts ever since the breakup of Yugoslavia two decades ago and the independence of the Yugoslav republics , all of which aspire for EU membership.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 under the name of Republic of Macedonia, which no country objected to except Greece, the northern province of which also bears the name of the ancient empire of Alexander the Great.

Greece reproached the newly independent Republic with territorial aspirations, which had, indeed, existed during a short period in the aftermath of the second world war.

The Macedonian leaders were not helpful in calming Greek apprehensions. They chose the “Vergina Sun”, the historic symbol of Greek Macedonia, as their national flag and installed a huge monument of Alexander the Great in their capital.

Since 1995 Macedonia has changed its flag and also agreed to use the name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) in its international relations. In return, Greece promised not to block Macedonia’s applications to international organisations.

Thus Macedonia (FYROM) was admitted to the UN, the Council of Europe, WTO, CEFTA, EBRD, WHO, IMF etc. But for practical reasons more than 100 UN countries, including USA, Russia and UK refer to the country as “Republic of Macedonia”. Greece has essentially lost its battle on the name of its northern neighbour a long time ago.

In 2008 it has reopened the issue by blocking Macedonia`s NATO membership under the official designation of FYROM. NATO membership being Macedonia`s top foreign policy priority, the government took the matter to the ICJ in the Hague, which, in early December 2011, ruled 15 against 1 in favour of Macedonia. On the basis of this ruling NATO should resume Macedonia`s application, ignoring possible Greek objections.

In parallel, the EU should pursue Macedonia` membership bid, which is pending since 2005. The EP has invited the European Commission to open negotiations. There is no urgency for membership. Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are in the pipeline. But in 2014 negotiations should finally start in the hope that by that time the Greek political class will have realised that Macdonia`s EU membership, far from representing a menace, will be beneficial for Greece as one of Macedonia`s main economic partners.

In the course the next two years the EU should therefore discreetly remind the Greek political elite that it expects it to make the necessary gestures for normalising relations with all Balkan countries.