Where is Europe set to go after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves? Are the Western Balkans next to join? Can the other ex-Yugoslav republics be kept out once Croatia has become an EU member state? And most controversially: What future for Turkey and Europe?

Governance is about setting and implementing rules. It is based on reciprocal trust between governments and citizens. The more citizens share similar values and traditions the easier it is to govern. Big countries or those encompassing different cultures therefore resort to federal structures, which allow much of the rule setting to take place at regional level.

As the number of member states and subject matters covered by EU legislation increases EU governance is bound to become even more complex.

Recent rifts on macro-economic policies between North and South, UK resistance to perceived EU encroachments on national traditions, Polish hesitations about stricter EU climate policy standards or poor compliance of southern member states with EU directives illustrate the conundrum of EU governance.

Europe cannot suspend legislation until national mentalities may have converged towards a single European one. That process will take decades; even then will Europe remain a federation of nation states with strong national identities, which distinguishes it from “born federations” like USA, Canada or Switzerland where primary loyalty goes to the Federation.

There are at least six ways for the EU to mitigate its conundrum with policy making.

• Keep a brake on enlargement

  Candidate countries should undergo a much longer apprenticeship in European culture and governance. The bureaucratic transposition of EU law is insufficient proof of their preparedness to act like a full club member. Much longer and intensive training of political elites about the special ways of EU government must precede formal membership.

• Put a cap on the number of Commissioners

  Their number should not exceed 75 per cent of member states, as provided by the Lisbon Treaty. This would also curb the expansion of EU staff, who quite normally want to demonstrate their abilities by proposing new rules.

• Put more emphasis on compliance with EU legislation

  Part of the present difficulties in southern member countries is due to lax implementation of EU legislation. The EU Commission must become a much stricter guardian of EU law and devote more of its energy to this rather unpleasant mission.

• Impose more self-restraint before proposing new rules

  The tense relations between EU and citizens are largely due to the flood of new rules from Brussels, which citizens are less and less able to digest. The EU Commission should restrain its urge to propose new rules. Before any new proposal it should systematically ask if it is absolutely necessary in the interest of all It might more frequently limit itself to making recommendations and leave it up to member states to follow according to their interests, without burdening the legislative process.

• Resort more frequently to enhanced cooperation

  It will often suffice to set rules only for the most interested member countries, or to introduce them very progressively, as in the case of EMS. That minimises the risks of backlash.

• Encourage adoption of «private» standards

Private/public networks of regions and municipalities may often serve as a flexible substitute for legislation. The EU should encourage such cooperation wherever feasible.

Eberhard Rhein, Brussels

Written by Lana Tomic (member of IPWG) Due to bad experiences related to former enlargements, stricter criteria were set for Croatia. In the past, several candidate countries turned out to be unprepared at the moment of accession, which later caused serious problems not only for those countries, but to European Union as a whole. These [...]

By Graham Bishop, economic analyst and founder of www.grahambishop.com The authors of the HMG paper ‘Scotland analysis: Currency and monetary policy’ (23 April 2013) faced a fundamental difficulty from the outset: If they were wholly non-partisan, then any merits in the case for Scotland joining the euro could be turned round and applied correspondingly to the [...]

I am publishing without any interference the insightful interview my colleague Veselin Jelev took from Bulgaria’s Ambassador to the EU Dimitar Tzantchev I kept the original title chosen by dpa. Georgi

By Veselin Jelev, dpa, copyright dpa Insight EU. On photo: Dimitar Tzantchev, MFA

Why has Bulgaria joined Greece in opposing an immediate opening of accession negotiations between the EU and Macedonia?

Bulgaria was the first to recognize the FYROM’s (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s) independence under its constitutional name and to help this newly established state during the hard times of the embargo against the ex-Yugoslavia. We used our influence on the leaders of the Albanian ethnic minority in the FYROM to prevent its further destabilization when the country was on the verge of civil war in 2001. We know well our responsibilities for the stability of the region.

Bulgaria is a staunch supporter of the European integration of the Western Balkans as it is the only way to guarantee peace, democracy and prosperity for the entire region. Regretfully, the current political leadership of FYROM has pushed our bilateral relations back to the past. Anti-Bulgarian stereotypes throughout the media, cinema, literature, history and geography textbooks in the official education system are widespread. Citizens of FYROM who openly declare their Bulgarian identity often face discrimination (dismissals from work, intimidation, police interrogations, institutional and media pressure). Provocative projects like “Skopje 2014″ clearly outline potential territorial and other claims against Bulgaria. FYROM has crossed certain limits, causing wide discontent in the Bulgarian public opinion. Skopje’s policies engender serious concerns already in two EU member states from the region and this should ring the alarm bell.

Should disputes about history stand in the way of EU integration in the 21st

century?

We have to face the reality. Macedonia is a geographical area that nowadays lies within the boundaries of at least three states (Greece, Bulgaria, FYROM). For this reason, the use of the geographical term Macedonia as an official name for the newly established state is burdened with political sensitivity in neighbouring countries where the term ‘Macedonian’ is used to indicate the link to the geographical area, but not to a national identity.

All historical facts show that by the time one part of this geographical area was included in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the WW I, the overwhelming majority of its Slavic population were identifying themselves as Bulgarians. The failure to eradicate the Bulgarian identity between the two World Wars by imposing a South Serbian identity, prompted Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito to launch in 1944 a policy aimed at forging a new Macedonian national identity in the then Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The communist leadership of former Yugoslavia would claim that every Slav inhabitant of the entire geographical area is Macedonian, belonging to the Macedonian nation. This policy included also the decreeing of the local Bulgarian dialect as a Macedonian language, as well as fabrication of historical background for the new Macedonian identity at the expense of neighboring countries’ history. Any attempt of the local people to manifest its Bulgarian identity was suppressed through Stalinist methods including imprisonment and arbitrary executions in 1944-1946 of the local political and the intellectual elite who selfidentified as being Bulgarian.

But even this couldn’t delete the collective memory of the people in our two countries. We share the same history, the same linguistic and cultural tradition. Therefore, we don’t see any reason why our common history should divide and not unite us. The fact that so many monuments of Bulgarian historical figures have been recently erected in Skopje, no matter how they are labeled now, only confirms that we have been one ethnical entity in the past.

Can’t your differences be tackled in the process of EU accession negotiations rather than before them?

The new EU members should be committed to the European values and respect their EU neighbors. Radical nationalist ideologies belong to the past. There will be long-term repercussions and risks to regional stability if the current policies of Skopje vis à vis neighboring countries continue. That is why such issues should be solved before, and not after the start of the accession negotiations. FYROM has a much bigger interest in starting accession negotiations than to continue its intransigent claims for non-existent minorities and stealing neighboring countries’ history.

The people of FYROM should look to the future and not to the past. We in the EU should help them do that. Because if they continue to look to the past, the only true fact of history they will find is the Bulgarian identity of the Slavic population in the geographical region of Macedonia. They will also face the undisputable fact that the Slavic population has arrived in that region many centuries after Alexander the Great. These are the facts of history and they cannot be changed. As the great Danish thinker Soren Kierkegaard observed: Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.

Bulgaria insists on concluding a treaty on good-neighborly relations with Macedonia. Macedonian foreign minister Nikola Poposki has recently said he saw no need for such a treaty. At the same time four rounds of talks on it have already taken place. What should we expect?

Indeed, Minister Poposki openly questioned the need for a Treaty the same day (April 16, 2013) the Commission’s progress report on FYROM was released. We don’t understand Skopje’s reluctance to commit itself to a legally binding document that would ensure it will not use its Constitution to interfere in Bulgaria’s affairs for the purpose of defending the status and the rights of persons who are not and who have never been FYROM’s citizens, but whom Skopje sees as belonging to the Macedonian people. FYROM has already undertaken such a commitment in the 1999 Joint Declaration with Bulgaria, as well as in its 1995 Interim Accord with Greece. It is only the Constitution of FYROM that contains such a claim and this engenders concerns in neighboring states.

We must say it very clearly: no matter what the result of the efforts to build a Macedonian nation is, it cannot be used as an argument for Skopje‘s minority claims vis à vis Bulgaria. No citizens of Bulgaria have taken part in such a nation-building process as it was started in 1944 and has been confined only to the territory of the then Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and after 1991, in FYROM. Therefore, any claims by Skopje for Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria are completely baseless and unacceptable.

Serbia and Kosovo have struck an agreement to normalize their relations. The Commission has consequently recommended opening accession talks with Serbia and association agreement talks with Kosovo. It has also issued a progress report on FYROM. The Member States are expected to decide in June whether to start membership negotiations with Serbia and FYROM. What are your expectations?

The agreement reached between Serbia and Kosovo is an impressive example that if there is a political will and commitment, there are no unsolvable problems, no matter how difficult they seem to be. The compromise that FYROM has to make is much smaller: to agree with a Treaty on good-neighborly relations based on a political declaration Skopje has already signed in 1999. We are, of course, aware that FYROM faces serious challenges also in other important areas – inter-ethnic relations, economic and financial stability. Recent months have marked a setback in the functioning of the democratic institutions and the freedom of expression.

Aren’t you concerned that FYROM may be destabilized if it loses its immediate EU-integration prospects?

Let me reply with a question: If a candidate state would be destabilized by the simple fact that it does not get immediately what it thinks it deserves, then what is the real level of stability and political maturity of that country? In such a case, there should be other factors challenging its stability. And it might be worth taking a closer look at the situation on the ground.

Copyright: dpa insight

Most of the Europeans would be surprised to know that more than one year before the European Parliament (EP) elections in spring 2014, there has been an effective voting for electing MEPs.

Yes, it did happen, and the reason is simple: with the accession of Croatia as a Member State the 1st of July of 2013, the election of 12 ew MEP was needed, in order to represent the country in the EU democratic institution. So far Croatia was only present in the EP as non-voting observers. For the first time in history, Croatians have been called to cast their vote and elect their representatives to the EU. However, the poor score of the elections in terms of participation (20.74% of voters, almost breaching the former 19.63% record of Slovakia in 2009) brings again to the scenario the worrying trend that the EP elections are following from the celebration of the first of them in 1979: a progressive loose of the percentage of people voting, which reached the bottom with only 43.24% of all voters practicing their right in 2009.

The consideration of the EP elections as “second order” elections is not new; it is highly noticeable that the national and regional elections normally have a bigger turnout than European ones. In this case there is another factor that adds to this consideration: the candidates now elected will stay in their seats for less than one year, until the 2014 EP elections. The problems in Slovenia, and specially the perception that belonging to EU has not kept their neighbors free of the financial crisis, can also be behind the poor percentage.

The low participation is worrying in terms of the lack of involvement and interest of the EU citizens on the European issues. In spite of the communication efforts of the European Union, that in 2009 launched the biggest campaign ever seen for EP elections, the results were lower than ever. There is also the question of to what extent the members elected are legitimated to represent their country since, in the case of Croatia, only one out of each five electors have voted.

In AEGEE we are aware of this situation, and take what happened now in the newest EU member as a potential anticipation of what may happen in one year from now. The institutions at every level should also take note and put the appropriate efforts to revert the trend. We in AEGEE have done our homework and, through the recently approved project Y Vote 2014, we will foster participation of young voters through different activities, remarking the importance of voting in the elections not only as a duty but as a right. Our intention is to make voting in EP elections the first step what will give the society a bigger involvement in the decision making process.

The case of this elections in Croatia can be an isolated one, or on the contrary it can be the pattern that will define the results on the coming elections. Taking the motto of our project, It is up to You(th) to have a more active participation that will contribute to change this trend.

Written by Javier Mendoza Jiménez ( AEGEE-Tenerife and Yvote 2014)

By Kader Sevinc Aylin Nazlıaka, a deputy from the main opposition party (CHP), referring to this prevailing attitude, stated in her parliamentary speech that: “the Prime Minister should stop standing guard over women’s vaginas”. Her statement is very familiar to those who are accustomed to the activist genre of feminism in Turkey and elsewhere. She was calling upon the Prime Minister to show respect and sensitivity when it comes to issues involving women’s privacy and sexuality.

Süleyman Çelebi, CHP İstanbul deputy, Member of Health, Family and Social Affairs Commission I would like to provide you with a summary of CHP’s appeal to Constitutional Court for cancellation and stay of execution of the relevant articles and provisions of the Law on Trade Unions and Collective Agreements (Law 6356). Süleyman Çelebi CHP Deputy [...]

And why Britain and Turkey may end up in much the same place

A longer version of this article may be found on LSE EUROPP at http://bit.ly/Zpjs75

The Great Recession pitches the European Union full tilt into a period of great change. In all probability, a Convention will be called in spring 2015 to install a federal economic government for a fiscal union. The chance will also be taken to rectify some of the mistakes made in the Lisbon treaty. A large majority of EU member states, the European Commission and the European Parliament already support that general approach. Angela Merkel may prefer only to make more surgical strikes at the treaties rather than a full-scale revision, but she must know that that option is rapidly disappearing.

After her recent visit to Turkey, the Chancellor will be confirmed in her view that, with the exception of Iceland, the prospect of early enlargement of the Union is remote. Turkey in any case appears to have changed its mind about accession, not least because the problem of Cyprus remains intractable, but also because the ruling party is more overtly Islamic in its orientation. And although they keep the aspiration to join the Union, no country in the Western Balkans is ready to assume the responsibilities of EU membership soon.

As the federal process quickens within the Union, the threshold of membership is raised. For candidate states, the Treaty of Lisbon is no longer the benchmark.

At the same time, the United Kingdom has called for a renegotiation of its own terms of membership in the hope of loosening the ties that bind. The UK, which will have to approve any revised treaty in a referendum, has the legal right to veto deeper integration for everyone else. Even if the Conservatives do not form the next government in 2015, there are few in Britain ready and willing to campaign for UK membership of the federal union which involves, above all and in the first instance, sterling joining the single currency.

Multi-Tier Governance

Despite these strong centrifugal forces, it is in everyone’s interests that the EU which emerges from its present troubles is capable of providing a pole of stability, liberty and prosperity on a continental scale. This matters for Britain just as much as for Eastern Europe. There is a similar perception of the need for a strong Europe in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

In the past, it has been assumed that all current and future states of the Union can proceed along the same chosen path, albeit at different speeds. Palpably, this is no longer the case. Lisbon itself bastardised by the failure of the earlier constitutional treaty may prove to have been the last treaty to corral all member states.

It is therefore time to use this critical situation to introduce the EU to more sophisticated multi-tier arrangements. Although some elements of more differentiated integration can be rendered by using the enhanced cooperation provisions of Lisbon, a more radical change is needed if Europe’s variable geometry is to acquire solid constitutional legitimacy.

The Brits, the Turks and the Rest

Over the years, the UK has won a large number of opt-outs and derogations from the core of the acquis communautaire. It declines to join the euro or Schengen. It now wants even less Europe. Mr Cameron wants to repatriate powers and competences from Brussels to London. His demands, which are to be spelled out by the end of 2014, are sure to jeopardise the cohesion of the single market and the integrity of EU law.

This UK government is prepared, as no predecessor has been, to absent itself from the Council when matters of fiscal union are being negotiated. It has declined to participate in the single supervisory mechanism of the banking union. The Conservative Party wants fewer rights from the Union in exchange for fewer duties. At the same time, its leaders preach about ‘the remorseless logic of fiscal union’, and encourage other EU countries to go forward to deeper integration without the UK. Missing the point, the Labour leadership accuses the Tories of sleep-walking towards the exit. In fact, the Tories are wide awake and have found the emergency stairway.

At the other end of Europe, the Turks look for a new relationship with the EU. The nostrum of a ‘privileged partnership’ outside the Union is unacceptable to Ankara, not least because it is difficult to find privilege in such an ambiguous concept. AKP ministers make it clear that Turkey is not prepared to pool national sovereignty in a federal EU. Like the British, the Turks want to opt out of the euro, and want of Europe a common market and a security relationship. Neither the Turks nor the Brits seem to like European fundamental rights. It does not go unnoticed that the UK is the strongest advocate of Turkey’s membership of the EU, but the suspicion is rife that the British Tories want further enlargement mainly in order to dilute further integration.

There is a third category of European state for which associate membership might prove to be amenable. In the European Economic Area, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein are virtual member states of the Union without any of the political or institutional trappings of full membership. Because this situation is unsatisfactory, Iceland is negotiating full accession and Norway is seeking to upgrade the terms and conditions of its EU partnership.

The Swiss, who declined even to accept EEA membership, are tied by a number of untidy bilateral deals to the EU’s internal market. The EU is right to insist that if Switzerland wishes to benefit from the fruits of European integration, it must at least recognise the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over that which is jointly agreed.

How To Do It

At the next revision of the treaties in 2015, a new clause should be added to establish the formal category of an associate state of the Union. Associate membership would require fidelity to the values and principles of the Union. However, it would not require adherence to all the political objectives of the Union, which include joining the euro. Nor would associate membership confer the duty to engage in all the activities of the EU.

For some, associate membership would be a spring board for full accession; for others, a long stay parking place; and for yet others a decent alternative to leaving the Union altogether. Associate membership would need to be negotiated on a case by case basis, and would be determined by the dynamics, as it were, of whether a state was coming or going. Participation by the associate state in the EU institutions would necessarily be limited, and would vary relative to the degree of EU regulation agreed. Each associate state would have to specify the policies and functions of the EU in which it intended to participate, and to accept terms and conditions, financial and institutional, on its participation.

Participation by an associate state in the internal market should not risk the operation of the market. Nor should its participation in the external action of the Union or in an international agreement of the Union prejudice the cohesion or limit the scope of the Union’s position. Associate states will agree contracts with the Commission and EU agencies for the delivery of policy in certain specified fields. These arrangements will contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly.

As far as institutional arrangements are concerned, there could be an annual summit meeting, and associate state governments would have observer status in relevant Council meetings. Associate states would take part in appropriate consultations of the Commission and in working groups of the Council. They should participate as observers in comitology. National MPs of associate states should be observers at the European Parliament. Associate states would acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, and could intervene in cases before the Court. They should nominate judges to the General Court.

The Alternative

There will be many who resist the notion of associate membership. Yet nobody should underestimate the risk, in that case, that one or other existing member state will block the revised treaty either at its negotiation or during its ratification. Endless concessions by those who need more Europe towards those who want less Europe in an attempt to buy off hostility to the federal package are also unlikely to achieve optimum results.

Moreover, to condemn candidate countries to ever more complex, long-winded and challenging accession negotiations will not be edifying. Neither is the EEA option attractive. EEA members cannot shape EU policy in any way whatsoever. And EEA membership means being a net contributor to the EU budget while receiving no benefit from the CAP or structural funds.

So the Convention in 2015 needs to craft something other than privileged partnership outside the Union, something more than the EEA, yet something less than full membership. The European Union has proved itself over the years capable of great constitutional ingenuity, and it is reasonable to assume that, given the political will to work together for the good of all Europe, it can continue to do so.

_______________

A longer version of this article appears on the LSE EUROPP blog at http://bit.ly/Zpjs75

Andrew Duff MEP is President of the Union of European Federalists and co-chair of the Spinelli Group of MEPs. He is the rapporteur of a new Fundamental Law of the EU which will be published shortly.

Download PDF here:
blogs.lse.ac.uk-The_case_for_an_Associate_Membership_of_the_European_Union

However, Denmark joined the Community not for ideological reasons but to a large extent only because Britain, a close ally and one of Denmark’s biggest exports markets and trade partners, was joining.

The Danes simply thought that it would be more difficult to sell bacon to the Brits if Denmark didn’t have access to the new trade market in Europe. So, no ideology, no willingness to create a better (more peaceful) world behind the Danes’ decision to join. But to be fair, I don’t think that any country since has joined the EEC or the EU because of more ideological reasons than economic.

Denmark held a referendum on the 2^nd of October 1972, where more than 60% backed an EEC membership. I came across this classic (not classy) poster from the “Yes” side; it was made by the “Committee for accession to the European Economic Community”. The Committee obviously knew exactly what would appeal to the promiscuous, hippie Danes.

I have tried to come up with ideas for the symbolic message(s) of the poster:

• “If Denmark joins the Community, there will be more naked women on bikes (for whatever reason)”.
• “You don’t have to worry. Nothing will change if we join the Community. There will STILL be naked women on bikes in Denmark afterwards”.
• “The Community will make us poorer. We will be stripped. Let’s join now”.
• “If we join the Community, we, the Committee, PROMISE you naked women on bikes will celebrate the membership”.

On December 17th 2012 the Council of the European Union, represented by the Cypriot Foreign Minister Ms. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis and the EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ms. Cecilia Malmström, signed the Visa Facilitation Agreement with the Republic of Armenia, represented by the Armenian Foreign Minister Mr. Edward Nalbandian.

Photo: The Council of the European Union

According to the provisions of the agreement, significant changes are coming to regulate bilateral visa matters between the agreeing parties. Particularly, starting from 2013 all the EU citizens will not have to pay for achievement of the Armenian entrance visa. For the Armenian citizens it will be easier and cheaper (30 EUR instead of 60 EUR) to achieve short-stay visas (period is exceeded up to 180 days). Additionally, according to the distributed official press release, visas will be free of charge for certain categories of applicants, including members of official delegations, children below the age of 12, pensioners, researchers and students. Holders of diplomatic passports are exempt from the visa obligation. The signed agreement will get in force right after the entry into the force of the EU-Armenia readmission agreement which will also be signed in the nearest future.

Taking the possibility, AEGEE-Europe would like officially welcome this important step in the development of the EU-Armenia bilateral relationship. We highly appreciate the special focus of the agreement on students and youth activists’ category and consider it fundamental ground for development of students’ mobility across Europe. We would like to state that this might become one of the most visible and the biggest benefits of the close cooperation, which has been developed between the EU and Armenia during the recent years within the frames of the EU Eastern Partnership Program.

AEGEE-Europe is also pleased with the strong commitment of the European Union and Armenian authorities to strengthen the existing relationship. The signed agreement and the recent political developments between the sides and bilateral visits of the high ranked politicians to Brussels and to Yerevan, and particularly the participation of the EU officials to the meetings with the representatives of the Armenian Civil Society, once again reaffirm strong belief on the European integration of Armenia, and the commitment of Armenian authorities to promote the shared European values in the South Caucasus.

AEGEE-Europe will also like to join to the official press points of the EU Commissioner Štefan Füle and call up the Armenian Government to continue the policy of internal reforms and strengthening the promotion of the common values in Armenia on which are based the bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, and to enhance the involvement of the youth in the civil activism.

Submitted by Armenak Minasyants, Policy Officer on EU Integration of AEGEE-Europe

Brussels, Belgium

 

 

The Lisbon Treaty contains an important provision for a leaner Executive. According to Article 17 the number of Commissioners will be reduced to two thirds of the number of Member States, as of 1^st November 2014, i.e. to 18 instead of 28, unless the European Council unanimously decides otherwise.

That is what the European Council has done, even before the entry into force of the Treaty, in December 2008, in order to placate the Irish prime minister’s concern to lose the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

At its meeting of 11. and 12.December 2008 the European Council has, indeed, agreed that “a Decision will be taken, in accord with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member State.”

On 2 October 2012, the European Council has formalised its 2008 agreement. In a hardly noticed Decision, it has ruled that the number of Commission members will be reduced at the earliest in November 2019 or when EU membership will have reached 30 countries.

The European Council will review the functioning of a Commission with 28 Members, sufficiently ahead of the 2019-24 Commission.

If it had wanted, it would have had plenty of time since 2009 to review the effectiveness of the functioning of a 27 member Commission, and most probably have concluded that, despite its size, it has functioned fairly effectively, ignoring higher administrative costs, caused by more fragmentation, internal coordination, staff and newly created functions.

Member States, whether big or small, simply do not like the idea of a Commission, in which they will no longer be “represented”even if only temporarily. The Irish referendum therefore served as a welcome pretext for not implementing Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union.

The situation will be no different in 2019. On the contrary, with a more “powerful” Commission all Member States will continue to insist on having a Commissioner of their nationality.Realistically, we should therefore not expect Member States to ever renounce having one of their nationals as a Member of the European Commission, which might allow them to influence “undesirable” Commission initiatives before they see the light of the day.

European citizens will therefore most likely have to put up with a Commission of some 35 members by 2030 when the enlargement process may finally be completed.

This will not be the end of the world, as long as the European Parliament and the Council work effectively and democratically. After all, the Commission does no more than proposing legislation and seeing to its implementation. That is why European citizens need not be shocked by its size and bias in favour of small Member States “represented” by 30 of the 35 Commissioners, provided the higher staff echelons fully reflect the demographic balance of the Union.

Eberhard Rhein, Brussels.

The discussion over the future of Turkey inside the EU has been stalled for years. Any development has been scheduled for the years to come, but with no specific plan nor prediction for the membership bid. Finally, should Turkey be member-state of the EU or not?

Since 2004 and the lauching of the negotiation talks, lot of water has been streamed into the channel of membership. Turkey could not at the time comply with some of the major chapters of the negotiation process, mainly dealing with human rights and the bilateral revendications against Greece in the Aegean, and therefore the discussions have stopped or put in future time. Meanwhile, the stong anti-Turkish standpoint of France’s President Sarkozy and the floating rhetoric of Germany also contributed to this deadlock.

In the years that followed, Turkey achieved to solidify its pivotal role in the region by exerting  robust politics when dealing with balances in the Middle East and the Central Asia states. The Davutoglu doctrine planned to open a wide sphere of concern in international politics for Turkey while the shift of Ankara towards more activeness in its backyard changed the landscape and, thus, the balances between EU and Turkey regarding the potential negotiations, the role and power of Turkey and the mismatch created after the triggering of the economic crisis and the softening of the international role EU used to play before 2008.

There is much discussion about the future of bilateral relations between EU and Turkey, and this is fundamentally linked with enlargement policy. The EU has freezed any prospect of enlargement for the moment as convergence -i.e. on the grounds of which enlargement policy was established- is impeded by the debt crisis inside Eurozone as well as by the poor performance of a growing number of candidate member-states, especially in the Balkan region. Nonetheless, Turkey is a case by itself and I strongly believe that a new project of enlargement policy should first start from Turkey.

The crisis in Europe has weakened its global role as well as the synergies that such a political establishment should develop and nourish. Turkey is a vital player in the Middle East area and a country with sustainable influence and growth, despite any deficiencies observed and occured, and the EU should consequently take them into consideration for its future evolution.

Here comes the long-lasting and non-answered question of whether or not Turkey is part of Europe. To my point of view, Turkey is by its 1/8 part of Europe geographically, but 10/10 part of the European Union politically and economically. No matter what the problems of the Turkish political system might be, since the rise of Erdogan in power, the country has achieved to prevent military coups and instability of the past, which I personally consider a great accomplishment.

With emphasis to current conditions, Turkey is faced with a considerable insurgence in its backyard, with Syria and the Kurdish question to be on the frontline. No matter what the future state of Syria will be, Turkey runs the danger of receiving an escalation backlash from a possible outburst of a conflict in Middle East; a conflict that could entangle Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and possibly, Israel. This scenario, even if it has been longly impeded and prevented by the United States and Russia, turns to take more solid dimensions. In case a wider escalation occurs in Middle East, it would certainly affect Turkey as well. How? By downgrading political stability and bringing into surface paramilitary groups that could put the country into an endless internal clash and devastate all economic and political achievements done since 2002. In this framework, EU could function as a protective shield for Turkey and solidify its external support.

The future of Turkey is found inside the European Union and the future of the European Union has to be linked with Turkey in order to secure peace in the homeland and the wider region while endeavoring to re-catch the lost ground of international influence in the framework of a wider synergy that would entail both EU and Turkey. It is a win-win game and both Ankara and the European Commission should start thinking on that basis.

Closer to the end of this week Ukraine was enjoying a couple of main political events. First of all, the new Parliament started its work on 12^th of December from scandals, fights and blocking of tribune. The opposition lost a couple of deputies which join the coalition of Ruling Party of Regions and the Communist. It is become obvious that no promises and agreements can save deputies from running from one party fraction in Parliament to another (these deputies in Ukraine are called “tushka” – that means a “body”). The only one who can stop such process is the special law. So the necessity of such law is incredibly high.

The other thing – Ukrainian MPs are changing very slowly. In spite of accepting new regulations of deputy’s work that prohibit voting with the cards of other MPs, newly elected People’s representatives widely practice old rules of voting for their colleagues. For that feature they are called the “pianists” because their voting procedure looks like playing piano.

As we discussed last time the Party of Regions did not manage to form the coalition by itself and had to address to the Communist party. The first price for that was appointing one of the Communist party members for the post of Parliament’s first vice-speaker. The next step will be some posts in the new government, probably connected to the social sphere. The coalition of ruling Party of Regions with Communists means that this union will be rather stable. Most of president’s and government’s initiatives will passed through parliament except those (constitutional and international issues) that need 2/3 of deputies voices. Rather predictable was the supportive voting for the Party of Region’s candidate (V.Rybak) on the post of the Parliament’s head. The same story appeared with voting for M.Azarov as the new premier-minister (he was the old one, too). No doubt president will support it.

The most interesting phrase of the last days was the remark from Ukrainian President V.Yanukovych. After the strong resolution of European Parliament on Ukraine with direct address to Ukrainian authorities to stop selective justice and violating of democratic practices President Yanukovych announced in his speech to the Parliament about the “ intentions to slowly join the rules of Customs Union”. The key motive – is the need of harmonization with countries that are the biggest markets for Ukrainian products. For the internal policy the President is stressing upon the social justice. So again Ukraine has a strong desire to sit at one time on two chairs. If it will be possible – it can be a new European knowhow.

Keep informing you about Ukraine’s political life.

Take care!

 

Hello, dear readers!

In my blog I will inform you about the main political and other events, trends, situations in Ukraine. I will also give some information about our friendly neighbors, especially, Russian Federation. We will also analyze all the other topics related to geopolitics, foreign policy of EU, Ukraine and other countries, economic, social, technological and security trends. I am open for the dialogue and hope to hear your requests and criticism about the information you would like to know on Ukraine and the Eastern European region. Let’s call it interactive analytics and communication.

So what do we have this week? Our government has resigned after the scandal Parliamentary elections because part of the ministers is going to return back to new Parliament. President as promised named the new candidate for the post of prime-minister….and it appeared to be again Mykola Azarov. So central authorities does not seriously want to change the rules of political game in Ukraine. By the end of this week we will probably see the new government. I bet that most of ministers will be the same. Interesting moment – whether the Communist Party will receive any posts in the government or on the high level of state service (for example, the place of Head of State Customs Service of Ukraine – good financial possibilities). If “yes” – then they form stable coalition with Party of Regions. If “no” – they will not be in coalition and each voting in the Parliament will be a separate performance with unknown end.

Other sensitive moment of last week – is a whole set of announcements from Ukrainian top politicians and state-servicemen about the growing possibility of integration to Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Interesting thing – all of them appeared just after the information about the real possibility of signing the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine in 2013. So it is not hard to guess who is staying behind the entire information wave about Customs Union. According to Russian forecasts Ukraine will finally join Customs Union in 2015.

Behind the curtain of geopolitical games Ukraine is turning to police state – as opposition claims. At the same moment the voted law project of state budget of Ukraine for 2013 (supported by the old Parliament – the new one will start it work on the 12^th of December) is transferred to the President for the signature. It should be noted that the level of budget deficit for 2013 is about 50,4 billions of hryvnas (about 6,15 billions of USD). So most people in the country are quite worried about the financial perspective of Ukraine and their households for the next year. Too bad the Christmas is near and the gift from Santa can be not very optimistic.

Anyhow I will keep informing you about all the key events in Ukraine.

Take care!

 

Mr. George Ayfantis is a Greek Ambassador and Diplomatic Advisor to SYRIZA-USF. He is amongst the most reformative voices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being realist and rational, while keeping his profile outside media. 1. In the midst of a devastating financial meltdown, what do you personally believe the answer of the European Union should be? The purpose of the EU as it was perceived by the European peoples has been the common prosperity that was the ideal which brought all these peoples together. Now this ideal has collapsed because for the citizens of  the European South, it is obvious that the Eurozone is all about austerity and restraining deficits, while people in the European North are having surpluses profiting all the advantages of the situation. Therefore, we find ourselves in a position where the Union has to address the way Europe deals with such fundamental issues, in order to put the entire establishment back to its initial track, that of common prosperity.   2. The European Union seems to have completely forgotten the founding cause of its establishment, which is literally the creation of a Union of states with more development, more solidarity, and less divergence. Is this decline an institutional or ideological one? As a matter of fact, it is both a practical and institutional problem. Institutionally it can be addressed by aligning the European Parliament in decision-making in order to have a saying in the financial policies implemented by the Union. The Parliament should be the authority that supervises national budgets, simply because it is an elected body. From a practical point of view, the common currency has to be examined in the long-run. It has so fourth brought supported development, it has been a tremendous advantage for Germany’s economy, its exports have flourished, but at the same time the markets and the production in the South have collapsed. Thus, EU has to restore the balances since the market and the banks cannot guarantee a regulating role. People have to rise up and take initiatives at their own hands.   3. Do you believe that austerity politics could increase separatism in Europe, as for instance in Spain (i.e. Basque Country; Catalunia), and further lead to a widespread ignition of regionalism and localism that could directly put into question the federal establishment of the EU? Of course, this is the main consequence of the economic crisis. People believe that by themselves they can do better, and sometimes this perception falls outside the national framework. This is wrong, as people act many times on the basis of instict. Independent Catalunia, or a more autonomous status of this region, can hardly be the answer. The culprit and cause of meltdown is not the state itself, but the European banks and their policy tools which are linked with the common currency.   4. Greece seems to have lost its geopolitical leverage in its neighbourhood (i.e. Balkans, Middle East). According to your opinion, what is the foreign policy doctrine that Greece should implement in order to shape a certain geostrategic role? Greece is an embattled nation having a huge internal, and therefore social, problem which is getting even harsher when dealing with the economic crisis. Developing policies is not a matter of ideological preferences of fixed ideas about regional conflict, but mainly a matter of how foreign policy will assist towards economic resurrection. Within this spectrum, we should see how Greece will develop relations with its neighbourhood. Greece is the Southest part of Europe, the link and corridor to the Middle East, and therefore it is of paramount importance for Europe as well. The Greek territory is vital to communications and to lines of supply from Middle East to Europe. In this respect, we need a pragmatic approach with no theoretical projections. The systemic approach is more a model for people to understand what is going on around; it is needless to literally focus on the model irregardless of what is really happening on the ground. For example, for us discussing about Middle East is not to substitute the people of the region, not to become more Palestinians than the Palestinians themselves,  not to be against or pro-Israel. Our purpose is to focus in how to better shape and serve our national interest following the circumstances.   5. In respect with the delimitation/demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), do you believe that Greece and Turkey will finally reach a mutual understanding? The pragmatic approach I discussed about in the previous question fits also with Turkey. The only hope for Greece to restore its economy are the natural resources, most of them found in the EEZ. If we were to ignore that, we would rely on tourism or on green energy, a sort of Mediterranean-Carribean state, which is not an example of welfare and prosperity. In this respect, exploiting natural resources is the only chance to inject development, and towards this direction we do possess both diplomatic and military capacity. Despite the fact that Turkey has no right in the Greek EEZ, it continues  projecting its military power regularly within our teritorial waters. In this context, it has to be addressed in a very decisive way that Turkey is not a regional superpower, but instead a fragile country engaged deeply in Syria, while facing an open rebellion in its Southeastern borders. I am saying all these not to underestimate the capabilities of the Turkish military, but to stress out that these capabilities should not be enough to deter Greece from exerting its legitimate rights. If we are going to drill 20 miles south of Crete we are going to do so, and if  Turkey decides to confront us militarily it has to acknowledge that it is on a losing position. In addition to that, I personally doubt for Turkey’s intention to engage militarily, but I have to point out that all those years of threatening and flexing its muscles has been a painful method. Ankara needs to change its mindset and mentality and we are here to help them by being calm, decisive and cooperative, but not in the discount of our national interests.   6. A possible Turkey’s EU membership could be positive or negative for the EU and in what terms? In this framework, the accession of Turkey cannot be a case for Greece more than it is for Turkey itself. If Ankara is not to accept what is perceived as “acquis européen”, well, there are rules of either withdrawing membership application or pressing towards adjusting and abiding by these rules. So far, Turkey is dealing with the EU as if it were the Ottoman Empire of the 16th century. Needless to say that it is not the case; Turkey is an ordinary state and, beyond its capabilities, it has no more rights than any other member-state. All things considered, my conclusion is that we cannot be more positive towards EU membership than the Turks themselves. Greece’s consent is not given irrespective of  what Turkey says and does.